Sorry, my religion and my bible (the Tanakh)
clearly teaches that B’Nai Noach (any
child of Noah who follows the 7 Noahide
laws) and is a non-Jew is a righteous
Gentile and gets to go to Heaven. So by
you saying, “read your bible”, I find it
insulting because I study my religion
every day! I do Daf Yomi (read a piece
of the Talmud daily). Today I read Bava Kama 82. I get this sent to me by e-mail daily.
For those with an interest,I will post the A and B side of this:
12A (comments on the Hebrew):
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[line 2] ISHTAMTIN ULA - Ula is avoiding me, lest I refute him
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[line 3] NEHARDE’AH - a town in Babylon, seat of the Yeshiva founded by Shmuel
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[line 3] AGVU DAYANEI D’NEHARDA’AH - the court judges in Neharde’ah collected Avadim from orphans
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[line 4] PUMBEDISA - the location of a great Yeshiva in Bavel (lit. Mouth of Bedisa, a canal of the Euphrates)
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[line 6] MAGVINAN LECHU L’APADNAICHU - or I will confiscate your (a) mansion; or (b) courtyard (both sources ARUCH) from you
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[line 10] PRUZBUL - (A document allowing the collections of loans after Shemitah)
(a) The Torah requires that all loans shall be canceled every seventh year, as it states in Devarim 15:2, “Shamot Kol Ba’al Masheh Yado” - “Every creditor who lends anything to his neighbor shall release it.” To demand payment of a loan after the Shemitah year is a violation of the prohibition of “Lo Yigos Es Re’ehu v’Es Achiv” - “he shall not exact it of his neighbor or of his brother” (ibid.) Most Rishonim rule that the Shemitah year cancels loans at the end of the year, on the last day of the month of Elul. (RAMBAM Hilchos Shemitah v’Yovel 9:1-4).
(b) Hashmatas Kesafim applies mid’Oraisa only when the Yovel year is in practice. Mid’Rabanan it applies today, whether inside or outside of Eretz Yisrael.
(c) Hillel the Elder saw that people stopped giving loans when the Shemitah year was approaching out of fear that that they would not get their money back because the debt would be annulled by the Shemitah year. By doing so, they were transgressing an express command of the Torah not to refuse to lend money prior to Shemitah (Devarim 15:9). Hillel therefore instituted the “Pruzbul” (from the Greek “Pruz” = benefit; “Buli” = [for] the rich), effectively creating a way to avoid having Shemitah annul one’s debts, as long as the borrower owns some land (Shevi’is 10:3,6).
(d) In a Pruzbul document, one files a contract with Beis Din, before the end of the Shemitah year, stating that he is placing all debts owed to him into the hands of the Beis Din to collect them for him (Shevi’is 10:4). By doing this, the creditor will not transgress the prohibition of “Lo Yigos” when he collects the loan after Shemitah, since he will not have to approach the borrower to collect the loan; Beis Din will take care of the collection and he will approach Beis Din. Beis Din, too, does not have to approach the borrower to collect the loan, since Beis Din can simply collect it themselves using their power of “Hefker Beis Din Hefker” (RASHI to Kesuvos 89a DH Pruzbul, to Gitin 32b DH Mosrani and to Bava Basra 27a DH Pruzbul). A Pruzbul only allows a person to collect the loan after Shemitah if the borrower has land. It is unusual for a person to lend money to a person without land, and the Rabanan did not institute the use of Pruzbul for unusual loans (RASHI to Gitin 37a DH Ela and to Bava Basra 27a DH Pruzbul). Alternatively, Pruzbul permits a person to collect a loan after Shemitah because the moment one allows Beis Din to collect his loans, it is as if they are already collected, and in his possession, immediately (since nothing can stop Beis Din from collecting the loan). This is also the reason the borrower must own land in order for Pruzbul to permit the collection of the loan. It is only if he has land that Beis Din can easily collect the loan. If the borrower only has movable possessions, it is possible for him to prevent Beis Din from collecting them by hiding them from Beis Din. Therefore they are not considered to have entered the creditor’s possession until they are actually collected as payment. (RASHI to Bava Kama 12a DH Chal)
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[line 11] METALTELIN NIKNIN IM HA’KARKA (KINYAN AGAV - the transfer of ownership by means of [the transfer of land])
(a) According to Torah law, certain modes of transferring ownership (Kinyanim) are effective only for land (Mekarka’in), while others are effective only for mobile objects in general (Metaltelin) or for specific mobile objects such as slaves (see next entry). Kinyan Agav is effective for the transfer of mobile objects in general.
