What If Wiretapping Works?

[quote]sasquatch wrote:
Show me one instance where I opposed any type of investigation.

If the law was broke that should be investigated and dealt with.

Most of what I have read has inferred law breaking, but none has yet to be shown. I therefore continue to support the program. And I would further support any and all steps–within the law and the powers granted the President–to aid in our security.

If that has been the crux of our problem, then that would be easily fixed. I have no problem with any investigation that is legitimate. If it is just a scooter-much ado about nothing except political wrangling-witch hunt, I think our efforts would be better used to combine forces and protect our borders.[/quote]

http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=1555119

Hagel didn’t seem to think that the current law allowed some of the warrentless “wiretapping” that the NSA is currently undertaking.

But, he, along with Barack Obama, seemed open to working with the White House to change the law to allow the program to continue, but not without checks and balances.

I wonder if anyone would be so kind as to define “known suspects”?

I mean, anyone put onto a “list of suspects” would inherently qualify as a “known suspect” would they not?

The issue with wiretapping isn’t that it shouldn’t be used. It is that is needs appropriate oversight.

We are heading down a road that will lead to random routine spying via automated systems with your name inserted onto a list whenever certain issues are raised.

I mean, it’s egalitarian, no one is singled out, and you have to do something that raises suspicion to get on the list, right?

The danger is that those in power will find a way to justify using it to their own benefit. As soon as that were to eventually happen, you are one step away from a police state.

All you need is something really scary to get all the “ends justify the means” people out of the woodwork. Oh, maybe communism, an aggressive China, another terrorist strike, whatever.

It’s difficult to tell whether anyone actually read Judge Posner’s article, or just fell back to arguing about the positions he already held…

FYI, Posner is a federal judge of long service who sits on the 7th Circuit – he’s an old-school law-and-economics guy from the U of Chicago, and tends to run toward libertarian on social issues and Coasean (a legal term of art) on economic issues.

Anyway, Posner makes a couple of key observations. 1) In judging the NSA program, it matters both how effective and how intrusive it is.

To quote:

[i]Lawyers who are busily debating legality without first trying to assess the consequences of the program have put the cart before the horse. Law in the United States is not a Platonic abstraction but a flexible tool of social policy. In analyzing all but the simplest legal questions, one is well advised to begin by asking what social policies are at stake. Suppose the NSA program is vital to the nation’s defense, and its impingements on civil liberties are slight. That would not prove the program’s legality, because not every good thing is legal; law and policy are not perfectly aligned.

But a conviction that the program had great merit would shape and hone the legal inquiry. We would search harder for grounds to affirm its legality, and, if our search were to fail, at least we would know how to change the law–or how to change the program to make it comply with the law–without destroying its effectiveness. Similarly, if the program’s contribution to national security were negligible–as we learn, also from the Times, that some FBI personnel are indiscreetly whispering–and it is undermining our civil liberties, this would push the legal analysis in the opposite direction. [/i]

  1. It seems that the data-mining aspect of the program makes it much less intrusive on privacy rights as they are traditionally understood than would be a traditional “wire tap” pursuant to which an agent would listen in on a conversation.

To quote:

[i]As far as an outsider can tell, the NSA program is designed to fill these gaps by conducting warrantless interceptions of communications in which one party is in the United States (whether or not he is a “U.S. person”) and the other party is abroad and suspected of being a terrorist. But there may be more to the program. Once a phone number in the United States was discovered to have been called by a terrorist suspect abroad, the NSA would probably want to conduct a computer search of all international calls to and from that local number for suspicious patterns or content. A computer search does not invade privacy or violate fisa, because a computer program is not a sentient being.

But, if the program picked out a conversation that seemed likely to have intelligence value and an intelligence officer wanted to scrutinize it, he would come up against fisa’s limitations. One can imagine an even broader surveillance program, in which all electronic communications were scanned by computers for suspicious messages that would then be scrutinized by an intelligence officer, but, again, he would be operating outside the framework created by fisa.

