Mage,
I wanted to suggest that you don’t waste time on pox. If I were you, I’d identify some open-minded liberals. There are some people on this board who are willing to acknowledge some facts that directly refute the current dnc talking points.
Anyway, your version of events happens to be borne out by the evidence.
Here is Duefler:
"Between 1996 and 2002, the overall MIC budget increased over forty-fold from ID 15.5 billion to ID 700 billion. By 2003 it had grown to ID 1 trillion. MIC?s hard currency allocations in 2002 amounted to approximately $364 million. MIC sponsorship of technical research projects at Iraqi universities skyrocketed from about 40 projects in 1997 to 3,200 in 2002. MIC workforce expanded by fifty percent in three years, from 42,000 employees in 1999 to 63,000 in 2002.
According to a mid-level IIS official, the IIS successfully targeted scientists from Russia, Belarus, Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, China, and several other countries to acquire new military and defense-related technologies for Iraq. Payments were made in US dollars. The Iraqi Government also recruited foreign scientists to work in Iraq as freelance consultants. Presumably these scientists, plus their Iraqi colleagues, provided the resident ?know how? to reconstitute WMD within two years once sanctions were over, as one former high-ranking Iraqi official said was possible.
Saddam met with his senior nuclear scientists in 1999 and offered to provide them with whatever they needed, and increased funding began to flow to the IAEC in 2001, according to the former Minister of Military Industrialization. Saddam directed a large budget increase for IAEC and increased salaries tenfold from 2001 to 2003. He also directed the head of the IAEC to keep nuclear scientists together, instituted new laws and regulations to increase privileges for IAEC scientists and invested in numerous new projects. He also convened frequent meetings with the IAEC to highlight new achievements.
Saddam asked in 1999 how long it would take to build a production line for CW agents, according to the former Minister of Military Industrialization. Huwaysh investigated and responded that experts could readily prepare a production line for mustard, which could be produced within six months. VX and Sarin production was more complicated and would take longer. Huwaysh relayed this answer to Saddam, who never requested follow-up information. An Iraqi CW expert separately estimated Iraq would require only a few days to start producing mustard?if it was prepared to sacrifice the production equipment.
Imad Husayn ?Ali Al ?Ani, closely tied to Iraq?s VX program, alleged that Saddam had been looking for chemical weapons scientists in 2000 to begin production in a second location, according to reporting.
Huwaysh stated that in 2001 Saddam approached him after a ministers? meeting and asked, ?Do you have any programs going on that I don?t know about,? implying chemical or biological weapons programs. Huwaysh answered no, absolutely not. He assumed that Saddam was testing him, so Huwaysh added that because these programs were prohibited by the UN, he could not pursue them unless Saddam ordered it. Huwaysh said Saddam seemed satisfied, asked no further questions, and directed no follow-up actions. The incident was perplexing to Huwaysh, because he wondered why Saddam would ask him this question. While he had no evidence of WMD programs outside MIC, Huwaysh speculated that Qusay had the ability within the SSO to compartmentalize projects and select individuals to do special work.
Saddam stated to his ministers that he did not consider ballistic missiles to be WMD, according to Huwaysh. Saddam had never accepted missile range restrictions and assessed that if he could convince the UN inspectors he was in compliance regarding nuclear, chemical and biological weapons then he could negotiate with the UNSC over missile ranges.
Saddam stated publicly in early 2001 that ?we are not at all seeking to build up weapons or look for the most harmful weapons . . . however, we will never hesitate to possess the weapons to defend Iraq and the Arab nation?.
Purported design work done in 2000 on ballistic and land attack cruise missiles with ranges extending to 1000 km suggests interest in long-range delivery systems.
In 2002, Iraq began serial production of the Al Samud II, a short-range ballistic missile that violated UN range limits?text firings had reached 183 km?and exceeded UN prescribed diameter limitations of 600mm. Iraq?s production of 76 al Samud IIs, even under sanctions conditions, illustrates that Iraq sought more than a handful of ballistic missiles, but was deterred by the existing trade restrictions.
Saddam directed design and production of a 650 to 750 km range missile in early 2002, according to Huwaysh. Saddam wanted the missile within half a year. Huwaysh informed him, later that year, that Dr. Muzhir Sadiq Saba? Al Tamimi?s twin Volga engine, liquid-propellant design would reach only 550 km and would take three to five years to produce. Saddam seemed profoundly disappointed, left the room without comment, and never raised the subject again.
Other reports suggest work on a ballistic missile designed to exceed UN restrictions began earlier. A high-level missile official of Al Karamahh State Company said that in 1997 Huwaysh requested him to convert a Volga (SA-2) air defense missile into a surface-to-surface missile. When the official briefed Huwaysh on the results, however, he said Huwaysh told him to stop work immediately and destroy all documentary evidence of the tests. In mid-1998, another missile official said Huwaysh ordered ?Abd-al-Baqi Rashid Shi?a, general director at the Al Rashid State Company to develop a solid-propellant missile capable of a range of 1,000 to 1,200 km. The missile official speculated Huwaysh?s order came directly from Saddam. A senior level official at Al Karamahh, alleged that in 2000 Huwaysh ordered two computer designs be done to extend the range of the al Samud, one for 500 km and the other for 1000 km, which were provided him in late 2000. Huwaysh disputes all these accounts."
Mage, if this isn’t evidence enough of the danger posed by saddam, then I don’t know what is.
He was pouring huge amounts of resources into reconstituting WMD. He was hiring foreign experts. He was denying his home-grown experts permission to leave the country.
Unfortunately, most people have a limited attention span (that’s why there is still a democratic party) so I won’t rehash some of the other interesting findings that Duefler presents. However, I encourage you to read saddam’s taped discussion of gassing the Saudi’s and the Israeli’s. That is particularly chilling.
JeffR