Religion: Just a Form of Brain Washing?

Off Topic Politics & World Issues
501

[quote]pat wrote:
mbm693 wrote:
pat wrote:

Nothing here is arbitrary. It is deductive in it’s purest form. If you want to the prime mover “monster” and hide him under your bed go right ahead. It doesn’t make it so. This stuff is not arbitrary.

To begin with, aristotle’s version of the unmoved mover was a god that would have been so disapointed with humanity that after he set everything in motion, he simply sat contemplating his own perfection. This is a long way from the personal, loving god I think you believe in.

Uh, what? We are now discussing what kind of God, God is? Aristotle never discuss what the prime mover was…
I am pretty sure Aristotle is quite relevant still.

Besides that, Aristotle was a great philosopher for his time, but he’s been passed by. The guy to argue with now is David Hume. He pushed logic as far as it could go. Kant is said to have answered him, but his writings are so hard to comprehend that no one really knows.

I love Hume, he is one of my favorites of all time. His insights into causation were brilliant. Where they fell short is his inability comprehend causality with out the temporal/ spatial element. But if you want to understand cause and effect relationships their is none better…
Kant’s writings are not hard to comprehend…What he did do is cease on the weaknesses in some of Hume’s arguments with particular emphasis on dispelling determinism, of which Hume was a supporter. That is not to say that his life was dedicated to arguing against Hume, but he did do that.

That’s not just me talking, that’s several PhD’s in philosophy. Given his conclusions (basically that certain things are just unthinkable) I honestly doubt he made any real progress.

Logical fallacy here: Appeal to Authority…Those Phd’s you know…give them that “monster” argument of yours. Let them ponder the wonder of that thing.

… Back to making you look foolish. Here is your argument for god being the prime mover: God is the prime mover.

Seems a little short. Looks more like a statement with no evidence to back it up to me.

Come back when you have actually read the argument. At no point did I “Affirm the consequence” as you suggest.[/quote]

I actually got this monster argument from the philosophy classes I had in college. It was quite effective against the bible beaters then and it’s still working pretty well against you.

Perhaps I’m not being clear enough about my point with regards to Hume and Kant. One of Hume’s arguments is that causality might not exist tomorrow. Objects may begin to fall up instead of down for no reason at all. As far as I can tell, he’s completely right. We dont’ have a guarantee that the world will work the same way tomorrow as it does today. When Kant tried to address this, I found it thoroughly undecipherable. If you’ve got a quick and dirty explanation of this part of Kant’s work, I’d love to see it. Seriously, no sarcasm here.

I have read the argument. I don’t debate that there is/was and uncaused event or entity. I just balk at playing the god card when the big bang (or any unknown event) will do just as well with fewer outlandish assumptions. If you’re just going to make being the prime mover part of the definition of god, then you’re just playing word games and not addressing the underlying reality of the situation.

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[quote]stokedporcupine wrote:
pat wrote:
mbm693 wrote:

You’re argument was that I can’t assign probability to a being’s existence because I can’t take it’s ‘nature’ into consideration… unless it already exists.

No I said you cannot assign properties to something that doesn’t texist. For you to say God is too complicated to have be a creator, you have to concede existence first.
Name one thing, that does not exist, that has properties.

I can’t really comment much on this whole discussion, because I have not been around to read the whole thing. I would like to comment on this though.

You could indeed assign properties to things that do not exist. This is done all the time in fantasy. For instance, Unicorns have a defining property, yet they do not exist. If you’d like an example from Kant, Golden mountains would be another example of things with properties that do not exist. For a more recent example, science does this all the time in theory development.
[/quote]

objects of fantasy, ideas, postulations, morals, etc. are all “things” wouldn’t you agree? Metaphysical objects are “things” just as much as physical things and therefore can have properties.
My argument is that you cannot deny the existence of something yet at the same time discuss the properties it has…To discuss the properties of something, you have to, at least for a moment, concede existence, don’t you think?

[quote]
But, moving away from examples, this whole discussion is related to Quine’s “ontological slum” which he attributes to people with a platonistic metaphysics. Without all the jargon, the problem is that if you admit into existence anything and everything that has properties (ie, anything and everything of which something can be predicated) then you have to admit that there exists an infinite number of things. This is for the obvious reason that there are an infinite number of different subject-predicate combinations that I could postulate.