The benefits of such programs are easy to see. At worst, they might cause terrorists to abandon or greatly curtail their use of telephone, e-mail, and other means of communicating electronically with people in the United States. That would be a boon to us, because it is far more difficult for terrorist leaders to orchestrate an attack when communicating by courier. At best, our enemies might continue communicating electronically in the mistaken belief that, through use of code words or electronic encryption, they could thwart the NSA. [/i]

His conclusion is quite good, and I think that’s where I would come down on this (and I would note the same formulation could easily be applied to the Patriot Act):

[i]We must not ignore the costs to liberty and privacy of intercepting phone calls and other electronic communications. No one wants strangers eavesdropping on his personal conversations. And wiretapping programs have been abused in the past. But, since the principal fear most people have of eavesdropping is what the government might do with the information, maybe we can have our cake and eat it, too: Permit surveillance intended to detect and prevent terrorist activity but flatly forbid the use of information gleaned by such surveillance for any purpose other than to protect national security.

So, if the government discovered, in the course of surveillance, that an American was not a terrorist but was evading income tax, it could not use the discovery to prosecute him for tax evasion or sue him for back taxes. No such rule currently exists. But such a rule (if honored) would make more sense than requiring warrants for electronic surveillance.

Once you grant the legitimacy of surveillance aimed at detection rather than at gathering evidence of guilt, requiring a warrant to conduct it would be like requiring a warrant to ask people questions or to install surveillance cameras on city streets. Warrants are for situations where the police should not be allowed to do something (like search one’s home) without particularized grounds for believing that there is illegal activity going on. That is too high a standard for surveillance designed to learn rather than to prove. [/i]

From the WSJ online editorial page.

THE WAR ON TERROR

Our Right to Security
Al Qaeda, not the FBI, is the greater threat to America.

BY DEBRA BURLINGAME
Monday, January 30, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST

One of the most excruciating images of the September 11 attacks is the sight of a man who was trapped in one of the World Trade Center towers. Stripped of his suit jacket and tie and hanging on to what appears to be his office curtains, he is seen trying to lower himself outside a window to the floor immediately below.

Frantically kicking his legs in an effort to find a purchase, he loses his grip, and falls.

That horrific scene and thousands more were the images that awakened a sleeping nation on that long, brutal morning. Instead of overwhelming fear or paralyzing self-doubt, the attacks were met with defiance, unity and a sense of moral purpose.

Following the heroic example of ordinary citizens who put their fellow human beings and the public good ahead of themselves, the country’s leaders cast aside politics and personal ambition and enacted the USA Patriot Act just 45 days later.

A mere four-and-a-half years after victims were forced to choose between being burned alive and jumping from 90 stories, it is frankly shocking that there is anyone in Washington who would politicize the Patriot Act.

It is an insult to those who died to tell the American people that the organization posing the greatest threat to their liberty is not al Qaeda but the FBI. Hearing any member of Congress actually crow about “killing” or “playing chicken” with this critical legislation is as disturbing today as it would have been when Ground Zero was still smoldering. Today we know in far greater detail what not having it cost us.

Critics contend that the Patriot Act was rushed into law in a moment of panic. The truth is, the policies and guidelines it corrected had a long, troubled history and everybody who had to deal with them knew it.

The “wall” was a tortuous set of rules promulgated by Justice Department lawyers in 1995 and imagined into law by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court. Conceived as an added protection for civil liberties provisions already built into the statute, it was the wall and its real-world ramifications that hardened the failure-to-share culture between agencies, allowing early information about 9/11 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi to fall through the cracks.

More perversely, even after the significance of these terrorists and their presence in the country was known by the FBI’s intelligence division, the wall prevented it from talking to its own criminal division in order to hunt them down.

Furthermore, it was the impenetrable FISA guidelines and fear of provoking the FISA court’s wrath if they were transgressed that discouraged risk-averse FBI supervisors from applying for a FISA search warrant in the Zacarias Moussaoui case.

