Propaganda and Iraq

Great post from former Air Force officer John Robb:

Sunday, October 01, 2006
PROPAGANDA WARS
Traditionally, guerrilla wars are fought in the moral sphere. This means that the side that can hold together its moral cohesion the longest, while simultaneously fragmenting its opponents, will come out the winner (I think this is shifting, but we can save that thought for later).

From this grain of truth, the US government/military reached (primarily due to hindsight bias re:Vietnam) the conclusion that moral conflicts are won through propaganda. In other words, the side with the better propaganda machine wins the war.

These organizations are implementing this conclusion in this conflict. Everything from embedded journalists to continuously rosy statements (such as “the tide of history is on our side,” “the insurgency’s back is broken,” “just a few more months and the turning point will be reached,” etc.) to pro-war bloggers that regurgitate talking points are part of a propaganda effort deemed necessary to win our current conflict.

However, this decision to build a propaganda machine isn’t showing signs of working. The reason is that a propaganda campaign within the current complex, global and media/information saturated environment is not only foolish, it is downright dangerous. Why? Here are the reasons:

  • It generates dissent faster than it solidifies support. People have access to so many alternative sources of information, that any concerted attempt to spin facts is quickly seen for what it is: deception. The result is that non-cooperative centers of gravity are generated (first globally and then domestically) so quickly, that the very moral cohesion sought is the first victim of the effort.

  • Propaganda efforts destroy effective decision making. The US military’s approach to this propaganda war has been to trot out generals at every opportunity to provide upbeat and positive assessments (the most negative statement is blandly neutral).

Anything less would be seen as a negative in the moral conflict and thereby disloyal. This has the unintended consequence of clouding internal decision loops. In the business world this is called “drinking your own kool-aid” (in a cold reference to the Jamestown religious cult where the members committed suicide by drinking poisoned kool-aid).

Facts are misinterpreted/misrepresented for marketing externally, these tainted facts are consumed by internal audiences, and bad internal decision making is the result (“we don’t need more troops,” “we should stick it out since it will get better soon,” “more of the same will work,” etc.). This is pure poison given the complexity of modern counter-insurgency.

  • Natural allies are quickly turned into enemies. Since propaganda is central to the US war effort, any criticism (from any quarter) is seen as something that aids and abets the enemy (“if you are not with us, you are against us”). A good rule of thumb (and this applies to all organizations and not just the US military/government), is that the best people don’t work for you.

However, it also follows that they aren’t necessarily working against you either, and they could provide you substantial benefit to you if properly enticed (this is something that has become a central aspect of most organizations in our heavily cross connected world). Propaganda alienates this group since they aren’t seen as being on the “team.”

The Alternative
Since propaganda is so ineffective, what would work? I believe a better approach (perhaps the only approach that even has a hope of working given the complex networked environment within which wars are fought today), is:

  • A strict adherence to unvarnished truth. Assessments should not be spun. Decisions and analysis of results should be completely caveated. This requires backbone (which is perhaps in short supply). Truth generates trust.

  • Transparency. Confidence in decision making is generated through transparency (both internally and externally). Transparency also allows the process to be improved. This is completely at odds with the Cold War secrecy culture that is currently in place.

  • A willingness to listen to criticism (particularly from knowledgeable external sources) and respond to it if justified. This doesn’t require thick skin, it only requires a willingness to acknowledge truth when you see it. This process generates a growing network of allies.

NOTE: This also requires that the hermetic seal around most government/military organizations needs to be broken. If the routes into these organizations are limited, the benefit will be limited too.

End Note
While truth, transparency, and receptiveness are difficult traits to develop, they offer the best path towards a sustainable effort. For those cynics out there, this isn’t nearly as naive as it looks at first glance.

The wars of the future will be non-existential (not against peer competitors, no matter how much some would like) and of indefinite duration (read: long). In order to pick the right ones to fight, fight them well, and sustain the effort over the entire required duration: an open process must be adhered to. Anything less offers nothing but vociferous dissent, sequential disasters, and ignoble defeat.

Interesting post.

[quote]Zap Branigan wrote:
Interesting post. [/quote]

Indeed.

Does this include the propaganda of the anti-war folk? “We can’t win! It’s another Vietnam!” “We’re just going to create more terrorists!” Hearing that you’re fighting an “illegal” war, therefore, killing people without just cause, can’t be good for morale.

After all, if it’s unjust war, than you’re a murder for participating in it, and are justly killed by the “freedom fighters.” Or, hearing how our soldiers are torturers and killers of innocent women and children.

In the end, I just don’t hear these glowing and sunny propoganda pieces that often. Especially from the bulk of the media. Hell, I’m surprised whenever I hear some talk of succes come from the media.

Another thing that helps win a counter-insurgency is:

a.admitting there is an insurgency
b.using counter-insurgency tactics.

we did neither.
(with a few brilliant exceptions to b.)

What is a counter insurgency tactic?

[quote]100meters wrote:
Another thing that helps win a counter-insurgency is:

a.admitting there is an insurgency
b.using counter-insurgency tactics.

we did neither.
(with a few brilliant exceptions to b.)[/quote]

Hope you’re not talking about this.

[quote]semper_fi wrote:
100meters wrote:
Another thing that helps win a counter-insurgency is:

a.admitting there is an insurgency
b.using counter-insurgency tactics.

we did neither.
(with a few brilliant exceptions to b.)

Hope you’re not talking about this.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter-insurgency[/quote]

err…no.

I’m talking more about tactics used by Gen. Petraeus who fought a counter-insurgency…winning hearts and minds and reducing support for the enemy vs. say…Odierno’s 4thID style of anti-insurgency. In general Petraeus’s style was to make sure no action created more enemyies than it reduced–
as Galula makes clear in Counterinsurgency Warfare

the people are the prize.

Because of piss-poor military and civilian command we didn’t get around to using such tactics till very late in the game (excepting Petraeus). Note that in 2005(really that long?) Gen Casey sets up COIN Academy and requires attendance for all new commanders.

It is sickening the level of bungling, ineptness, and stuborness that has insured a no win situation born of a horrible decision in the first place.

And of course ALL was predicted by intellectuals both military and civilian pre-invasion. Obscene.

Excellent thought provoking original post.

[quote]Wreckless wrote:
Zap Branigan wrote:
Interesting post.

Indeed.[/quote]

Absolutely.