Nukes and North Korea

A couple excellent observations from The Belmont Club:

http://belmontclub.blogspot.com/2005/02/all-for-one-and-one-for-all-2-north.html

North Korea has announced that it has nuclear weapons ( http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=486863 ).

[i]Seoul, South Korea Feb 10, 2005 ? North Korea on Thursday announced for the first time that it has nuclear weapons and rejected moves to restart disarmament talks any time soon, saying it needs the armaments as protection against an increasingly hostile United States. ...

Previously, North Korea reportedly told U.S. negotiators in private talks that it had nuclear weapons and might test one of them. Its U.N. envoy told The Associated Press last year that the country had "weaponized" plutonium from its pool of 8,000 nuclear spent fuel rods. [/i]

This had long been suspected. Pyongyang’s declaration may be doubted without a test that proves actual possession. But why announce nuclear status now? North Korea benefited from an earlier ambiguity for several reasons. The foremost was keeping Japan non-nuclear. The second was to extort payments from those who preferred to think that bribes would prevent them from attaining what they already had. Lastly, there remained the hope that North Korea could sell its secret weaponry for profit or use it deniably. All these advantages are now foregone.

In exchange North Korea may believe that a nuclear status will confer great power status and immunity from outside interference. A Pyongyang worried about its stability would be tempted to use a nuclear status to say ‘leave me alone’. But North Koreas declaration, whether true or false will now force Japan, Australia, Taiwan, South Korea and perhaps Singapore to either obtain ironclad guarantees of inclusion under the American nuclear umbrella or develop nukes themselves. It would be intolerable for those countries to face a North Korean threat without a comeback. The could trigger a chain reaction of proliferation. For example, Australian nukes would make Indonesia think of having them.

The acquisition of nuclear weapons by a rogue or lawless state with weak control systems will create, to a lesser degree, one the instabilities consequent to a nonstate organization like Al Qaeda getting them. As All for One and One for All pointed out ( Belmont Club: All for One and One for All ), a world in which the possession of nuclear weapons became commonplace and deniable use possible would create an environment where smaller nations and eventually nonstate actors would pursue secret WMD programs not out of superpower fear, but out of mutual dread. In 1962, Israel feared that Nasser of Egypt was preparing a radiological attack on Israel. In a meeting with President Kennedy ( President Kennedy Meeting With Israeli Foreign Minister Golda Meir (December 1962) ), Golda Meir stated those concerns:

[i]Israel knows that Egypt has, with German help, been building ground-to-ground missiles since 1960. Now Israel has learned, as it didn't know one or two months ago, that the Egyptians are making preparations for radiological warfare. The warheads are to be filled with materials that would contaminate the land for years and years. It seems that if the refugees can't come back, the Egyptians think that at least the land should not be available to Israelis. Now Israel has information that Egypt has established a secret budget of $220-250,000,000 for work of about four years or so on this. [/i]

Whether true or not, such fears may have fueled the secret Israeli nuclear weapons program. Its history, with minor changes of date and names, sounds disturbingly familiar ( Nuclear Weapons - Israel ).

[i]For reactor design and construction, Israel sought the assistance of France. ... France was a natural partner for Israel and both governments saw an independent nuclear option as a means by which they could maintain a degree of autonomy in the bipolar environment of the cold war. ...  This complex was constructed in secret, and outside the IAEA inspection regime, by French and Israeli technicians at Dimona, in the Negev desert under the leadership of Col. Manes Pratt of the IDF Ordinance Corps.

At the height construction, some 1,500 Israelis some French workers were employed building Dimona. To maintain secrecy, French customs officials were told that the largest of the reactor components, such as the reactor tank, were part of a desalinization plant bound for Latin America. ... President de Gaulle was concerned that the inevitable scandal following any revelations about French assistance with the project, especially the chemical reprocessing plant, would have negative repercussions for France's international position, already on shaky ground because of its war in Algeria.

At a subsequent meeting with Ben-Gurion, de Gaulle offered to sell Israel fighter aircraft in exchange for stopping work on the reprocessing plant, and came away from the meeting convinced that the matter was closed. It was not. ...  In reality, not much changed - French contractors finished work on the reactor and reprocessing plant, uranium fuel was delivered and the reactor went critical in 1964.