(b) A Kinyan “Agav Karka” is a “package deal” wherein when land is transferred through one of the modes of transferring land one automatically transfers mobile objects as well. For example, if a person is interested in selling a parcel of land and also a cow, when the buyer pays for the land, thereby acquiring it through Kinyan Kesef, he immediately acquires the cow as well. This Kinyan is learned from the verse in Divrei ha’Yamim II 21:3 (Gemara below).
(c) The Gemara (Kidushin 26a) discusses whether the mobile object that one transfers with Kinyan Agav must be located in the parcel of land that is being transferred or not. This is known as “Tzevurin.” The Gemara (ibid. 27a) concludes that it is not necessary for the mobile objects to be Tzevurin.
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[line 13] HECHEZIK (KINYAN CHAZAKAH)
(a) When a person buys an object, he must make a Ma’aseh Kinyan, a formal Halachically-binding act denoting his acquisition of the object, in order for the sale to be irrevocably binding. Depending on what object one is acquiring, different Kinyanim are used, as follows.
(b) The forms of Kinyan that may be used for the acquisition of Metaltelin (mobile items) are:
- Hagbahah, i.e. lifting the item;
- Meshichah, i.e. pulling the item or causing it to move;
- Mesirah, i.e. handing over the reigns of an animal or the tie lines of a boat, or a bill of debt (Shtar Chov);
- Chatzer, i.e. bringing the item into one’s private domain;
- Chalipin (exchange or barter), i.e. taking another object to demonstrate one’s consent for the Kinyan (or for an agreement).
- Agav, i.e. acquiring the moveable object automatically upon the acquisition of land.
(c) The forms of Kinyan that may be used for the acquisition of land are:
- Kesef, i.e. paying at least a Perutah’s worth of money for the land;
- Shtar, i.e. receiving a legal document containing the details of the sale;
- Chazakah, i.e. performing an act that is normally performed only by an owner;
- Chalipin (as mentioned above, b:5)
(d) Examples of Chazakah for real estate are Na’al (locking), Gadar (fencing in) and Paratz (making a breach in a fence to create an entrance) or any act that is done to enhance the land, such as digging to improve a field and the like (MISHNAH Bava Basra 42a).
(e) A normal adult slave, although mobile, is compared to real estate with regard to the type of Kinyan that is required for his purchase (Kidushin 22b, based on Vayikra 25:46). As such, a slave may be purchased with Kesef (paying money), Shtar (handing over a contract) or Chazakah (having the slave perform an act for his intended master that demonstrates their impending relationship, with the intention of buying him).
(f) Examples of Chazakah for slaves are taking off his master’s shoes, following his master to the bathhouse carrying a change of clothing for him, undressing his master, washing him, etc. (Kidushin ibid.).