The search, finally conducted on the afternoon of 9/11, produced names and phone numbers of people in the thick of the 9/11 plot, so many fertile clues that investigators believe that at least one airplane, if not all four, could have been saved.

In 2002, FISA’s appellate level Court of Review examined the entire statutory scheme for issuing warrants in national security investigations and declared the “wall” a nonsensical piece of legal overkill, based neither on express statutory language nor reasonable interpretation of the FISA statute.

The lower court’s attempt to micromanage the execution of national security warrants was deemed an assertion of authority which neither Congress or the Constitution granted it. In other words, those lawyers and judges who created, implemented and so assiduously enforced the FISA guidelines were wrong and the American people paid dearly for it.

Despite this history, some members of Congress contend that this process-heavy court is agile enough to rule on quickly needed National Security Agency (NSA) electronic surveillance warrants.

This is a dubious claim. Getting a FISA warrant requires a multistep review involving several lawyers at different offices within the Department of Justice. It can take days, weeks, even months if there is a legal dispute between the principals. “Emergency” 72-hour intercepts require sign-offs by NSA lawyers and pre-approval by the attorney general before surveillance can be initiated.

Clearly, this is not conducive to what Gen. Michael Hayden, principal deputy director of national intelligence, calls “hot pursuit” of al Qaeda conversations.

The Senate will soon convene hearings on renewal of the Patriot Act and the NSA terrorist surveillance program. A minority of senators want to gamble with American lives and “fix” national security laws, which they can’t show are broken.

They seek to eliminate or weaken anti-terrorism measures which take into account that the Cold War and its slow-moving, analog world of landlines and stationary targets is gone. The threat we face today is a completely new paradigm of global terrorist networks operating in a high-velocity digital age using the Web and fiber-optic technology.

After four-and-a-half years without another terrorist attack, these senators think we’re safe enough to cave in to the same civil liberties lobby that supported that deadly FISA wall in the first place. What if they, like those lawyers and judges, are simply wrong?

Meanwhile, the media, mouthing phrases like “Article II authority,” “separation of powers” and “right to privacy,” are presenting the issues as if politics have nothing to do with what is driving the subject matter and its coverage. They want us to forget four years of relentless “connect-the-dots” reporting about the missed chances that “could have prevented 9/11.”

They have discounted the relevance of references to the two 9/11 hijackers who lived in San Diego. But not too long ago, the media itself reported that phone records revealed that five or six of the hijackers made extensive calls overseas.

NBC News aired an “exclusive” story in 2004 that dramatically recounted how al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, the San Diego terrorists who would later hijack American Airlines flight 77 and fly it into the Pentagon, received more than a dozen calls from an al Qaeda “switchboard” inside Yemen where al-Mihdhar’s brother-in-law lived.

The house received calls from Osama Bin Laden and relayed them to operatives around the world. Senior correspondent Lisa Myers told the shocking story of how, “The NSA had the actual phone number in the United States that the switchboard was calling, but didn’t deploy that equipment, fearing it would be accused of domestic spying.”

Back then, the NBC script didn’t describe it as “spying on Americans.” Instead, it was called one of the “missed opportunities that could have saved 3,000 lives.”

Another example of opportunistic coverage concerns the Patriot Act’s “library provision.” News reports have given plenty of ink and airtime to the ACLU’s unsupported claims that the government has abused this important records provision.

But how many Americans know that several of the hijackers repeatedly accessed computers at public libraries in New Jersey and Florida, using personal Internet accounts to carry out the conspiracy? Al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi logged on four times at a college library in New Jersey where they purchased airline tickets for AA 77 and later confirmed their reservations on Aug. 30.

In light of this, it is ridiculous to suggest that the Justice Department has the time, resources or interest in “investigating the reading habits of law abiding citizens.”

We now have the ability to put remote control cameras on the surface of Mars. Why should we allow enemies to annihilate us simply because we lack the clarity or resolve to strike a reasonable balance between a healthy skepticism of government power and the need to take proactive measures to protect ourselves from such threats?