Quine’s solution to this ontological slum of course is that only objects that can be quantified over exist (though this is a technical point in predicate logic that i don’t have time to explain). Though this approach “clears the slum”, it makes it possible to deny that things like unicorns and golden mountains exist, it does not automatically decide which objects (in you case, things that i can attribute properties too) can be quantified over (ie, which ones are real).

For this reason, Quine’s approach to clear the slum is attractive in that it explains how and why we can postulate the properties of things that do not exist. On the other hand, Quine’s approach does not automatically answer the question of which objects actually exist. This for Quine is an empirical matter, but of course you might try to prove the existence of something a priori.

Whatever the case may be, the point is that you can indeed postulate what properties an object might have and deduce consequences about those things and their properties without assuming the existance of the things. [/quote]

In am empirical Quine’s approach makes sense, but only if you require physical existence as a necessary attribute. Which I do not? With this approach you would also have to deny the existence of ideas, love, dreams, etc.
I dislike Plato but I am with him on this one…“Forms” do exist.

Thanks for the breath of fresh air…
Do you have an opinion on the cosmological argument?

503

[quote]mbm693 wrote:
pat wrote:

So when you said this:
“You’re 7 years old and you hear a noise under your bed. It’s really unlikely that it’s a monster, it’s probably just the cat.”

You didn’t really say it? Oh brother, you’re just killing me with this shit.

I have been telling you it’s irrelevant for pages now, thanks for finally getting it.

I said, it’s PROBABLY just the cat. The whole point of the analogy is that you don’t know what the noise is. How are you still missing this?

You’re argument was that I can’t assign probability to a being’s existence because I can’t take it’s ‘nature’ into consideration… unless it already exists.

No I said you cannot assign properties to something that doesn’t exist. For you to say God is too complicated to have be a creator, you have to concede existence first.
Name one thing, that does not exist, that has properties.

I’m saying a being with those properties is unlikely to exist. The bottom line is, you don’t really KNOW what created this universe. This is an excellent time to apply Occam’s Razor and go with the simplest explanation that fits the available evidence. That is the big bang, not and all powerful, all knowing god.

Lucky the Leprechaun has a set of properties that make him extremely unlikely to exist. If you’re seriously saying that I can’t take his properties into account when I consider his existence, then what good reason do I have for not believing in him?

That’s completely circular. That’s not hard to see. I’m not even mad anymore, I just feel bad for you.

I guess in a world where you did say something you actually said, it may seem circular in a rectangular sort of way. Otherwise there is nothing circular about it…The cosmological argument came into being to prevent circular reasoning.

No, your argument is circular. I’ll say it again: something does not have to exist for it to be unlikely for it to exist.
[/quote]
Something does not exist
therefore,
it is unlikely to exist…

Affiriming the consequent…again. That’s your argument not mine…

Here is a very condensed version of the argument…please point out where it circles back to itself.

[i]# Every finite and contingent (dependent) being has a cause.

Nothing finite and contingent can cause itself.

A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.

Therefore, a First Cause (or something that is not an effect) must exist.[/i]

[quote]
The cosomlogical argument did not come into being to prevent circular reasoning. That’s a load of horse shit. The cosmo argument is not circular, just arbitrary. It arbitrarily assumes that god is the first cause based on an arbitrary definition of perfection and what it takes to create it. [/quote]

It’s goal wasn’t to dispel circular reasoning. It is that cause and effect cannot be infinite because that would be circular reasoning. Theory of the first cause. solves that particular problem.

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[quote]mbm693 wrote:
pat wrote:
mbm693 wrote:
pat wrote:

Nothing here is arbitrary. It is deductive in it’s purest form. If you want to the prime mover “monster” and hide him under your bed go right ahead. It doesn’t make it so. This stuff is not arbitrary.

To begin with, aristotle’s version of the unmoved mover was a god that would have been so disapointed with humanity that after he set everything in motion, he simply sat contemplating his own perfection. This is a long way from the personal, loving god I think you believe in.

Uh, what? We are now discussing what kind of God, God is? Aristotle never discuss what the prime mover was…
I am pretty sure Aristotle is quite relevant still.

Besides that, Aristotle was a great philosopher for his time, but he’s been passed by. The guy to argue with now is David Hume. He pushed logic as far as it could go. Kant is said to have answered him, but his writings are so hard to comprehend that no one really knows.

