^ Laplace’s demon has precisely nothing to do with omniscience. It illustrates an inescapable consequence of a rigidly causal universe.
I feel like saying “if something is intrinsically random, that intrinsic randomness is the causing factor” is no different than saying “a circle is a circle because it’s a circle.”
[quote]ZJStrope wrote:
I feel like saying “if something is intrinsically random, that intrinsic randomness is the causing factor” is no different than saying “a circle is a circle because it’s a circle.”[/quote]
Indeed. I would go even further and suggest that it is a meaningless combination of words. “Intrinsic randomness” is not itself a thing that can serve to bring the potential to the actual; it is merely a description we use to point to a particular phenomenon.
The phenomenon in question is, generally speaking, a simple event: state A turns to state B. The causal principle dictates that there was a specific set of conditions such that, given them, A must have turned to B and, were those conditions duplicated precisely, A would always turn precisely to B.
This is where Laplace’s demon comes into play. The demon would, given state A and the mentioned conditions, be able to exactly predict B. Not “something like B” and not “either B or C”–precisely B.
If the world did operate in this way, then, if the demon knew the precise measurements of every little bit of matter or particle or wave-function or field or whatever you’d like to call the makeup of existence–if it had a complete snapshot of the universe at any given time–and it also knew the “laws of nature” which describe how the causal principle operates, then the demon could tell you every single thing that has even happened, and every single thing that ever will happen, those things being necessarily deducible from simple analysis of any actual state of the universe.
[quote]smh_23 wrote:
[quote]ZJStrope wrote:
I feel like saying “if something is intrinsically random, that intrinsic randomness is the causing factor” is no different than saying “a circle is a circle because it’s a circle.”[/quote]
Indeed. I would go even further and suggest that it is a meaningless combination of words. “Intrinsic randomness” is not itself a thing that can serve to bring the potential to the actual; it is merely a description we use to point to a particular phenomenon.
The phenomenon in question is, generally speaking, a simple event: state A turns to state B. The causal principle dictates that there was a specific set of conditions such that, given them, A must have turned to B and, were those conditions duplicated precisely, A would always turn precisely to B.
This is where Laplace’s demon comes into play. The demon would, given state A and the mentioned conditions, be able to exactly predict B. Not “something like B” and not “either B or C”–precisely B.
If the world did operate in this way, then, if the demon knew the precise measurements of every little bit of matter or particle or wave-function or field or whatever you’d like to call the makeup of existence–if it had a complete snapshot of the universe at any given time–and it also knew the “laws of nature” which describe how the causal principle operates, then the demon could tell you every single thing that has even happened, and every single thing that ever will happen, those things being necessarily deducible from simple analysis of any actual state of the universe.[/quote]
Yeah that makes sense. It’s kind of along the lines of something I saw Stephen Hawkins talking about regarding “free-will.” I like to analogize to ensure my understanding is correct.
Stephen proposes that perhaps “free-will” isn’t really free-will in how we discuss and/or perceive it; rather, our free-will is dictated by our experiences. Our experiences then dictate how we will respond to other experiences/stimuli. So in that sense, I’m really not consciously making a decision as I have a predisposition to react a certain way.
So in this sense, if someone knew how the combination of experiences impact how I function, they should then be able to predict how someone would react to certain stimuli. However, I would further propose that we are of a certain intelligence level that we may be able to overcome these and make an unpredictable or random choice.
Does this make sense and is it analogous?
[quote]ZJStrope wrote:
[quote]smh_23 wrote:
[quote]ZJStrope wrote:
I feel like saying “if something is intrinsically random, that intrinsic randomness is the causing factor” is no different than saying “a circle is a circle because it’s a circle.”[/quote]
Indeed. I would go even further and suggest that it is a meaningless combination of words. “Intrinsic randomness” is not itself a thing that can serve to bring the potential to the actual; it is merely a description we use to point to a particular phenomenon.
The phenomenon in question is, generally speaking, a simple event: state A turns to state B. The causal principle dictates that there was a specific set of conditions such that, given them, A must have turned to B and, were those conditions duplicated precisely, A would always turn precisely to B.
This is where Laplace’s demon comes into play. The demon would, given state A and the mentioned conditions, be able to exactly predict B. Not “something like B” and not “either B or C”–precisely B.