The mantra of civil-liberties hard-liners is to “question authority”–even when it is coming to our rescue–then blame that same authority when, hamstrung by civil liberties laws, it fails to save us. The old laws that would prevent FBI agents from stopping the next al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were built on the bedrock of a 35-year history of dark, defeating mistrust.

More Americans should not die because the peace-at-any-cost fringe and antigovernment paranoids still fighting the ghost of Nixon hate George Bush more than they fear al Qaeda. Ask the American people what they want. They will say that they want the commander in chief to use all reasonable means to catch the people who are trying to rain terror on our cities.

Those who cite the soaring principle of individual liberty do not appear to appreciate that our enemies are not seeking to destroy individuals, but whole populations.
Three weeks before 9/11, an FBI agent with the bin Laden case squad in New York learned that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were in this country.

He pleaded with the national security gatekeepers in Washington to launch a nationwide manhunt and was summarily told to stand down. When the FISA Court of Review tore down the wall in 2002, it included in its ruling the agent’s Aug. 29, 2001, email to FBI headquarters: "Whatever has happened to this–someday someone will die–and wall or not–the public will not understand why we were not more effective and throwing every resource we had at certain problems.

Let’s hope the National Security Law Unit will stand behind their decisions then, especially since the biggest threat to us now, [bin Laden], is getting the most ‘protection.’"

The public has listened to years of stinging revelations detailing how the government tied its own hands in stopping the devastating attacks of September 11. It is an irresponsible violation of the public trust for members of Congress to weaken the Patriot Act or jeopardize the NSA terrorist surveillance program because of the same illusory theories that cost us so dearly before, or worse, for rank partisan advantage.

If they do, and our country sustains yet another catastrophic attack that these antiterrorism tools could have prevented, the phrase “connect the dots” will resonate again–but this time it will refer to the trail of innocent American blood which leads directly to the Senate floor.

Ms. Burlingame, a former attorney, is the sister of Charles F. “Chic” Burlingame III, the pilot of American Airlines flight 77, which was crashed into the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001.

An excellent op-ed from the NYT opinion page (from a University of Texas Law prof) on how to view the NSA surveillance program:

Why We Listen

By PHILIP BOBBITT
Published: January 30, 2006

IN the debate over whether the National Security Agency’s eavesdropping violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, we must not lose sight of the fact that the world we entered on 9/11 will require rewriting that statute and other laws. The tiresome pas de deux between rigid civil libertarians in denial of reality and an overaggressive executive branch seemingly heedless of the law, while comforting to partisans of both groups, is not in the national interest.

Owing to the globalization of telecommunications, many telephone calls between parties in foreign countries or with an American at one end are routed through American networks. By analyzing this traffic, the National Security Agency has been gathering clues to possible terrorist activities.

The agency was authorized by the president, we are told, to intercept messages if one of its supervisors believed there was a link to Al Qaeda ? rather than requiring the usual statutory showing before a special court of probable involvement in terrorist activity when one party to the exchange is a “U.S. person” (a person in America or at an American corporation abroad). This would appear contrary to the provisions of the surveillance act.

The N.S.A. is our most important intelligence agency. Typically, about 60 percent of the president’s daily brief comes from its intercepts. But the agency was created during the cold war to collect against enemy countries, and that war, indeed that kind of war, has now been superseded. Signals intelligence in the 20th century meant intercepting analog signals along dedicated voice channels, connecting two discrete and known target points. In the 21st century, communications are mostly digital, carry billions of bits of data, are dynamically routed in packets to be reassembled and are globally networked.

Consider that on Sept. 10, 2001, the N.S.A. intercepted two messages: “The match begins tomorrow” and “Tomorrow is zero hour.” These were not picked up through surveillance of suspected individuals but from random monitoring of pay phones in areas of Afghanistan where Al Qaeda was active. Not surprisingly, these messages were not translated or disseminated until Sept. 12th.