I love Hume, he is one of my favorites of all time. His insights into causation were brilliant. Where they fell short is his inability comprehend causality with out the temporal/ spatial element. But if you want to understand cause and effect relationships their is none better…
Kant’s writings are not hard to comprehend…What he did do is cease on the weaknesses in some of Hume’s arguments with particular emphasis on dispelling determinism, of which Hume was a supporter. That is not to say that his life was dedicated to arguing against Hume, but he did do that.

That’s not just me talking, that’s several PhD’s in philosophy. Given his conclusions (basically that certain things are just unthinkable) I honestly doubt he made any real progress.

Logical fallacy here: Appeal to Authority…Those Phd’s you know…give them that “monster” argument of yours. Let them ponder the wonder of that thing.

… Back to making you look foolish. Here is your argument for god being the prime mover: God is the prime mover.

Seems a little short. Looks more like a statement with no evidence to back it up to me.

Come back when you have actually read the argument. At no point did I “Affirm the consequence” as you suggest.

I actually got this monster argument from the philosophy classes I had in college. It was quite effective against the bible beaters then and it’s still working pretty well against you.
[/quote]
Obviously.

Hume believed nothing existed because nothing can be proven to exist. Kant believed that there was a reality and it existed, but we can or don’t necessarily know what it is.

That is a very over simplified summary, but it catches the drift.

Well now that is something different. If you are conceding that an uncaused cause exists, aka prime mover, then we can move on to discussing what “that” is.

505

[quote]pat wrote:
mbm693 wrote:
pat wrote:

I’m saying a being with those properties is unlikely to exist. The bottom line is, you don’t really KNOW what created this universe. This is an excellent time to apply Occam’s Razor and go with the simplest explanation that fits the available evidence. That is the big bang, not and all powerful, all knowing god.

Lucky the Leprechaun has a set of properties that make him extremely unlikely to exist. If you’re seriously saying that I can’t take his properties into account when I consider his existence, then what good reason do I have for not believing in him?

Here is a very condensed version of the argument…please point out where it circles back to itself.

[i]# Every finite and contingent (dependent) being has a cause.

Nothing finite and contingent can cause itself.

A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.

Therefore, a First Cause (or something that is not an effect) must exist.[/i]

The cosomlogical argument did not come into being to prevent circular reasoning. That’s a load of horse shit. The cosmo argument is not circular, just arbitrary. It arbitrarily assumes that god is the first cause based on an arbitrary definition of perfection and what it takes to create it.

It’s goal wasn’t to dispel circular reasoning. It is that cause and effect cannot be infinite because that would be circular reasoning. Theory of the first cause. solves that particular problem.[/quote]

I don’t discount that there has to be a first cause, I never have. I’m making very specific points in my posts, please read them carefully before responding.

[i]# Every finite and contingent (dependent) being has a cause.

Nothing finite and contingent can cause itself.

A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.

Therefore, a First Cause (or something that is not an effect) must exist.[/i]

This is not the argument I’m calling circular. I’m saying that automatically assigning god to be the first cause is arbitrary.

Something does not exist
therefore,
it is unlikely to exist…

This is not an argument either of us made. I have always said that I cannot prove the negative. It is impossible to ever prove that something does not exist. The best you can do is say that some thing’s existence is extremely unlikely based on the available evidence.

You seem to want to say something already has to exist before you can assign a probability to it’s existence. This is the argument I’m calling circular. Lucky the Leprechaun is extremely unlikely to exist because of the nature and characteristics assigned to him. If I can’t use his nature to relegate him to(likely) non-existance, then I have to assume he is real and live my life accordingly. There just isn’t another option.

506

[quote]pat wrote:

Hume believed nothing existed because nothing can be proven to exist. Kant believed that there was a reality and it existed, but we can or don’t necessarily know what it is.

That is a very over simplified summary, but it catches the drift.

Well now that is something different. If you are conceding that an uncaused cause exists, aka prime mover, then we can move on to discussing what “that” is.

[/quote]

I’ll agree to this summary. For as short as it is, I’d say it’s very good actually.

I think we’re discussing this effectively in our other series of posts. Now that we’re down to one, I’ll finally have time to look at porn again. Life is good :).

507

[quote]mbm693 wrote:
stokedporcupine wrote:

this is not what occam’s razor is.

Wikipedia quote, so take it for what it’s worth.

