[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:
There is not discrimination just because the type of contract they would prefer to enter is not offered. Discrimination for a heterosexual contract, or against a homosexual contract, does not fall under the category of gender discrimination. It is entirely a different idea from the idea of barring women from being members of “public” societies or schools (which is where the gender discrimination caselaw comes from, generally).
vroom wrote:
Boston,
I see your point, but I think it is quite arguable.
A woman walks up, says I want to marry a man, bingo, done.
A man walks up, says I want to marry a man, bzzzt, denied.
While the sexual preference of the individual may be different, perhaps it would be a sexless marriage of convenience, the actual sex is different, and is the reason for denial even if the preference isn’t.
The way to show this would be for two men that are not gay to attempt marriage.
The preference is not the issue in that case, but the marriage is denied. It can be argued, perhaps well, that same sex marriages are denied based on sex alone. Whether or not it descriminates against a man or against a women, however, is immaterial.
How does the state verify the preference of the individuals wishing to enter into the contract of marriage in order to discriminate based on preference, instead of sex? Does it sneak into the bedroom to make sure?
A proper test is for two straight men, with appropriate preference, to take one for their gay friends and attempt marriage. Taking it all the way to the supreme court with proof of their preference for women and a rational reason for wanting the marriage contract.[/quote]
vroom,
I see what you’re trying to set up, but it fails in terms of a Constitutional analysis for one simple point: Your whole analysis is predicated on an individual right to marriage, which isn’t there.
The state is NOT prohibiting gays from entering into a series of contracts that would approximate the duties and benefits of marriage (minus any tax benefits). Thus, they are not infringing upon any implications of freedom of association. They aren’t even treading on an expansive reading of the right to privacy, because no one is required to report what they do with whom, or with whom they live, or whatever – and those facts are not the basis of the definition.
All the state has done is define a particular package of contractual rights and benefits, added some tax incentives, and made that available only on the basis of the behavior it wishes to incentivize: heterosexual unions.
It doesn’t matter one bit if the individuals have a rational reason for wanting the benefits of marriage, but don’t want to conform to the required standards. I have a rational basis for wanting a deduction on interest paid on my taxes, but I don’t wish to buy a house – that doesn’t mean I have a right to the deduction that was violated because the definition didn’t meet what I wanted. What matters is whether the state has a rational basis for its standards – and that is an extremely low standard of review. Any and every rational basis theoretically satisfies that standard of review.