Nor was the fact that we knew the identities of two of the terrorists sufficient to thwart the attack the next day. But had we at the time cross-referenced credit card accounts, frequent-flyer programs and a cellphone number shared by those two men, data mining might easily have picked up on the 17 other men linked to them and flying on the same day at the same time on four flights. Such intelligence collection would not have been based on probable cause, and yet the presence of the hijackers in the country would have qualified them as “U.S. persons.”

Clearly, “random” information is likely to be useless when it is not linked to surveillance focused on an individual, while that focused intelligence is much less useful when it is not linked to data mining collected in broad surveillance of “U.S. persons.”

If we agree that the National Security Agency now needs to trace and analyze large volumes of phone and Internet traffic looking for particular patterns and to cross-reference leads, then it seems clear that traditional, specific warrants may sometimes not be appropriate.

Furthermore, not only are there presumably conspirators within the United States, but conversations between two foreign persons could be routed, via the Internet, through American switches to give the appearance of a domestic-to-international connection. It is difficult to imagine getting warrants now in such situations, because the standard of probable cause to conclude that the target is a terrorist cannot be met.

Indeed, trying to determine just who qualifies as a terrorist agent is the point of the unfocused cross-hatching collection work of the security agency. In such a world, we will need new techniques to protect the identities and privacy of innocent people here and abroad.

This is not to play down the damage done to our war aims by the executive branch’s repeated appearance of an indifference to law. A president does have an obligation to assess the constitutionality of statutes, but when he secretly decides a measure is unconstitutional and neglects to say so (much less why), he undermines the very system of public consent for which we are fighting. Having said that, we also must not be so absorbed by questions of statutory construction that we ignore the revolutionary political and technological events that are transforming the world in which our laws must function.

Philip Bobbitt, aprofessor at the University of Texas Law School and a former National Security Council senior director, is the author of the forthcoming “Wars Against Terror.”

It’s no longer a hypothetical.

(Original l ink courtesy of Powerline: http://powerlineblog.com/archives/014277.php )

Those terror suspects that were nabbed in Canada with enough explosives to pull off something 3X bigger than the Oklahoma City bombings – they were nabbed as part of a transnational project that included gathering information via wiretapping of international calls and searching internet communications.

Here’s the story in the Canadian paper the National Post:

EXCERPT:

[i] The FBI confirmed Saturday the arrests were related to the recent indictments in the U.S. of Ehsanul Sadequee and Syed Ahmed, who are accused of meeting with extremists in Toronto last March to discuss terrorist training and plots.

?There is preliminary indication that some of the Canadian subjects may have had limited contact with the two people recently arrested from Georgia,? Special Agent Richard Kolko, the FBI spokesman, said in an e-mail to the National Post.

The intricate web of connections between Toronto, London, Atlanta, Sarajevo, Dhaka, and elsewhere illustrates the challenge confronting counter-terrorism investigators almost five years after 9/11.

Linking the international probes are online communications, phone calls and in particular videotapes that authorities allege show some of the targets the young extremists considered blowing up.[/i]

[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:
It’s no longer a hypothetical.

Those terror suspects that were nabbed in Canada with enough explosives to pull off something 3X bigger than the Oklahoma City bombings – they were nabbed as part of a transnational project that included gathering information via wiretapping of international calls and searching internet communications.[/quote]

Why wouldn’t it work?

There are other things that would work too. Put a government controlled remote camera in every area of every of everyones home and auto.

Yea…it all works…But of course there are other problems huh?

Enough hysteria… wiretapping works, just get a warrant:
[i]
But sources close to the investigation told the Star that the investigation began in 2004 when CSIS began monitoring fundamentalist Internet sites and their users.

They later began monitoring a group of young men, and the RCMP launched a criminal investigation. Police allege the group later picked targets and plotted attacks.
[/i]
Notice that a criminal investigation was launched? That should entail getting the proper judicial approval to spy on citizens.