This is often paraphrased as “All other things being equal, the simplest solution is the best.” In other words, when multiple competing theories are equal in other respects, the principle recommends selecting the theory that introduces the fewest assumptions and postulates the fewest entities. It is in this sense that Occam’s razor is usually understood.

This is exactly why I’m arguing that the big bang makes more sense than god. A lot less goes into creating the big bang, than creating an omnipotent being.

[/quote]

that is in the same spirit as occam’s razor, but its not really correct. without mentioning all the historical stuff, “occam’s razor” is a general principle in metaphysics which states that unnecessary things should not be postulated to exist in a metaphysical system. the classic debate is always been those who believe only that particulars exist, and those that believe universals exist (or some combination).

according to occam’s razor, if the nominalist can explain all of reality by only using particulars, and not appealing to universals, then the nominalist should. if though it is proven by the platonist that universals must be accepted, then, occams razor says they should be accepted.

occam’s razor though makes no claims on general theory evaluation.

There’s not really a particular word to describe it, but it is of course generally accepted that simpler yet equally powerful theories are better. its just that this isn’t occam’s razor.

508

[quote]mbm693 wrote:
stokedporcupine wrote:
mbm693 wrote:
stokedporcupine wrote:

ummm… wow. you know nothing about philosophy. nothing about Aristotle, Hume, or Kant.

Enlighten me.

pat already responded to your post for me.

your first big mistake was in claiming that Aristotle is not relevant anymore…

I’m gonna stick by this one (for now). I think he’s valuable to philosophy from a historical perspective, but I don’t think any of his arguments are still relevant. I am a bit rusty though so I’m interested in discussion.

[/quote]

Aristotle has written many things (almost 3000 pages worth of stuff, to be exact). while some of what Aristotle has written is only of historical value, much of is still relevant.

Much of what is relevant is Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics. In the last 100 years there’s actually been quite a turn back to an aristilian approach in the academic study of ethics. Also, much of aristotle’s metaphysics never become irrelevant for the simple reason that he laid so much of the groundwork that is taken for granted today. It’s somewhat akin to algebra–sure, its not terrible interesting, but it’s sure important. Further, there’s much in Aristotle’s metaphysics thats still hotly debated today–particularly in the universal vs. particular debates.

Aristotle’s logic and number theory is another area that’s interesting. while model formal logic greatly surpasses Aristotle’s logic in power, the modal syllogisms are still quite advanced and interesting. Aristotle’s also always kinda been the rallying cry for the relevance logics people argue for today. On the number theory stuff, Aristotle is amazing sophisticated. While his number theory stuff isn’t really considered in modern philosophy of math stuff (those guys are still hung up on frege and his friends, perhaps for good reason), that is starting to change. There are several people working more now on Plato and Aristotle’s number theory.

509

[quote]pat wrote:

objects of fantasy, ideas, postulations, morals, etc. are all “things” wouldn’t you agree? Metaphysical objects are “things” just as much as physical things and therefore can have properties.

[/quote]

sure, i never denied that. that i was trying to point out is that one of the big problems in metaphysics (well, if not THE problem) is trying to clarify in just what sense anything exists and how different objects or “things” relate to each other (say like particulars and universals)

sure you can, this is what i was saying all along–Quine’s theory of bound variables coupled with Russel’s theory of definite descriptions shows you exactly how this is done without getting into metaphysical messes or absurdities (like the slum). The details of this all depend on formal predicate logic, so they’re hard to explain unless you have the background. if your interested one place to find it, quine sketches the theory out in his article “one what there is” (review of metaphysics, 2, (1948), p. 21-38). if your interested and can’t get a hold of it yourself, i can get a pdf copy and send it to you.

now, you might object and say that what your claiming is that it is not psychologically possible for a person to contemplate properties of something without provisionally accepting it’s existence, but here i also disagree. (this differs from the standard slum problem in metaphysics. there, the problem is that it seems like discussing properties of imagined particular things requires at the very least accepting the existence of universal forms for those particulars–otherwise there would be nothing at all to discuss. quine solves this problem)

i have to disagree with this claim as well, it is perfectly possible for a human to reason hypothetically–to consider if-then clauses. in reasoning hypothetically, one does not need to consent to or accept the antecedents of of the if-then clauses.