The United States first became aware of Dimona's existence after U-2 overflights in 1958 captured the facility's construction, but it was not identified as a nuclear site until two years later. The complex was variously explained as a textile plant, an agricultural station, and a metallurgical research facility, until David Ben-Gurion stated in December 1960 that Dimona complex was a nuclear research center built for "peaceful purposes." [/i]

The Jewish-Islamic arms race had begun. There is precious little historical basis to believe that every ethnic hatred in the world will not someday engage in its equivalent.


http://belmontclub.blogspot.com/2005/02/i-lied-uk-times-reports-egg-on.html

The UK Times reports egg on everyone’s face in the wake of North Korea’s announcement that it has nuclear weapons ( http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,542-1479070,00.html ).

[i] The political, as distinct from military, significance of North Korea?s move is considerable. Since being confronted in 2002 with US evidence that it had cheated on a 1994 agreement to suspend all its nuclear weapons programmes, the regime has tried bluff, bluster and partial truths. Both forced admissions and boastful hints emanated from behind closed doors, in official negotiations or in easily retracted hints to reporters. Never before has it made a formal public statement that it possesses nuclear bombs.

The regime of Kim Jong Il may not have intended to make life more difficult for Beijing, but it has surely done so. China?s stance throughout has been that it opposes a nuclear-armed Korean peninsula, but that since it was unclear whether North Korea was even close to the point of developing actual nuclear weapons, the US and Japan should have the patience to fall in with China?s preferred strategy of gradual engagement. Only last week, US envoys were in Beijing to show the Chinese evidence of a North Korean sale of a uranium compound to Libya, and to deliver a letter, from George W. Bush to President Hu Jintao, speaking of ?the greatly heightened urgency? of tackling the problem. Now that Pyongyang itself has made that case, Beijing must have been thankful yesterday that the Chinese new year holiday excused it from early comment. [/i]

Well how about that? Kim Jong Il actually lied to Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton. Who would have thought it possible? The problem with nuclear weapons nonproliferation agreements today is that they create the temptation to plan contingencies on the basis of intent rather than capability. North Korea is a case in point. The diplomatic approach toward North Korea depended not on its actual capability but on the perception of its capability. Nothing changed over 24 hours except the North Korean press release claiming the possession of nuclear weapons; yet the announcement, not the reality, made all the difference. The reason the fiction, if fiction it was, lasted so long is that so many desperately wanted to believe that WMDs could be contained, so that the music could keep playing and everyone could return to the old games of saving the whales, dancing in ethnic costumes and clapping their hands.

http://www.cs.rice.edu/~ssiyer/minstrels/poems/889.html

[i]Faces along the bar
Cling to their average day:
The lights must never go out,
The music must always play,
All the conventions conspire
To make this fort assume
The furniture of home;
Lest we should see where we are,
Lost in a haunted wood,
Children afraid of the night
who have never been happy or good.
-- WH Auden [/i]

The alternative is to abandon the “sophisticated” view of a stable international order and understand that we are a planet in crisis; that in some meaningful sense humanity is in a death match with terror.

From today’s Wall Street Journal editorials:

China’s Korea Test
February 14, 2005; Page A18

North Korea’s announcement last week that it has nuclear weapons, and that it will pull out of disarmament talks, brings to mind Vice President Dick Cheney’s words last April in Beijing. “Time is not necessarily on our side,” the visiting Veep was reported as telling China’s leaders.

Mr. Cheney’s warning was delivered in the context of praising China for trying to persuade Pyongyang to give up its nuclear ambitions, most notably by hosting the so-called six-party talks among North and South Korea, China, the U.S., Japan and Russia. But time for that approach is fast running out. If China expects to join the G-8 nations as a constructive force, it will have to behave like one – and how it now leans on North Korean President Kim Jong Il is a major test.

It’s not hard to understand why North Korea chose this moment to act out. The last six-party talks took place in June, and Pyongyang had delayed its response to the next round hoping that a President Kerry would agree to bilateral negotiations. Now that President Bush is staying and has made it clear he wants to stick with the six-party format, the North Koreans are testing the waters.

Pyongyang aims to exploit what it perceives as fissures between the U.S. and South Korea and China about how to deal with the North. In the case of South Korea, the difference is growing. In the nearly two years that he has been in office, President Roh Moo-hyun has done everything possible to prop up the Kim regime. His administration continues to pump money into projects in the North, and there are those in Mr. Roh’s circle who consider Washington a greater threat than Pyongyang to South Korean security.