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[line 24] “[VA’YITEN LAHEM AVIHEM MATANOS RABOS L’CHESEF UL’ZAHAV UL’MIGDANOS IM] AREI METZUROS BIYEHUDAH…” - “And their father gave them many gifts of silver and gold and of precious things, with fortified cities in Yehudah…” (Divrei ha’Yamim II 21:3)
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[line 24] D’LO NAIDEI - that do not move
11a) [line 25] NECHASIM SHE’EIN LAHEM ACHRAYUS - mobile goods such as money
b) [line 26] NECHASIM SHE’YESH LAHEM ACHRAYUS - immobile goods such as land
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[line 25] NECHASIM SHE’EIN LAHEM ACHRAYUS NIKNIN IM NECHASIM SHE’YESH LAHEM ACHRAYUS B’CHESEF BI’SHTAR UV’CHAZAKAH
(a) When a person purchases Nechasim she’Yesh Lahem Achrayus (immobile goods such as land) along with Nechasim she’Ein Lahem Achrayus (mobile goods such as a flowerpot), as soon as he makes a Kinyan of Kesef (paying money), Shtar (handing over a contract) or Chazakah (enhancing the land with the intention of buying it) on the land, he concurrently buys the mobile goods, also (Kidushin 26a and RASHI ibid.).
(b) The word Achrayus in this context means that people will trust a borrower who owns land since they can expect to extract payment from the land should the borrower not have the money to pay back his loan (RASHI ibid.).
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[line 32] B’ODAN ALAV - while they are upon the slave
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[line 33] CHATZER MEHALECHES HI
(a) When a person acquires an object, he must make a Ma’aseh Kinyan (a formal Halachically-binding act denoting the change in ownership). See above, entry 8.
(b) The Kinyan of Chatzer works only when the Chatzer is a stationary domain. If the Chatzer is a moving domain (“Chatzer Mehaleches” – lit. “a walking Chatzer”), then the Chatzer is not effective to make a Kinyan. Hence, an object placed on a person’s slave cannot be acquired through Kinyan Chatzer (even though the slave is considered the person’s domain), because the slave is a moving Chatzer.
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[line 35] KAFUS - bound
12B commentary starts here:
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[line 1] LO BE’INAN TZEVURIN - Kinyan Agav does not require that the Metaltilin be on the land with which it is being acquired
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[line 5] SADNA D’AR’A CHAD HU - the block of the earth is a single entity
18a) [line 8] KODSHIM KALIM / KODSHEI KODASHIM
(a) The term Kodshei Kodashim refers to the Korbenos Olah, Chatas and Asham (and Menachos), which have a greater degree of sanctity. They may only be slaughtered in the northern part of the Azarah and may only be eaten in the Azarah by Kohanim.
(b) The term Kodshim Kalim refers to the Korbenos Shelamim, Todah, Ma’aser Behemah, Pesach and Bechor, which have a lesser degree of sanctity. They may be slaughtered in the entire Azarah (and not only in its northern part) and may be eaten in the entire city of Yerushalayim by men or women.
b) [line 9] MAMON BE'ALIM HU
(a) As soon as a person dedicates any article of his property to Hekdesh, it leaves his possession and enters the possession of Hekdesh. Therefore, the person may no longer sell it or give it as a present as a normal owner would.
(b) However, Rebbi Yosi ha'Gelili rules that this law only applies to Kodshei Kodashim (see Background to Pesachim 82:8b) and to Kodshei Bedek ha'Bayis (objects that are dedicated to Hekdesh *not* as a sacrifice), which are considered Mamon Gavo'ah (property of Heaven) as soon as they are dedicated. Kodshim Kalim remain the property of their owner in all respects until they are slaughtered, except for the fact that they must be offered on the Mizbe'ach to fulfill his pledge. Therefore, according to Rebbi Yosi ha'Gelili, a person may use Kodshim Kalim to betroth a woman; likewise, he may sell them or give them as a present.
19a) [line 9] “U’MA’ALAH MA’AL BA’HASH-M” - “[If a person sins,] and commits treachery against HaSh-m, [and lies to his neighbor about an object that was delivered to him to guard, or about [money given to him as] a fellowship, or about an object taken away by force, or he has defrauded his neighbor.]” (Vayikra 5:21)
b) [line 10] L’RABOS KODSHIM KALIM (ASHAM GEZEILOS)
(a) When a person steals money from a fellow Jew (see previous entry), swears in Beis Din that he holds no such money and later admits his sin, he must return what he stole, pay a fine of Chomesh, and bring a Korban Asham Vadai to receive atonement (Vayikra 5:20-26). The Korban Asham Gezeilos is a ram that costs at least two Sela’im.
