e,
I’m tired of spoon-feeding you. I’m even more weary of showing you evidence without you reading the links.
My first response was edited as being too large. I was going to post the ENTIRE link. My hope was that you would at least make a superficial attempt to educate yourself. The shotgun approach.
Here is just a taste of Duefler:
There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD production after sanctions were lifted by preserving assets and expertise. In addition to preserved capability, we have clear evidence of his intent to resume WMD production as soon as sanctions were lifted. All sources suggest that Saddam encouraged compartmentalization and would have discussed something as sensitive as WMD with as few people as possible.
Huwaysh claimed that in 1999 Saddam asked how long it would take to build a production line for CW agents. Huwaysh tasked four officials to investigate, and they responded that experts could readily prepare a production line for mustard within six months. VX and Sarin production were more complicated and would take longer. Huwaysh relayed this answer to Saddam, who never requested follow-up information. An Iraqi CW expert separately estimated Iraq would require only a few days to start producing mustard?if it were prepared to sacrifice the production equipment.
Miscalculation, 2002-2003
As the reality of the UN?s impending return sank in, Iraq rapidly initiated steps to prepare for inspectors. Committees and groups were formed to ensure sites and key scientists were ready to receive the inspectors.
As had often occurred in the past, individual scientists, heads of departments and security officials examined their plans of work for items or documents that would be subject to inspections. In every relevant location in Iraq, to some extent, normal work was disrupted in the effort to ensure Iraq was not suspected of undertaking proscribed activities.
According to a senior chemist at the MIC, Huwaysh in October 2002, issued an order?the same order issued several times in the past?which held scientists personally responsible for any materials, equipment, or other prohibited items found by the UN.
Vice President Taha Ramadan chaired a meeting of over 400 scientists before the inspectors returned, threatening scientists with dire consequences if the inspectors found anything that interfered with Iraq?s progress towards the lifting of sanctions.
When inspections resumed, foreign experts were hidden from the inspection teams.
In the final days of his Regime, Saddam continued to pursue efforts to enhance Iraq?s industrial base, with plans underway for the construction of a multipurpose chemical plant, and nine oil refineries in Southern and Northern Iraq. The plans for this chemical plant were the result of years of the IIC?s efforts to coordinate research into the indigenous production of chemicals.
The Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) owned a plot of land west of Baghdad that it set aside for construction of this multipurpose production facility, which was designed to produce a year?s supply of 100 chemicals using only 10 independent pilot-scale production lines. (For more information, see Iraq?s Infrastructure: Production Capability).
Construction was scheduled to begin in March 2003, but was halted just prior to OIF. The plant would have provided Iraq with an indigenous multi-purpose production facility capable of producing large quantities of chemicals, in a relatively short time"
Pretty easy to see what he was up to.
For people who are trully interested in challenging their preconceptions…
JeffR