If the world did operate in this way, then, if the demon knew the precise measurements of every little bit of matter or particle or wave-function or field or whatever you’d like to call the makeup of existence–if it had a complete snapshot of the universe at any given time–and it also knew the “laws of nature” which describe how the causal principle operates, then the demon could tell you every single thing that has even happened, and every single thing that ever will happen, those things being necessarily deducible from simple analysis of any actual state of the universe.[/quote]
Yeah that makes sense. It’s kind of along the lines of something I saw Stephen Hawkins talking about regarding “free-will.” I like to analogize to ensure my understanding is correct.
Stephen proposes that perhaps “free-will” isn’t really free-will in how we discuss and/or perceive it; rather, our free-will is dictated by our experiences. Our experiences then dictate how we will respond to other experiences/stimuli. So in that sense, I’m really not consciously making a decision as I have a predisposition to react a certain way.
So in this sense, if someone knew how the combination of experiences impact how I function, they should then be able to predict how someone would react to certain stimuli. However, I would further propose that we are of a certain intelligence level that we may be able to overcome these and make an unpredictable or random choice.
Does this make sense and is it analogous? [/quote]
It does indeed make sense.
The really crazy thing is to think that, if the materialists are correct, even the choices we make–our reactions to the stimuli–are nothing more than sums of exceedingly small events: No different, qualitatively, than Robinson Cano’s bat connecting with a high fastball for a home run. In which case it would seem that even the most intelligent of us could never fool the demon.
[quote]smh_23 wrote:
If all goes according to plan, this will wrap up my writings on the subject of quantum acausality.
[/quote]
Doubtful. Even if a theory proposes a position of ‘exists for no reason’, it’s still a theory which at best is unproven by definition.
This statement is false:
‘Further, in most philosophical views of physical laws, the laws have no causal efficacy’. The author is confusing the statement and observation by which a law is derived from the causal processes involved. The said law does not exist in a vacuum as the law that is derived is also caused.
‘In Aristotelian terms, we are looking for the efficient cause: the thing that brings about the change at the instant it occurs.’
We’re not talking about ‘efficient cause’, we’re talking about contingency, time is not a factor in contingency.
‘Now, I’m happy to admit that there are probably some definitions of those terms that allows one to deduce the principle from them. But then you are left with the question of whether those definitions have anything to do with the sort of changes we actually see in the world.’ ← Author shoots himself in the foot here. Seeing said changes in the ‘real world’ is irrelevant to the problem. The ability to define a process is a statement of causation.
‘So, quantum mechanical processes give us strong reason to doubt the premise that “Whatever changes is changed by something else.”’ ← This statement also misses the point and is either deliberate ignorance regarding what causation is, or only holding fast to Aristotelian causation. Again, that’s not the argument.
It’s also irrelevant that QM as a whole is necessarily incomplete. No science is, if it were there would be nothing left to discover.
‘Last time, we saw that in trying to establish the principle “Whatever changes is changed by something else,” Feser argued that a potentiality can’t be actualized by nothing, because then there would be no way of explaining when the change occurred.’ ← This is just completely bastardized. That in no way, represents the argument. Again, time is not a factor, it’s just another caused entity.
'The electron can be excited to a higher energy level by absorbing a photon. ← In trying to explain that said event happens for no reason, he gave a reason…Being able to predict when this happens is completely irrelevant.
Well, I don’t know why you posted this one since it actually defends what I am saying about causation and it defends causation itself, but ok. Certainly, I agree, in short, not stating a cause does not entail that no cause exists.
Which is arguing against a type of causation, not causation at it’s core. Whether it changes by something else, which the author presupposes is a physical cause, it does not suppose it happens for no reason. Said reason need not be physical.
I said that quantum mechanics itself is caused. More specifically, the study of quantum events is caused. It’s caused by the observation and categorization of that which exists in the subatomic realm.
I agree wholeheartedly that the study, or observation of something, or a description of something is not a statement of cause.
You do realize that this author is defending causation, right? It’s actually refuting what you claim, not supporting it, at all, in any way. It is in fact supporting what I have been saying all along.
You’re mixing up articles here. But nevertheless, the author’s caveat “If this is the basis of the metaphysics response” is the key here. It is not the basis for the metaphysical response. Author is dealing with ‘efficient cause’, which is not what is proposed.
