[quote]vroom wrote:
Umm, Scalia’s dissenting opinion may be interesting and all, but it is only a dissenting opinion.
Isn’t the judgement reached in a case in the supreme court simply the law of the land when it comes to lessor jurisdictions?
Why the hyperbole about some lower court adhering to the ruling. Essentially, it should have no choice.[/quote]
vroom,
You’re right in that dissents aren’t binding authority, and that all lower courts are bound by the majority opinion.
However, Romer should not be applicable in this case, given how limited it was to its facts. In stretching it so broadly – and then in stretching the amendment at bar so broadly – the judge was doing much more than simply applying the law as laid down by the USSC.
Please revisit this analysis of the part of the ruling for which the Judge claimed to rely on Romer:
Equal protection: The court holds that the Nebraska amendment violates the Equal Protection Clause, citing Romer v. Evans (1996). Here, it’s argument is at least plausible: Romer struck down a Colorado amendment that prohibited all state and local bans on sexual orientation discrimination. I think Romer is wrong, badly reasoned, and vague in its implications; but, while it’s impossible to tell for sure given Romer’s vagueness, I think that Nebraska amendment is constitutional even under Romer.
Romer rested in large part on the conclusion that the Colorado amendment’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.” The Colorado amendment’s defenders urged that the amendment was needed to protect “other citizens’ freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality”; and the Court did not condemn this interest. Rather, it concluded that “The breadth of the Amendment is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them,” chiefly because the Colorado courts interpreted the amendment as being extremely broad, covering many situations where no private landlords or employers were involved (for instance, when the government created a nondiscrimination policy governing its own operations).
Here, the law leaves state and local government free to enact bans on sexual orientation discrimination in lots of contexts. The government only mandates that marriage and similar institutions be reserved for opposite-sex couples; and this mandate is closely tied to the government’s desire to reserve the special benefits of marriage for that sort of relationship ? a union of one man and one woman ? that Nebraskans think is particularly valuable to society, and thus particularly worth fostering.
The test that Romer set forth was that the law must have a rational relationship to legitimate state interests, not the very demanding “strict scrutiny” test (which requires narrow tailoring to compelling state interests). This “rational basis” test is traditionally pretty deferential to the government; and while in Romer it wasn’t applied with the normal deference, the Court’s stress in Romer was simply that the law was so overinclusive relative to the interest in protecting associational freedom that it was irrationally broad. Here, the law is a much better fit with the government interest. And it seems to me (and, I’d wager, to the Supreme Court) that the government interest in promoting opposite-sex relationships as the best for society is indeed a legitimate interest, even if it’s one that reasonable minds may differ about.
Nor is it right to argue, as the court does, that the law “goes so far beyond defining marriage that the court can only conclude that the intent and purpose of the amendment is based on animus against [the] class [it affects].” First, the law doesn’t go at all far beyond defining marriage; it clearly covers marriage and its modern equivalents and near-equivalents. It makes perfect sense that as new quasi-marriage statuses are set up to avoid the legal restrictions on marriage, voters would cover these quasi-marriages as well as traditional marriages.
Second, while the law does reflect a sense that same-sex unions are less worthy of public support than opposite-sex unions, the Court has never held that this view is impermissible. Most laws reflect the notion that some conduct is better than other conduct. Unless (and I’ll get to this below) the court really is saying that it’s unconstitutional “animus” to have marriage be opposite-sex-only ? that is to say, unless the court believes that Nebraska has to recognize same-sex marriages ? there’s no unconstitutional animus in Nebraska voters’ insisting that marriage be opposite-sex-only, rather than just leaving the matter to their representatives in the legislature.
Finally, note that the standard canon of interpreting statutes is that they must be interpreted to avoid constitutional problems, when such an interpretation is consistent with the language. For instance, if the court fears that reading the amendment broadly ? for instance, covering co-tenancy contracts, or co-ownership arrangements, among romantically linked same-sex couples ? would violate the Equal Protection Clause under Romer, then the court should read the amendment (quite plausibly) as not being that broad, and only covering marriages, statutory civil unions, or statutory domestic partnerships, not centuries-old generally applicable rules of contract and property law.
Judges should not choose the broadest interpretation of a statute and then strike the statute down because the interpretation they themselves chose was unconstitutionally broad. Thus, the judge’s argument that “a domestic limited partnership” ? a business entity ? “composed of same-sex partners as defined in the Partnership Act could run afoul of [the Nebraska amendment] as it is written” is quite wrong. Reading the amendment as covering business partnerships that just happen to have partners of the same sex isn’t even a particularly plausible reading of the amendment; and it certainly isn’t the only or most plausible reading of the amendment. The judge must therefore choose the reading that is constitutionally permissible under Romer, rather than choosing an unnecessarily broad reading that would then lead him to strike the statute down.