As for China, it’s worth noting that Pyongyang made its announcement on Thursday, the first day of the Lunar New Year, when government offices were closed in Beijing and senior officials weren’t around to react. China is the only nation that exercises any significant influence on Pyongyang, and in recent years it finally seems to have dawned on it that having a nuclear neighbor run by a deranged dictator is not necessarily in its national interest. China supplies 80% to 90% of North Korea’s energy needs, and two years ago this month it turned off the oil pipeline for three days to make a point about nuclear misbehavior. It is a critical source of food for the North.

China also shares an extensive border that is the preferred escape route for North Korea’s enslaved population. China’s longstanding policy is to repatriate Korean refugees, refusing even to hand them over to the United Nations. Even Kim Jong Il must realize his regime would collapse if China declared the border open, just as East Germany’s did when Hungary refused to turn back refugees in 1989.

Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing called Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice over the weekend and said his country would push North Korea for a new round of six-party talks. The state-run Chinese press has strongly condemned Pyongyang’s actions. But the six-party talks were Beijing’s idea in the first place, presented in 2003 as the alternative to U.N. Security Council action when North Korea expelled international arms inspectors and withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Meantime, as Nicholas Eberstadt describes in a related commentary, Pyongyang has been able to conclude that it can get away with pretty much anything.

We can understand why the Bush Administration wanted to downplay the Korean issue through last fall’s election, but the second term is here. If China refuses to act after Kim’s latest threats, the only U.S. leverage will be to take the matter to the U.N. Security Council for sanctions and other action. At least then every country, including China, will have to declare whether it really wants to tolerate and sustain a nuclear North Korea.

[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:
We can understand why the Bush Administration wanted to downplay the Korean issue through last fall’s election, but the second term is here.[/quote]

That’s funny. I don’t understand it.

[quote]Professor X wrote:
BostonBarrister wrote:
We can understand why the Bush Administration wanted to downplay the Korean issue through last fall’s election, but the second term is here.

That’s funny. I don’t understand it.[/quote]

Votes, man - votes.

Oh Shit!

Here’s the Stratfor take on the situation – and it seems to be playing out, given Rice’s comments that North Korea may just be blustering:

“North Korea might believe it has raised the stakes in the game of chicken, but it has yet to be seen if the United States is even playing the game.”

North Korea’s Nuclear Game: One Player or Two?

By Rodger Baker
and Marla Dial

The world continues to react to North Korea’s clearest statement yet that it possesses nuclear weapons. And major powers, despite cautious public statements, already appear to be weighing how they can best play the issue to their advantage. However, Pyongyang’s Feb. 10 message was crafted with primarily one audience in mind, and ultimately it is only the United States that can halt the game of nuclear chicken.

The timing of the announcement is the biggest clue to North Korea’s intent, as the official statement itself did little but confirm what long has been treated as de facto by much of the world, and was issued when most of Asia’s reactions would be slowed by celebrations of the Lunar New Year. Turning to its traditional mouthpiece, the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang specifically mentioned President George W. Bush’s inaugural and State of the Union addresses, as well as statements made by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in its decision to abandon six-way negotiations on the nuclear issue.

Though both officials gave short shrift to North Korea in their actual words, Pyongyang – which is consumed by the need for regime preservation – clearly sees itself targeted by the Bush administration’s second-term priorities: to spread “American-style liberty and democracy” throughout the world and stem the spread of nuclear weapons. Through KCNA, the Foreign Ministry said officials expect nothing different in Bush’s second term than they saw in the first, and called Washington’s emphasis on six-party talks “a bid to mislead the world public opinion.”

With typically tactful phrasing, the statement continued: “This is nothing but a far-fetched logic of gangsters as it is a good example fully revealing the wicked nature and brazen-faced double-dealing tactics of the U.S. as a master hand at plot-breeding and deception.”

Pyongyang long has been demanding direct attention and recognition of its sovereignty by the United States. In essence, the nuclear announcement was an ultimatum to Washington to drop the policy initiative of regime change in return for abandonment of North Korea’s weapons program.