The problem with the blogger’s assumption is this statement “then you need to somehow justify the idea that there is always a reason for the change to happen when it does.” In short, ‘when’ is not the question or the problem. If he didn’t put ‘when’ in there, he would have made a much better objection, but the defense is simple as is the defense of the Principle of Sufficient reason. In short, something happens for a reason, or it does not happen because something cannot come from nothing. Nothing is a broad definition, or lack there of. Nothing is an utter lack of existence in any form. To say that something happens for ‘no reason’ is to say, from nothing, something. Nothing doesn’t exist, it’s not ‘very little’ it’s absolutely nothing. An from what does not exist, something cannot be brought to exist.
Which is an incorrect notion since we are not concerned with ‘traditional notions of causality’. Causality can be understood under some ‘traditional notions’ such as aristotelian causation, but non-traditional notions such as contingency which is a purer form are still in play.
No you didn’t. You presented, and in some cases misrepresented (as in the case with 'intrinsic randomness which deals with locality, not true ramdomness, which account for it’s predicate ‘intrisic’) some quantum mechanical events that seem to have no apparent efficient cause, but they don’t dismiss causation as a whole.
You don’t actually think you’ve proven that deductive reasoning is de facto circular do you?
And sure, you can have all the parts of a motor cycle and not have a motor cycle. If you could lay all the parts of a circle on a table, you would not have a circle until you have ‘assembled them’ in the correct order.
No, you didn’t. You attempted to show that deductive arguments are circular and therefore fallacious by default.
Hume certainly did a number on causation as it is understood empirically. He did way more damage to science than he did to theism.
This if you will, suffers from the fallacy of ‘appeal to authority’.
Further, said ‘blogs’ are blogs. And they attempted to debunk aristotelian causation, of which even that, I don’t beleive they did a sufficient job.
Again, appeal to authority. Intelligent people does not presuppose they are infallable and cannot be wrong. Further, they are in able to disprove theism on the basis of scientific proofs.
You could not prove the existence of God by facing him. That’s a sensible experience which cannot be proven a priori.
So let me retort. You have not proven that ‘intrinsic randomness’ is truly random, you seem to mistake the ‘problem’ of local causes, under the model of efficient cause with happening for ‘no reason’. The reason something happens need not require physical cause. It may be the nature of the object to behave in a non-measurable way as a result of the properties of the particle. But you certainly have not shown that it happens for no reason. And as long as there are unknowns about the object, process or event, you cannot eliminate a cause. Further it seems you misunderstand the principle altogether in that ‘intrinsic randomness’ is an observation, about the behavior of certain particles or fields under certain conditions. The theories do not dispel the notion of causation, quite the opposite, it posits that this unmeasurable behavior is a function of the ‘system’ that it belongs to. Much like twins in New York and L.A, feeling the same emotion at the same time. It actually helps the ‘classical model’ of causal relationships in that is shows that cause and effect can happen simultaneously. In more pure formal understanding of causation, time is not necessary for this phenomena. If they belong to the same system, and display related behavior over vast expanses of space and time, one looks to the system for the cause. Which is a far more interesting conclusion than trying to disprove causation.
Further, I ask for clarification on this matter, you provided none. I asked for an example that can be looked at, you provided none.
Now as to my ‘proofs’, I provided what you requested. If you lacked information, you did not tell me you needed it. I am not sure what you need me to provide for instance, for you to understand that premises and conclusions are not identical things. Premises leading to a conclusion is not circular reasoning tautologically, or by any other method. You may not understand it, or I may not have been clear, or clear enough. But most assuredly, that which makes up a thing and the thing itself are not the same and they are not interchangeable. Nor is it a matter of the thing itself defining itself. It’s logically impossible for that to be true.
As for the cosmological argument, at least you are doing the right thing, you are attacking it’s premises. If you are going to attempt to prove the argument wrong that’s the only thing you can do. You have not disproved causation, not even close, no matter how much you think you have. And whether you realize it or not, you don’t really want to, because it makes that which exists literally unintelligible.
Now the tables are turned on you. If you want to prove that the theory of ‘intrinsic randomness’ is indeed pure, authentic randomness on display, then provide an example where it’s on display and we can discuss that. You are the one proposing that from nothing therefore something. Prove it.
If you want to show that a premise and a conclusion are the same thing, then prove it. Now this is not a notion’ I put forth in terms of deductive logical arguments. You are the one arguing that a conclusion and the premises that make it so, are identical and are indistinguishable from one another so much so, that something is the result of itself. You are the one arguing that basic logic at it’s core is circular by default, so prove it.
I have played nice with the burden of proof, although it’s arguable on who the burden lies, since you are the one making claims against pre-existing claims and demanding proof that the pre-existing claims are true without proving they are false. Now it’s your turn.