Quine himself argued against the traditional “empirical/rational” distinction. Quine is actually quite famous for showing the problems with the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction as well. I was only trying to say that given Quine’s more scientific leanings, he would probably say that deciding the question of God’s existence is an empirical matter. whether this is right or not, i do not know.

510

i’ll have to get back to you on the cosmological argument. i don’t want to speak without reviewing the details myself.

in general though, i do know that it is widely accepted that the cosmological, teleological, and ontological arguments are invalid.

There is something quite interesting about the ontological argument though. For a long time this was considered a ridiculous argument–both in terms of common sense and in terms of it being logically invalid. What is funny though is that with the advent of modern modal logic, the ontological argument is shown to actually be valid in the standard modal systems (i mean the systems of modal logic which logicans agree capture how we normally talk… not some trivial system in which all formulas are true). There are of course objections to this, but it is interesting to see how the argument runs in a standard modal system.

i’ll try to get back to you on the cosmological stuff soon.

511

[quote]stokedporcupine wrote:
Aristotle has written many things (almost 3000 pages worth of stuff, to be exact). while some of what Aristotle has written is only of historical value, much of is still relevant.

Much of what is relevant is Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics. In the last 100 years there’s actually been quite a turn back to an aristilian approach in the academic study of ethics. Also, much of aristotle’s metaphysics never become irrelevant for the simple reason that he laid so much of the groundwork that is taken for granted today. It’s somewhat akin to algebra–sure, its not terrible interesting, but it’s sure important. Further, there’s much in Aristotle’s metaphysics thats still hotly debated today–particularly in the universal vs. particular debates.

Aristotle’s logic and number theory is another area that’s interesting. while model formal logic greatly surpasses

Aristotle’s logic in power, the modal syllogisms are still quite advanced and interesting. Aristotle’s also always kinda been the rallying cry for the relevance logics people argue for today. On the number theory stuff, Aristotle is amazing sophisticated. While his number theory stuff isn’t really considered in modern philosophy of math stuff (those guys are still hung up on frege and his friends, perhaps for good reason), that is starting to change. There are several people working more now on Plato and Aristotle’s number theory.
[/quote]

I tend to see ethics as a non-starter all the way around. Right/wrong, good/evil seem to me to be entirely man-made constructs used to justify one set of actions or behaviors over others. The preponderance of evidence suggests to me that free will(without which ethics would never be considered) is just an illusion and that humans (like everything else) are just chemical reactions.

I feel the same way about number theory. Math is useful as a tool to model the real world around us,but that doesn’t make it anything more than a figment of our imagination.

Please don’t misunderstand, I think Aristotle was absolutely brilliant. And I totally agree with your algebra analogy, that’s what I was trying to capture when I relegated him to being important for history only. Studying aristotle shows why later philosophy is conducted the way it is. But I think the limits of science at the time he lived led him down paths that turned out to be dead ends.

If I’m being overly broad, or misinterpreting your post, please let me know and I’ll give it another shot.

512

[quote]mbm693 wrote:
I tend to see ethics as a non-starter all the way around. Right/wrong, good/evil seem to me to be entirely man-made constructs used to justify one set of actions or behaviors over others. The preponderance of evidence suggests to me that free will(without which ethics would never be considered) is just an illusion and that humans (like everything else) are just chemical reactions.
[/quote]

The problem though is that the way you see it might be right, or it might be wrong. the only way to know is to actually study ethics to find out. Further, you are vastly simiplying the subject, its not just about “right/wrong” and “good/evil”. If you read Aristotle’s ethics, you’ll see he actually talks little about these things. he takes a much more naturalized approach to ethics, one that a scientist might take.

again, this is a view which needs to be substantiated. also, your view is not the standard view in math or philosophy–actually, all the “evidence” seems to suggest otherwise, that math is not merely a human construct. i don’t really have time to go into all the details, but, suffice to say you would have a very hard time defending this point.

[quote]
Please don’t misunderstand, I think Aristotle was absolutely brilliant. And I totally agree with your algebra analogy, that’s what I was trying to capture when I relegated him to being important for history only. Studying aristotle shows why later philosophy is conducted the way it is. But I think the limits of science at the time he lived led him down paths that turned out to be dead ends.

If I’m being overly broad, or misinterpreting your post, please let me know and I’ll give it another shot. [/quote]

this i agree with. keep in mind though that Aristotle basically was science at the time. he is the one who basically developed what is generally considered the “scientific method”. this of course is a bit simplistic, but, i think its accurate.

