[quote]pat wrote:
I have one major problem with the agreement, even if the Iranians stick with every single rule, it still ends in 15 years.[/quote]
No, it does not.
-Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
-Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.
[quote]pat wrote:
After which they will be as much a part of the nuclear proliferation treaty as the US, Russia, China, etc. I.E. they will be free to do what they want.[/quote]
You haven’t read or have fundamental misunderstandings of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The five permanent members of the UN Security Council constitute the de jure nuclear weapon states. Their obligations under international law differ from those of the non-nuclear weapon states, Iran included. As I pointed out above, a final agreement will not abrogate Iran’s treaty obligations under the following two articles.
Article II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Article III
- Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency’s safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
[quote]pat wrote:
I do not like that they are allowed to keep all their centrifuges, I do not like that they get to keep every nuclear capability they currently have, yet they ‘promise’ to keep the U-235 yield low.[/quote]
Again, I encourage you to read the actual text of the JCPOA.
Enrichment
Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
Iran’s breakout timeline - the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one weapon is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only - into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.
Iran’s time to breakout will increase by 400-600%. Increased inspections and transparency measures will make the prospect of an Iranian breakout or sneak-out much less likely to be successful. Everyone who desires preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state should be for a final agreement.