(b) Since the verse states, “v’Kichesh ba’Amiso,” - “and [he] lies to his neighbor” (ibid. 5:21), objects of Hekdesh are excluded from this Korban. Rebbi Yosi ha’Gelili, however, learns from the words “u’Ma’alah Ma’al ba’Hash-m” (ibid.) that Kodshim Kalim are considered the personal property of their owner. As such, a person could betroth a woman with them, and stealing Kodshim Kalim could lead to a Korban Asham Gezeilos.
20) [line 11] HA'MEKADESH B'CHELKO - a Kohen who betroths a woman with his share of the Korbanos of the Beis ha'Mikdash
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[line 16] MI’SHULCHAN GAVO’AH KA ZACHU - the Kohanim receive the portion of the Korbanos from “HaSh-m’s table”; they don’t have any monetary rights to it merely a Zechus to eat it
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[line 17] BECHOR (BECHOR BEHEMAH TEHORAH)
(a) The Kedushah of Bechor rests on every first-born male of an ox, goat or sheep when it comes out of its mother’s womb. Nevertheless, there is a Mitzvah for a person to sanctify it himself (Erchin 29a, based on Devarim 15:19). He must then give it to a Kohen; it may not be redeemed.
(b) If the animal has no Mum (blemish), the Kohen must bring it as a Korban during its first year. After its blood and Emurim (see Background to Yevamos 7:8 and 100:9) are offered on the Mizbe’ach, its meat is eaten in Yerushalayim during the following two days and the intervening night. If the animal has or develops a Mum, it must be slaughtered and eaten during its first year. If it developed a Mum after the first year, it must be slaughtered and eaten within thirty days. The Kohen can give it away or sell it, even to a non-Kohen. However, it may not be sold in a meat market or weighed in the usual manner.
(c) Now that there is no Beis ha’Mikdash, a Kohen must care for a Bechor until it develops a Mum. Alternatively, he can sell it, even if it has no Mum, to a non-Kohen, who may eat it after it develops a Mum. It may not be sold in a meat market in the usual manner, or bought in order to resell for a profit (Sefer ha’Chinuch #393, #445). The Chachamim penalized a person who intentionally inflicts a Mum in a Bechor, that the animal may never be slaughtered (Bechoros 34a).
Addtional comments of note:
WHICH WITNESSES COUNT
A get divorce document which does not have two witnesses
signed upon it but is delivered to the woman in the presence
of witnesses is valid according to the view of Rabbi Elazar.
Rabbi Elazar’s interpretation of the Torah directive to
“write” a get is limited to the writing of the text alone; it
does not refer to the signing of witnesses. Rabbi Meyer, by
contrast, considers a get without witnesses signed upon it as
invalid even if it is relayed before witnesses.
The gemara concludes that we rule like Rabbi Elazar who states
in the mishna that the witnesses of the delivery make the get
valid; the only reason the Sages instituted that the witnesses
sign the get, continues the gemara, is to protect the woman:
If her husband eventually challenges the divorce and the
witnesses to the delivery are not alive or unavailable to
testify to its validity, the signatures can be used to
validate the get.
Rabbi Yitzchak Alfasi (Rif) initiated a lively debate amongst
the early commentaries by declaring that if there are no
witnesses to the delivery, only witnesses signed upon the get,
it is valid even according to Rabbi Elazar. One of his proofs
is the above-mentioned rabbinical enactment to have witnesses
sign so that their signatures would serve as proof of the
get’s validity in case delivery witnesses were unavailable.
If such witnesses are not sufficient, he asks, what is the
value of the decree?
His position is challenged by a disciple of his, Rabbi
Ephraim, whose view (and that of the Tosefists) is that since
Rabbi Elazar always states that delivery witnesses are what
counts and he never explicitly adds that signed witnesses are
sufficient, we must conclude that without delivery witnesses,
the get is invalid. The rabbinical decree to have witnesses
sign, explains Rabbi Ephraim, is a safeguard to indicate that
there were indeed witnesses to the delivery since we assume
that witnesses would not have signed on a get unless they saw
that there were witnesses to the delivery. But if we know
that there were no such witnesses to the delivery the get will
be invalid.
