[quote]Zap Branigan wrote:
GDollars37 wrote:
Zap Branigan wrote:
GDollars37 wrote:
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Then I’m real curious what you’re reading. And the officer corps was Sunni-dominated, of course, but the conscript enlisted men were largely Shiite. Instead of being paid and kept out of trouble they probably constitute significant portions of the militias of Sadr, the Dawa Party, SCIRI and the rest.
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These guys are not at the heart of the problem.
The problem is primarily Sunnis and foreign fighters to a lesser extent.
Speaking of Strategypage, they had this to say:
"One of the key decisions the government-that-doesn’t-exist-yet has to make, is what to do with the Shia and Kurd militias. There are two each, and the two Shia militias, those of the Badr and Sadr organizations, both backed by Iranian factions, are the most dangerous. The Shia militias represent Shia political parties that want to run the government. Not a democratic government, but a religious dictatorship
The two Shia militias are basically religious gangs, whose crimes are now seen as more of a problem than the declining violence of the Sunni Arab terrorists. For nearly three years, these Shia religious radicals were considered an asset. While the Shia radicals in southern Iraq are protected by the 10,000 armed men of the Badr Brigade (a part of (SCIRI, or the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq), a smaller, but similar organization exists in central Iraq. This is the Mahdi Army, led by Muqtada al Sadr. This group tried to fight the U.S. forces, and lost big time. The Mahdi Army only has a few thousand armed men, and they have made themselves very popular in the Shia community by fighting the Sunni Arab gangs and terrorists that went after the millions of Shia Arabs living central Iraq."
The Shia militias are very much a problem. They don’t fight us openly as much, but they are mostly pushing for an Islamic state governed by sharia, and their death squads (targeting Sunnis) both make a civil war more likely and help drive more Sunnis into the arms of the insurgents.
If you think keeping the former Shia conscripts in the Iraqi army would have prevented them from siding with their own people I think you are mistaken.
We have had enough trouble weeding the bad ones out of the new police force and army. Just keeping the old ones in would have been no help at all.[/quote]
It’s not an issue of “good ones” or “bad ones” as much as it is an issue of keeping armed men of military age occupied and paid. Very simple stuff. Debaathification was probably overdone too, but that’s a whole other topic.
And you said no one seriously thought we should keep the Iraqi Army intact? Here’s one of the many voices, retired Marine General Joseph Hoar, a former CENTCOM commander, speaking a year and a half ago:
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/pentagon/interviews/hoar.html
Scroll down to the question “What do you make of our disbanding the Iraqi army? Was it a fundamental error?”
Key line: “You didn’t need to have 30-odd years of experience in the military to realize that sending hundreds of thousands of troops home, all of them armed, and all with military experience, that there’s not going to be any good outcome from that.”
The whole interview is very interesting, as is this entire Frontline episode, there are plenty more interviews of senior generals, journalists, and policymakers accessible from the top right hand corner.