[quote]jackreape wrote:
spamme wrote:

Instead, federal prosecutors say, all police need to claim is that the information obtained might in some way be “relevant” to a criminal investigation. "

Note, criminal investigation, nothing to do with terrorism. Isn’t living in a dream world blissful.

Yeah, i forgot, you lefties aren’t wild about going after anything “relevant to a criminal investigation”.

Seriously, you had better come up with a better platform than this or you are really gonna get schwacked in November, and 08 too.

i seriously want a sharp democrat to make the election interesting and about a clear choice in direction.

Right now you offer unmonitored cell phone calls(LMAO), dead babies on demand, and letting off Tookie lookalikes. That won’t push the right hard enough to matter.

jmo
jack[/quote]

Want a pitcher of beer to wash down that straw man?

[quote]ZEB wrote:
BostonBarrister wrote:
It’s no longer a hypothetical.

Those terror suspects that were nabbed in Canada with enough explosives to pull off something 3X bigger than the Oklahoma City bombings – they were nabbed as part of a transnational project that included gathering information via wiretapping of international calls and searching internet communications.

Why wouldn’t it work?

There are other things that would work too. Put a government controlled remote camera in every area of every of everyones home and auto.

Yea…it all works…But of course there are other problems huh?

[/quote]

I agree. Because it is useful still does not mean it is right

[quote]ZEB wrote:
Why wouldn’t it work?

There are other things that would work too. Put a government controlled remote camera in every area of every of everyones home and auto.

Yea…it all works…But of course there are other problems huh?
[/quote]

There aren’t other problems with international wire taps.

And, the point on whether they work is the balance between general investigative techniques that are good to find suspects, like datamining programs, versus those used when you have found them, which require a warrant and are much more invasive.

[quote]vroom wrote:
Enough hysteria… wiretapping works, just get a warrant:
[i]
But sources close to the investigation told the Star that the investigation began in 2004 when CSIS began monitoring fundamentalist Internet sites and their users.

They later began monitoring a group of young men, and the RCMP launched a criminal investigation. Police allege the group later picked targets and plotted attacks.
[/i]
Notice that a criminal investigation was launched? That should entail getting the proper judicial approval to spy on citizens.
[/quote]

From the way the article was written, it appears as if the scary internet monitoring occurred prior to the beginning of the criminal investigation – looks like they actually needed to identify suspects to get into the more direct and invasive (of privacy) techniques… quelle surprise.

[quote]sasquatch wrote:
I think it’s quite clever how you used the word terror to deflect the actual issue. You also use the term illegal. That is yet to be ‘proven.’

[/quote]

Terrorism is the issue.

Also, my statement about covering “illegal activity” was not referring to any alleged criminal behavior on the part of the government. Rather, I was referring to the use of terrorism laws to cover wide ranging offenses that were never traditionally seen as terrorism. Selling drugs, for example, is not terrorism… yet, there is a convoluted argument that lumps it in with other “terrorist” activities. It’s much more convenient to ignore rights and procedure when investigating crimes. It doesn’t matter if those in charge are well-meaning or not.

[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:
From the way the article was written, it appears as if the scary internet monitoring occurred prior to the beginning of the criminal investigation…[/quote]

I don’t think anybody has been concerned about scary Internet monitoring as was described here.

If something is posted publicly to the world, I don’t see why the authorities should not observe it and convince a judge to issue further authority.

I swear… some of you dolts are so trusting in big brother it is cloying.

I have a lot of respect for Canadian legal systems and authorities, but that doesn’t mean I want them to operate without appropriate checks and balances either.

In particular, I have great respect for the federal systems, such as CSIS or the RCMP. As far as I know, they have not been drawn so visibly into the political landscape here in Canada, as federal departments are in the US.

[quote]
sasquatch wrote:
I think it’s quite clever how you used the word terror to deflect the actual issue. You also use the term illegal. That is yet to be ‘proven.’

nephorm wrote:
Terrorism is the issue.