Rabbeinu Nissim (Ran) elaborates in his defense of the Rif’s
position and offers a revolutionary explanation for signed
witnesses being effective even when we know there were no
delivery witnesses. Since they saw the writing of the get and
now see it in the hands of the woman, we consider it as if
they saw the actual delivery. Since there is no other
plausible explanation for how it got to her, we view the
conclusion the witnesses reach as an extension of what they
actually saw.
(At the end of his long discussion on his position, Rif quotes
one of the Geonim who disagrees with him, explaining that
“even though his words contradict mine I chose to quote them,
because they represent heavenly labor.”)
=====================================
A NOT SO BAD KING
On the list of the kings of the Kingdom of Israel, which was
composed of the ten tribes that had seceded from the Kingdom
of Yehuda during the reign of Rechavam, is Hoshea ben Eilah.
He is described (Melachim II 17:2) as “doing what was evil in
the eyes of Hashem, but not like the kings of Israel before
him.” This would seem to indicate a radical change in the
pattern of idol worship set by his predecessors. Yet the very
next passage reports that his kingdom was punished by an
invasion from the Assyrian king who made Hoshea subservient to
him. Why would he, more righteous than the preceding kings,
be thus subjugated while they were not?
The gemara’s explanation of this paradox returns us to the
founder of the Kingdom of Israel, Yerovam ben Nevat. Fearful
that if his followers were to make their regular pilgrimages
to Jerusalem to offer sacrifices in the Beit Hamikdash which
was under the control of his rival, Rechavam, they would
eventually desert him and rejoin the Kingdom of Yehuda, ruled
by David’s descendants. He therefore established two golden
calves which he placed in Bet El and Dan as alternative
objects of worship and he installed sentries along the roads
to prevent pilgrimage to Jerusalem.
This pattern of worshipping idols and preventing Jews from
going to the Beit Hamikdash was continued by succeeding kings
of Israel, who are described as following in the evil ways of
Yerovam. Hoshea was also an idol worshipper but when he saw
that Yerovam’s golden calves were exiled by a foreign power he
decided to do away with the sentries and to allow his subjects
the choice of going to Jerusalem or worshipping the local
idols. This is what is meant by his being evil but not like
those before him.
Once the Jews in his kingdom had the opportunity of making
pilgrimage to Jerusalem and yet failed to do so, Hashem
decreed that they would go into exile for all those years they
did not go up to Jerusalem. This is the connection to the
next passage describing the beginning of that exile.
A serious problem is raised by Maharsha (Mesechta Bava Batra
121a). The Sage Ulla states that the 15th day of the Month of
Av is a holiday for Jews because it was on that date that
Hoshea removed the sentries. Why is this a cause for
celebration, he asks, if it was this un-utilized opportunity
which served as the catalyst for exile? Maharsha remarks that
there is a resolution for this problem, but he does not spell
it out. It has been suggested that the opportunity was
utilized by some righteous Jews, which made it a day to be
annually remembered, but that the majority clinging to
idolatry despite their new religious freedom brought about
their exile.
(BTW, I want to wish all Jewish readers a good Rosh Hodesh tonight as we go from the month of Tishrei to Cheshvan - don't forget
to add the appropriate passages during
mincha and ma'ariv for this).
You don’t think I know my bible, eh? 
Anyhow, do NOT, never, ever, NEVER…claim to
tell me what my bible says or does not says
without reading it and being able to cite
the passage your are making your claim on.
Because I will surely make you look foolish
and I really hate doing this. I am sure
some of the Christian scholars discussing
this topic in this thread can do the same
to you for New Testament citations, an area
I am not well versed in, especially
exegetically (for obvious reasons :-).
Brock