In many respects, the entire dynamic is eerily similar to that with Iran, which also has been engaging in a game of nuclear brinksmanship lately – at least at the rhetorical level. Iran, however, has at least a few other cards in its diplomatic deck, not the least of which is oil. But for Pyongyang, as the Foreign Ministry statement tacitly acknowledged, only the recognition of the world’s sole superpower or a strong military deterrent will safeguard North Korea’s sovereignty. And if North Korea were to test a nuclear weapon (the one step that would elevate the entire discussion from the rhetorical level), it stands to reason that other unarmed Asian states would be forced to pursue their own weapons initiatives. That, of course, would undermine the significance of the United States’ own nuclear umbrella, as well as its global influence.

North Korea has left the door open for talks, but only on an equal diplomatic footing with the United States.

At this writing, the Bush administration has given no definitive reaction to Pyongyang – we suspect deliberately. The problem for North Korea is that the White House consistently has refused to allow the situation to be shaped by wild-eyed statements from the Hermit Kingdom, and there appears to be no reason for Washington to treat this instance differently, despite worldwide media play.

North Korea might believe it has raised the stakes in the game of chicken, but it has yet to be seen if the United States is even playing the game.

[quote]Professor X wrote:
BostonBarrister wrote:
We can understand why the Bush Administration wanted to downplay the Korean issue through last fall’s election, but the second term is here.

That’s funny. I don’t understand it.[/quote]

Prof,

I think it comes down to the fact that there’s not really all that much for the U.S. to do – we need to deal with China and have them step up and control the situation. I think that the idea that it was downplayed during the election was because it would have added confusion to the election, given it wasn’t really a campaign issue. It’s a complex issue – Kerry didn’t want to bring it up because he didn’t have an alternative, and Bush didn’t want to bring it up because of how much his plan (seemingly) involves convincing China that it’s in China’s best interest to shut North Korea down on this (There will probably be some sort of horse trading, with us reminding China that our allies, notably Taiwan and Japan, might want to develop their own nukes if faced with an unstable nuclear-powered regime in North Korea).

BB,

The liberal line is: If we attack Iraq, we must attack, North Korea, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, etc…

It’s all or nothing, baby!!!

If we don’t attack every brutal dictator, there couldn’t possibly have been a humanitarian aspect to the invasion of Iraq.

Funny thing is, if W. proposed it, they wouldn’t support any of it.

Ever!!!

JeffR

If I was a leader in China, what incentive do I have to get involved in the situation at all?

North Korea, while a somewhat strange situation, is really a threat to US interests in the region, much more so than Chinese (or Russian), is it not?

I can certainly understand wanting to include more regional players in any unfolding situation, but I’m a little fuzzy in understanding their actual incentive…

[quote]vroom wrote:
If I was a leader in China, what incentive do I have to get involved in the situation at all?

North Korea, while a somewhat strange situation, is really a threat to US interests in the region, much more so than Chinese (or Russian), is it not?

I can certainly understand wanting to include more regional players in any unfolding situation, but I’m a little fuzzy in understanding their actual incentive…[/quote]

If N Korea is a threat to the U.S., then it damn well better be a threat to China. If the U.S. was to take away our trade with China, they would crash and burn in a matter of months. They don’t have the ability to maintain their economy based on domestic use.

Another reason China should take the N. Korean situation seriously is that, if they want to be considered a real player in the G-8, they have to at least act like they care about global stability.

Nuclear weapons in the hands of rogue states is bad for everyone.

[quote]vroom wrote:
If I was a leader in China, what incentive do I have to get involved in the situation at all?

North Korea, while a somewhat strange situation, is really a threat to US interests in the region, much more so than Chinese (or Russian), is it not?

I can certainly understand wanting to include more regional players in any unfolding situation, but I’m a little fuzzy in understanding their actual incentive…[/quote]

vroom,

The main issue is that everyone knows North Korea cannot do anything without Chinese approval. The Chinese supply North Korea with oil, and also with food and aid. If they were to say “jump,” North Korea would necessarily say “How high?”, with attendant diplomatic niceties, of course.

The incentive for the Chinese is that they are currently the regional power in the Southeast Asian area, and probably should be considered the pre-eminent military power in Asia. What they don’t want is a major disruption in their regional hegemony – and I can’t think of many things that would be more disruptive than an arms race that is triggered by North Korea that ends up with Japan and/or Taiwan obtaining nuclear weapons – if the Chinese were to see a cause-effect relationship between North Korea having nukes and Taiwan getting them, they would definitely shut down the North Koreans.