513

[quote]mbm693
I tend to see ethics as a non-starter all the way around. Right/wrong, good/evil seem to me to be entirely man-made constructs used to justify one set of actions or behaviors over others. The preponderance of evidence suggests to me that free will(without which ethics would never be considered) is just an illusion and that humans (like everything else) are just chemical reactions.[/quote]

And here we run into the performative contradiction. If it’s all just chemical reactions, yours is no more meaningful on the truth-scale. Which is to say, if what you say is true, then it’s false (chemical reactions that lead to different conclusions regarding reality are not different, values-wise. How can one chemical reaction be more ‘valid’ than another?), and so it is false.

514

[quote]wirewound wrote:
mbm693
I tend to see ethics as a non-starter all the way around. Right/wrong, good/evil seem to me to be entirely man-made constructs used to justify one set of actions or behaviors over others. The preponderance of evidence suggests to me that free will(without which ethics would never be considered) is just an illusion and that humans (like everything else) are just chemical reactions.

And here we run into the performative contradiction. If it’s all just chemical reactions, yours is no more meaningful on the truth-scale. Which is to say, if what you say is true, then it’s false (chemical reactions that lead to different conclusions regarding reality are not different, values-wise. How can one chemical reaction be more ‘valid’ than another?), and so it is false.
[/quote]

while I do not agree with mbm693’s stance on human cognition, this makes no sense. First, not even die-hard physicalists and determinists argue that our thoughts are synonymous with any one particular “chemical reaction” in the brain. Even these people take the much more reasonable position that human thought (which is what makes claims that have truth-values) is a higher order process that arises out of the mechanical processes of the brain. So they may contend that while human thought is dependent on mechanical processes, that that human thought is not part and parcel the mechanical processes. even from an intuitive perspective, such a position is made–obviously, chemical reactions are different then though.

Thus, even on the most deterministic, physical accounts of human cognition, one thought can be more true then another. What it comes down to is not individual chemical reactions, but the sum total of all reactions. these sum totals lead to different thought processes, some of which just happen to be better then others.

515

[quote]stokedporcupine wrote:
wirewound wrote:
mbm693
I tend to see ethics as a non-starter all the way around. Right/wrong, good/evil seem to me to be entirely man-made constructs used to justify one set of actions or behaviors over others. The preponderance of evidence suggests to me that free will(without which ethics would never be considered) is just an illusion and that humans (like everything else) are just chemical reactions.

And here we run into the performative contradiction. If it’s all just chemical reactions, yours is no more meaningful on the truth-scale. Which is to say, if what you say is true, then it’s false (chemical reactions that lead to different conclusions regarding reality are not different, values-wise. How can one chemical reaction be more ‘valid’ than another?), and so it is false.

while I do not agree with mbm693’s stance on human cognition, this makes no sense. First, not even die-hard physicalists and determinists argue that our thoughts are synonymous with any one particular “chemical reaction” in the brain. Even these people take the much more reasonable position that human thought (which is what makes claims that have truth-values) is a higher order process that arises out of the mechanical processes of the brain. So they may contend that while human thought is dependent on mechanical processes, that that human thought is not part and parcel the mechanical processes. even from an intuitive perspective, such a position is made–obviously, chemical reactions are different then though.

Thus, even on the most deterministic, physical accounts of human cognition, one thought can be more true then another. What it comes down to is not individual chemical reactions, but the sum total of all reactions. these sum totals lead to different thought processes, some of which just happen to be better then others.

[/quote]

How do you guage ‘better’? That is, what constitutes ‘better’ if it’s all just ‘frisky dust’? Isn’t that which causes you to call one thing ‘better’ just deterministic mechanical reactions and chemistry?

516

you are confusing different levels of normative claims.

the point is that variation of processes that lead to thought is possible under a physicalist account of cognition. Thus, if processes can vary, then thoughts themselves can vary. Not all thoughts are of the same truth-value because some might have been formed by more truth conducive processes.

Now, your objection is that even if this is all true, how would anyone ever know which thoughts were more true then others? My very evaluation itself would be the result of other, perhaps less reliable, processes.

this is perhaps a valid point, BUT… it still does not mean that some thought is more truth conducive then other thought (which was your original claim)

i’m not really prepared to defend determinism. BUT… your objection is not exactly a knock down one. Consider two points.