Pat, you are confusing who made what claim.
You made the claim that proofs of God rely on no assumption. This, you have not proved.
I made a number of claims. One sub-claim–on which my larger argument does not rest, and which I don’t need–was that uncaused events are averred by some particle physicists. This I have just proved. That man is a physicist, and he is plainly averring what I needed him to, and he is doing it squarely within the bounds of mainstream QM.
Now, the burden if proof is entirely on you. You say that you can prove that all things must have causes. You have not done so.
So you understand, I don’t aver the opposite of your claim. I aver that your claim is an assumption and either is, or rests on, an unprovable maxim.
[quote]pat wrote:
And sure, you can have all the parts of a motor cycle and not have a motor cycle. If you could lay all the parts of a circle on a table, you would not have a circle until you have ‘assembled them’ in the correct order.
[/quote]
Which is why the proper assembly is part of the definition. C’mon now.
[quote]smh_23 wrote:
[quote]pat wrote:
And sure, you can have all the parts of a motor cycle and not have a motor cycle. If you could lay all the parts of a circle on a table, you would not have a circle until you have ‘assembled them’ in the correct order.
[/quote]
Which is why the proper assembly is part of the definition. C’mon now.[/quote]
Hence circle part + circle part + circle part +…= Circle
When I see + in this instance, I don’t think equation, I think “consider all of these items together, as a whole.” The same way you must Add together items within ( ) of an equation and multiply them together. For instance 58 = 5(4+4)
[quote]ZJStrope wrote:
I feel like saying “if something is intrinsically random, that intrinsic randomness is the causing factor” is no different than saying “a circle is a circle because it’s a circle.”[/quote]
That’s not what’s being asserted in either case.
[quote]smh_23 wrote:
[quote]pat wrote:
And sure, you can have all the parts of a motor cycle and not have a motor cycle. If you could lay all the parts of a circle on a table, you would not have a circle until you have ‘assembled them’ in the correct order.
[/quote]
Which is why the proper assembly is part of the definition. C’mon now.[/quote]
Assembly of the properties is not defined in the properties, it is intrinsic to the logical process.
[quote]smh_23 wrote:
Pat, you are confusing who made what claim.
You made the claim that proofs of God rely on no assumption. This, you have not proved.
[/quote]
A deductive process by which a conclusion is drawn is not an assumption, it’s deduction. An assumption is something believed to be true without sufficient premises defined to make it so. It’s not an assumption no matter how bad you want it to be. Deductive logic is not assumed it’s either true or not true. Only empirical logic is subject to assumption. The difference between the two is vast. Science relies on empiricism. It relies on assumptions and your attempt to show that deductive logic relies on assumptions, alas relied on assumptions.
You haven’t proved this one iota. You misused a quantum mechanical phenomena to try and prove randomness, yet a closer look at the actual theory is that it deals with non-local causation. The ‘intrinsic randomness’ of which you speak is the function of non-deterministic systems. Don’t look now, but that’s a cause.
[quote]
Now, the burden if proof is entirely on you. You say that you can prove that all things must have causes. You have not done so.
So you understand, I don’t aver the opposite of your claim. I aver that your claim is an assumption and either is, or rests on, an unprovable maxim.[/quote]
Well let’s look that that. A claim already exists that a conclusion is a result of it’s premises. This is basic logic at it’s core. You claim that, no all logic is circular.
There is the established basic logic, on which the foundation of all science, indeed all disciplines of study are based. You claim, no this is not true, all logic is inherently circular.
You try to put the burden of proof on me that basic deductive logic is indeed correct and that a conclusion is indeed a function of it’s premises. You made the claim that all deductive logic is circular and by default fallacious. You made that claim, therefore you need to prove deductive logic is circular and therefore fallacious. You most definitely have not done that.
You really need to stop saying you’ve proved these things. You have neither proven logic is circular nor real, actual randomness exists.
[quote]ZJStrope wrote:
[quote]smh_23 wrote:
[quote]pat wrote:
And sure, you can have all the parts of a motor cycle and not have a motor cycle. If you could lay all the parts of a circle on a table, you would not have a circle until you have ‘assembled them’ in the correct order.
