Interesting analysis:
Beijing’s Stance on North Korea
By ANNE WU
February 18, 2005
North Korea’s declaration that it has nuclear weapons and withdrawal from the six-party talks on the issue amounts to a slap in the face for China, which had worked hard to facilitate these difficult negotiations. All sides agree that the key to resolving the deadlock now lies in Beijing’s hands.
China’s strategy rests on trying to get Pyongyang back to the negotiating table, as Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing made clear in a weekend telephone conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. He said Beijing would press for another round of the six-party talks, which bring together the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Russia and Japan.
Traditionally China has been reluctant to put strong pressure on Pyongyang to achieve such goals, arguing that wielding sticks against the Kim Jong Il regime would only prove counterproductive. Although Beijing has previously been prepared to privately caution North Korea, support a resolution in the International Atomic Energy Agency accusing it of violating the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and even briefly cut off oil supplies for three days in 2003, it has generally opposed economic sanctions or any other form of international pressure which might risk shaking Kim’s regime.
Beijing doubts the effectiveness of sanctions against its hermit neighbor, which has shown substantial resilience and pride. Whenever any country or institution has threatened it in the past, Pyongyang has simply responded by stepping up its rhetoric. Moreover, the spillover effects of imposing sanctions on a neighboring country could be severe. China fears that sanctions could leave it shouldering a heavier economic and social burden, including a greater influx of refugees that would pose both humanitarian and diplomatic dilemmas. It also fears that if sanctions did lead to the collapse of the Kim regime, there would be still worse consequences – potentially even including a geopolitical realignment in Asia.
However North Korea’s declaration of nuclear weapons may have changed the equation. It runs counter to China’s long-declared desire for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. And it threatens to cause all manner of undesirable effects, not least the risk that Japan, South Korea, and even Taiwan may seek to follow suit.
It’s also becoming much harder for China to resist the growing pressure from the international community to take a tougher line against Pyongyang. U.S. President George W. Bush was quick to share with Beijing the alarming intelligence that North Korea may have sold uranium to Libya, sending Michael Green, the senior director for Asia at the U.S. National Security Council, to China to deliver a personal letter to President Hu Jintao earlier this month. China has so far refused to accept Washington’s assertions that Pyongyang is conducting a secret uranium-enrichment program, or support a U.N. Security Council resolution criticizing North Korea’s behavior. But in the face of increasing pressure from the U.S. and the international community, China may have no choice but to take bolder action. A change of stance on both issues is now possible.
But any new policy will still be a far cry from Washington’s formula of “hawkish engagement” with North Korea. Instead the policy that China is likely to adopt might best be described as “dovish containment.” That means continuing to understand North Korea’s concerns and refusing to consider any punitive measures until all possible peaceful means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted. But it also means making it clear to Pyongyang that, if it continues to take advantage of Beijing’s support to act in a way that undermines China’s credibility and national interest, then there will come a point when Beijing will have to take a tougher stance.
That’s a message which Wang Jiarui, head of the Chinese Communist Party’s international liaison department, will have an opportunity to drive home when he begins a high-level visit to North Korea tomorrow [Friday]. Beijing needs to be more straightforward in making it clear to Pyongyang that its support is not unqualified-as summed up by a Chinese idiom that refers to those who refuse a toast being forced to drink a forfeit instead.
But China will only be prepared to take bolder action if Washington too is prepared to show flexibility. Beijing’s view remains that placing too much pressure on Pyongyang without offering it a way to climb down gracefully will only push North Korea in a corner that could lead to war. That means pressuring Washington to show flexibility over such issues as offering measures to satisfy North Korea’s economic and security needs, and being prepared to accept an initial freeze of Pyongyang’s plutonium program without immediately insisting on its ultimate objective of “complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization.”
China knows full well that both Pyongyang and Washington want its support, and that puts it in a powerful bargaining position. As Sun Tzu said in “The Art of War,” “Those skilled in war bring the enemy to the field of battle and are not brought there by him.” It’s time for the other parties to seize the initiative from North Korea and jumpstart the talks. And by slightly shifting its policy toward one of dovish containment, China can play an important role in that process.
Ms. Wu, a former official in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.