First, not all physicalists or determinists hold the exact same view. Determinism does not have to call for every little nuance of thought to be predetermined. For example, the level of determinism that mbm has called for–a level where ethics is useless–does not necessarily require such an extreme position. In grouping all of determinism together into one bunch and attributing to it the most extreme position, you really have created a straw man.

Second, if a physicalist model of human cognition is true, you must remember that such a model will be incredibly complex… more complex then any other physical system in the known universe. As a machine, or computer, the human brain is more complicated then all man made computers put together. Given this mind-boggling complexity, it is difficult to say exactly of what our brain is capable.

517

pat,

on the cosmological argument, i don’t really have much to say. I am sure you and mbm have probably covered most of the details that i possibly could.

I do have two points though. The one is kinda a trivial point, the other more interesting.

First, though the argument is quite simple in form, its quite complex. Evaluating the argument requires 2 things that mankind does not have: (1) a satisfactory account of causation, and (2) a definitive metaphysics. Since i have neither of these, i don’t really know what to think of the argument, other then that it’s interesting to say the least. also, the argument makes a dubious assumption. it assumes that an understanding of space/time and causation that works on a human scale applies in all other scales. (which we know is incorrect).

Second (and more interesting), the argument turns on the idea that infinite regresses are impossible. The idea is that everything we know of in the universe is caused, and thus since a causal chain cannot extend back forever (by definition), there must have been a first cause. It is possible though that this is incorrect. the thing is that we have merely defined causation in such a way that a causal chain, on our definition, cannot involve infinite regress. Perhaps it is possible to have such an infinite causal chain. Perhaps under a better definition or understanding of causation such a chain will appear possible.

“infinite regresses” have caused problems for many subjects (the formal concept of justification in epistemology is one such place). for a long time it was always thought that infinite regress was impossible. Now though there are those who argue that we need to look more seriously at infinite regress, and consider it. it actually is possible to explain and use infinite regress in some current theories. so… it is possible that the answer to the cosmological “problem” is by simply accepting infinite regress and coming up with a good model for it. (which, there is no reason to think can’t be done)

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[quote]stokedporcupine wrote:
you are confusing different levels of normative claims.

the point is that variation of processes that lead to thought is possible under a physicalist account of cognition. Thus, if processes can vary, then thoughts themselves can vary. Not all thoughts are of the same truth-value because some might have been formed by more truth conducive processes.

Now, your objection is that even if this is all true, how would anyone ever know which thoughts were more true then others? My very evaluation itself would be the result of other, perhaps less reliable, processes.

this is perhaps a valid point, BUT… it still does not mean that some thought is more truth conducive then other thought (which was your original claim)
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How do you know? How CAN you know? What I’m saying is that, strictly speaking, a materialist viewpoint can only tell you that two thought-patterns are DIFFERENT. It cannot say which is ‘better’. ‘Better’ is a subjective decision, not an objective one - and if everything is ‘objects out there’ (even your brain is ‘out there’ in that it’s objectively visible), then one can only measure quantity - not quality. Quality is a subjective and inter-subjective judgment.

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[quote]mbm693 wrote:
pat wrote:
mbm693 wrote:
pat wrote:

I’m saying a being with those properties is unlikely to exist. The bottom line is, you don’t really KNOW what created this universe. This is an excellent time to apply Occam’s Razor and go with the simplest explanation that fits the available evidence. That is the big bang, not and all powerful, all knowing god.

Lucky the Leprechaun has a set of properties that make him extremely unlikely to exist. If you’re seriously saying that I can’t take his properties into account when I consider his existence, then what good reason do I have for not believing in him?

Here is a very condensed version of the argument…please point out where it circles back to itself.

[i]# Every finite and contingent (dependent) being has a cause.

Nothing finite and contingent can cause itself.

A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.

Therefore, a First Cause (or something that is not an effect) must exist.[/i]

The cosomlogical argument did not come into being to prevent circular reasoning. That’s a load of horse shit. The cosmo argument is not circular, just arbitrary. It arbitrarily assumes that god is the first cause based on an arbitrary definition of perfection and what it takes to create it.

It’s goal wasn’t to dispel circular reasoning. It is that cause and effect cannot be infinite because that would be circular reasoning. Theory of the first cause. solves that particular problem.

I don’t discount that there has to be a first cause, I never have. I’m making very specific points in my posts, please read them carefully before responding.