[/quote]
Which is why the proper assembly is part of the definition. C’mon now.[/quote]
Hence circle part + circle part + circle part +…= Circle
When I see + in this instance, I don’t think equation, I think “consider all of these items together, as a whole.” The same way you must Add together items within ( ) of an equation and multiply them together. For instance 58 = 5(4+4) [/quote]
Okay, so how does that make them identical to the item itself? How are premises identical to a conclusion?
Mentally omitting the functions doesn’t make them disappear, you just not thinking about them. Understanding comes with taking into account everything including the method.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-consequence/
I know this is an appeal to authority but no professor would take this objection seriously. I am not sure what else I have to do or how else to explain this. See the link, perhaps it does a better job of explaining than I am doing.
[quote]pat wrote:
[quote]ZJStrope wrote:
[quote]smh_23 wrote:
[quote]pat wrote:
And sure, you can have all the parts of a motor cycle and not have a motor cycle. If you could lay all the parts of a circle on a table, you would not have a circle until you have ‘assembled them’ in the correct order.
[/quote]
Which is why the proper assembly is part of the definition. C’mon now.[/quote]
Hence circle part + circle part + circle part +…= Circle
When I see + in this instance, I don’t think equation, I think “consider all of these items together, as a whole.” The same way you must Add together items within ( ) of an equation and multiply them together. For instance 58 = 5(4+4) [/quote]
Okay, so how does that make them identical to the item itself? How are premises identical to a conclusion?
Mentally omitting the functions doesn’t make them disappear, you just not thinking about them. Understanding comes with taking into account everything including the method.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-consequence/
I know this is an appeal to authority but no professor would take this objection seriously. I am not sure what else I have to do or how else to explain this. See the link, perhaps it does a better job of explaining than I am doing.[/quote]
Alright. They are not identical. They, added, are identical. And they, added, is exactly how you defined circle. Therefore, what you said, can be expressed as: A circle is a circle. There is no other way for this to be put, or understood.
[quote]pat wrote:
You have [not proved that] real, actual randomness exists.[/quote]
How am I expected to participate in this argument, when you won’t take the time even to understand what my claim is?
I wrote, like two hours ago and in the plainest terms, that I am absolutely not claiming that either intrinsic randomness or quantum acausality exist. I am claiming that physicists aver them to exist. This I have already proved.
[quote]pat wrote:
Okay, so how does that make them identical to the item itself? How are premises identical to a conclusion?
Mentally omitting the functions doesn’t make them disappear, you just not thinking about them. Understanding comes with taking into account everything including the method.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-consequence/
I know this is an appeal to authority but no professor would take this objection seriously. I am not sure what else I have to do or how else to explain this. See the link, perhaps it does a better job of explaining than I am doing.[/quote]
Started reading and it gave me a headache. I’ll have to look at it again when I’m not at work.
[quote]pat wrote:
You haven’t proved this one iota. You misused a quantum mechanical phenomena to try and prove randomness, yet a closer look at the actual theory is that it deals with non-local causation. The ‘intrinsic randomness’ of which you speak is the function of non-deterministic systems. Don’t look now, but that’s a cause.
[/quote]
Everything about this excerpt is either in error or without meaning. Again–and for the last time–I’m done with QM. I linked to a physicist who says that uncaused events can happen, because he thinks that events can happen which were not prefigured by any condition in any location. Please stop and note that last point: This is not about locality
Here’s another link, this to someone who says that self-caused events can happen–a contention that you also called impossible:
That’s the most celebrated physicist alive. I have proved this particular subcontention of mine–that physicists say your theories of causality and contingency are assumptive (or flat-out wrong). If your proof were indeed a settled matter, as you think it is, it seems altogether unlikely that a man who knows more than either of us by several dozen orders of magnitude would doubt it.
Now, I’d like to get back to the meat of the matter, rather than dwelling on misinterpretations of recondite theory. I offer again:
[b]Uncaused events can happen.[/b]
Prove me wrong, formally.
Let’s do it this way:
[i]There can be be an uncaused event.[/i]
Prove me wrong. If you want to do this right, do it formally.
[quote]pat wrote:
You claim that, no all logic is circular.
[/quote]
I claim that your definition of a circle is circular. Perhaps some things can be defined without circularity. You certainly haven’t done it with a circle though. Not nearly.
Regarding “uncaused events can happen”–
Before you tell me the burden of proof is on me, know this: I don’t contend that that proposition can be proved true. I contend that it is an assumption, like its inverse, and that neither of them can be proved correct or incorrect. They can only be transformed into other and vaguer assumptions.
If you think otherwise, then do it.