[quote]Dr. Pangloss wrote:
[quote]jjackkrash wrote:
I’d like to be clear I’m not advocating for government interference either as a matter of policy; my comments are limited to the theory of automatically giving artificial entities rights akin to the bill of rights. I think doing so without clearly thinking out the theoretical implications of this is problematic.
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What was the extent of the Citizen’s United ruling? Was it limited to First Amendment rights, or could it be construed to include other rights? Does a corporation have protections against search and seizures or are those rights only applicable to the individuals that make up the corp?
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Its reasoning was pretty fucking broad.
The Court has recognized that HN22 [***LEdHR22] LEdHR(22)[22]First Amendment protection extends to corporations. Bellotti, supra, at 778, n. 14, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (citing Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 S. Ct. 1614, 52 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1977); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S. Ct. 958, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1975); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S. Ct. 1239, 43 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1975); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1975); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S. Ct. 2831, 41 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1974); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971) (per curiam); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S. Ct. 534, 17 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686; [**900] Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 360 U.S. 684, 79 S. Ct. 1362, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1512 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S. Ct. 777, 96 L. Ed. 1098 (1952)); see, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 137 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1997); Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 135 L. Ed. 2d 888 (1996); Turner, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497; Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. 105, 112 S. Ct. 501, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476; Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 106 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1989); Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 109 S. Ct. 2603, 105 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 89 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1986); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S. Ct. 2440, 49 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1976); [***784] Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S. Ct. 1537, 26 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1970).
This protection has been extended by explicit holdings to the context of political speech. See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S., at 428-429, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 56 S. Ct. 444, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936). Under the rationale of these precedents, HN23 [***LEdHR23] LEdHR(23)[23] political speech does not lose First Amendment protection “simply because its source is a corporation.” Bellotti, supra, at 784, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707; see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S. Ct. 903, 89 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“The identity of the speaker is not decisive in determining whether speech is protected. [*343] Corporations and other associations, like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster” (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 783, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707)).
The Court has thus rejected the argument that political speech of corporations or other associations should be treated differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not “natural persons.” Id., at 776, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707; see id., at 780, n. 16, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707. Cf. id., at 828, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
I don’t think the cases cited are as clear on this as the opinion suggests. For example, in the Bellotti case cited first, the Court noted:
Certain “purely personal” guarantees, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, are unavailable to corporations and other organizations because the “historic function” of the particular guarantee has been limited to the protection of individuals. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 (1944). Whether or not a particular guarantee is “purely personal” or is unavailable to corporations for some other reason depends on the nature, history, and purpose of the particular constitutional provision.
The clear trend in the law is leaning towards broadly giving/expanding bill-of-rights type rights to corporations and treating them like natural people, but I’m just not convinced this is a wise policy or trend or that its necessary to protect liberty in the same way that its necessary to protect individuals. In all honesty, I haven’t thought the issue through as much as I’d like, something about automatically extending “natural rights” or con-law-bill-of-rights type rights to corporations troubles me.