[i]# Every finite and contingent (dependent) being has a cause.

Nothing finite and contingent can cause itself.

A causal chain cannot be of infinite length.

Therefore, a First Cause (or something that is not an effect) must exist.[/i]

This is not the argument I’m calling circular. I’m saying that automatically assigning god to be the first cause is arbitrary.

Something does not exist
therefore,
it is unlikely to exist…

This is not an argument either of us made. I have always said that I cannot prove the negative. It is impossible to ever prove that something does not exist. The best you can do is say that some thing’s existence is extremely unlikely based on the available evidence.

You seem to want to say something already has to exist before you can assign a probability to it’s existence. This is the argument I’m calling circular. Lucky the Leprechaun is extremely unlikely to exist because of the nature and characteristics assigned to him. If I can’t use his nature to relegate him to(likely) non-existance, then I have to assume he is real and live my life accordingly. There just isn’t another option. [/quote]

It is a series of steps. To get “there” you have to first get to a point where you eliminate all invalid point and get to a point that is agreed upon. From there you can start debating the unknowns and agreed to points. Preferably with out calling me a huge pussy all the time.
Now think about all the properties an uncaused cause, must have.
Two obvious properties, is that it must exist eternally and it cannot be created or destroyed.
I refer to this “thing” as God. This doesn’t define God, it just merely states that this is a couple of properties a “God”, must have.
Now if you can, with out calling me a coward, with out “owning” me or calling me a huge pussy, preferably, debate whether or not you think it’s true.

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[quote]stokedporcupine wrote:
pat wrote:

objects of fantasy, ideas, postulations, morals, etc. are all “things” wouldn’t you agree? Metaphysical objects are “things” just as much as physical things and therefore can have properties.

sure, i never denied that. that i was trying to point out is that one of the big problems in metaphysics (well, if not THE problem) is trying to clarify in just what sense anything exists and how different objects or “things” relate to each other (say like particulars and universals)

My argument is that you cannot deny the existence of something yet at the same time discuss the properties it has…To discuss the properties of something, you have to, at least for a moment, concede existence, don’t you think?

sure you can, this is what i was saying all along–Quine’s theory of bound variables coupled with Russel’s theory of definite descriptions shows you exactly how this is done without getting into metaphysical messes or absurdities (like the slum). The details of this all depend on formal predicate logic, so they’re hard to explain unless you have the background. if your interested one place to find it, quine sketches the theory out in his article “one what there is” (review of metaphysics, 2, (1948), p. 21-38). if your interested and can’t get a hold of it yourself, i can get a pdf copy and send it to you.

now, you might object and say that what your claiming is that it is not psychologically possible for a person to contemplate properties of something without provisionally accepting it’s existence, but here i also disagree. (this differs from the standard slum problem in metaphysics. there, the problem is that it seems like discussing properties of imagined particular things requires at the very least accepting the existence of universal forms for those particulars–otherwise there would be nothing at all to discuss. quine solves this problem)

i have to disagree with this claim as well, it is perfectly possible for a human to reason hypothetically–to consider if-then clauses. in reasoning hypothetically, one does not need to consent to or accept the antecedents of of the if-then clauses.
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I am not familiar with Quine, but I understand what you are saying. You can consider the hypotheticals postive and negative. with out having accepted the initial argument.

In this situation we were not discussing what God is, we were discussing whether or not such thing as a God exists.
What that means is that I was wrong, you can discuss the properties of something with out accepting the argument. It is just at that time, when discussing existence, discussing God’s “nature” was irrelevant to the discussion. I should have stuck with that.

[/quote]
In am empirical Quine’s approach makes sense, but only if you require physical existence as a necessary attribute. Which I do not? With this approach you would also have to deny the existence of ideas, love, dreams, etc.
I dislike Plato but I am with him on this one…“Forms” do exist.

Thanks for the breath of fresh air…
Do you have an opinion on the cosmological argument?

Quine himself argued against the traditional “empirical/rational” distinction. Quine is actually quite famous for showing the problems with the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction as well. I was only trying to say that given Quine’s more scientific leanings, he would probably say that deciding the question of God’s existence is an empirical matter. whether this is right or not, i do not know.
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I’d say he is partially right. When counter arguments to premises of the cosmological argument, for instance simultaneous causation, these things can be empirically tested.