The incentive for the Chinese is that they are currently the regional power in the Southeast Asian area, and probably should be considered the pre-eminent military power in Asia.[/quote]

I think I would classify them as the pre-eminent military power in the world. They just flex their muscles as much as we do! I mean a billion man army is pretty damn scary coupled with nukes and bottle rockets…

The incentive for China is to assert itself as a major power. It’a thier backyard.

As to the vaunted billion man army…it is untested and defensive in nature.

Preeminent not by a long shot. They cannot project power yet. The US would most likely sweep the sea and sky of the PLA in a matter of days. We certainly would not slug it out with them on the ground…we have no reason too. Our technology is a force multiplier of at least 20 to 1 in most cases.

China has an interest in keeping the peace. If they don’t we will do it for them. they don’t want a nuclear N Korea any more then we do.

[quote]hedo wrote:
Preeminent not by a long shot. They cannot project power yet. The US would most likely sweep the sea and sky of the PLA in a matter of days. We certainly would not slug it out with them on the ground…we have no reason too. Our technology is a force multiplier of at least 20 to 1 in most cases.

China has an interest in keeping the peace. If they don’t we will do it for them. they don’t want a nuclear N Korea any more then we do.[/quote]

Careful, careful…you might be accused of ‘misunderestimation’, or ‘misoverestimation’.

One should never comment on military power, or lack thereof, in this forum. It makes liberals, and ProfessorX irritable.

Okay guys, I’m hearing China is important in the region and yada yada yada. I’m not convinced that the arguments you’ve given actually incent China to do anything.

My take is that if China had incentive to deal with the situation, we wouldn’t be in the current position at all. They’ve been there all along and they’ve let the whole situation brew continously.

Is it really likely that surrounding countries will get their own independent nukes, when alternately they are already under the umbrella of US protection anyway?

Wouldn’t some type of crisis in the region simply allow China to step in after the fact and offer aid and stability to the affected areas afterwards? Seems to me this is the cheapest method of annexing a hunk of land without pissing everyone off.

If China wants to be taken seriously as global economic power, then they have to take some responsibility for the goings on in their back yard.

They’ve won the economic lottery so to speak. A lottery winner will do one of two things with their new-found wealth: squander it on trailer houses and boob jobs, or invest it, grow it, and make more money. By sitting there and doing nothing about the N. Korea situation, China will be doing the former - especially if the U.S. downgrades them from MFN status. By getting their unruly step-child to behave, they are building some equity.

I think the people most concerned are probably the South Koreans.

Rainjack,

I know what you are saying, but that is entirely from our point of view. Perhaps China doesn’t give a crap whether or not we consider them a respectable world economic power.

Their size, capabilities and economy are simply things… whether or not we appreciate them having very little to do with their continued operation.

I ask again, what, other than our own ego-centric ideals for them as a country incents them to take action, when the US is proving itself very willing to be the world police and look after this issue?

China avoids the conflict, avoids the negative publicity and potentially benefits by picking up the pieces. If we were Chinese, we’d be sitting around hoping the US would both pay for and do our dirty work for us.

While I understand that we don’t want to do this, and would really appreciate their help on the issue, I don’t know what we’ve offered as incentive if the situation doesn’t have incentive enough on its own. This situation has been brewing along steamingly for many years now. Why?

vroom,

Japan and Taiwan haven’t decided to go nuclear yet – but they could, quickly.

Japan is classified as a “Virtual Nuclear State”. They have developed a complete nuclear fuel cycle (including plutonium breeding and extraction) but have only refrained from developing nuclear weapons because of the cultural stigma involved. North Korea’s antics over the last decade have been eroding this cultural taboo at an ever-increasing rate. Serious analysts of Japan’s nuclear industry argue that Japan could go nuclear within six weeks of deciding to do so.

Also, Japan has several delivery systems, including a orbital rocket that could be developed into an ICBM rather quickly.

I don’t know about Taiwan’s capability, but if we were to imply to China that we would help, that changes the perceptions rather quickly.

Fear is a dangerous thing. Especially when you are a couple of hundred miles from a madman.

Forgot to mention – South Korea also has nuclear technology. An escalation in an arms race over there could happen very, very quickly. U.S. military power as a balance against China has prevented it thus far, but a nuclear-armed North Korea adds a hugely unstable element to the mix.