Also, my statement about covering “illegal activity” was not referring to any alleged criminal behavior on the part of the government. Rather, I was referring to the use of terrorism laws to cover wide ranging offenses that were never traditionally seen as terrorism. Selling drugs, for example, is not terrorism… yet, there is a convoluted argument that lumps it in with other “terrorist” activities. It’s much more convenient to ignore rights and procedure when investigating crimes. It doesn’t matter if those in charge are well-meaning or not.[/quote]

I agree that this is a huge issue, and it is my hugest reservation on the terrorism laws. They need to be written so that any evidence gathered via expanded powers can only be used for terrorism prosecution.

[quote]
BostonBarrister wrote:
From the way the article was written, it appears as if the scary internet monitoring occurred prior to the beginning of the criminal investigation…

vroom wrote:
I don’t think anybody has been concerned about scary Internet monitoring as was described here.

If something is posted publicly to the world, I don’t see why the authorities should not observe it and convince a judge to issue further authority.

I swear… some of you dolts are so trusting in big brother it is cloying.

I have a lot of respect for Canadian legal systems and authorities, but that doesn’t mean I want them to operate without appropriate checks and balances either.

In particular, I have great respect for the federal systems, such as CSIS or the RCMP. As far as I know, they have not been drawn so visibly into the political landscape here in Canada, as federal departments are in the US.[/quote]

vroom,

There’s a big difference between operating without checks and balances and having certain authority with which you disagree.

These programs need to be evaluated based on the specific freedom infringed versus the specific efficiency gained. That’s why I’m generally a lot less bothered with computerized data mining, aka random, non-human controlled searches that are less capable of being abusive, than I am about expanded authority to prosecute.

[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:
ZEB wrote:
Why wouldn’t it work?

There are other things that would work too. Put a government controlled remote camera in every area of every of everyones home and auto.

Yea…it all works…But of course there are other problems huh?

There aren’t other problems with international wire taps.

And, the point on whether they work is the balance between general investigative techniques that are good to find suspects, like datamining programs, versus those used when you have found them, which require a warrant and are much more invasive.[/quote]

Well then as long as there’s no problems and never a mistake…

Oops!

WASHINGTON ? The FBI says it sometimes gets the wrong number when it intercepts conversations in terrorism investigations, an admission critics say underscores a need to revise wiretap provisions in the Patriot Act (search).

The FBI would not say how often these mistakes happen. And, though any incriminating evidence mistakenly collected is not legally admissible in a criminal case, there is no way of knowing whether it is used to begin an investigation.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,170940,00.html

I don’t know about you ole’ pal, but I think they need to get it right. Not unlike a doctor who is operating to save someones life. There is no room for these sort of mistakes.

[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:
There’s a big difference between operating without checks and balances and having certain authority with which you disagree.

These programs need to be evaluated based on the specific freedom infringed versus the specific efficiency gained. That’s why I’m generally a lot less bothered with computerized data mining, aka random, non-human controlled searches that are less capable of being abusive, than I am about expanded authority to prosecute.[/quote]

No, I think what you are promoting is the idea that the checks and balances should be suspended in certain situations.

Anyway, I suggest you think with a bit more creativity when you say that certain activities are not as open for abuse.

Sometimes automated systems are the most powerful and most trusted. If the computer says something, then people take it as true.

As somebody who develops software, I know just how easy it is to slip misinformation into a database. Do you imagine that the bad guys won’t find ways to either threaten or entice the people with the ability to work with such systems?

You are naive indeed if you think organized crime doesn’t have people typing on the keyboards of many of our instititions. This is particularly true in business/financial situations, where crooks can access and sell our credit records, perhaps our drivers license information, and other records (maybe for the purpose of identity theft), this is a big business these days.

There are more types of abuse than simply evil government abuse. Seriously, anything that concentrates power, whether it be the power to watch or the power to falsely incriminate, or the power to misappropriately specify identity, can be abused.

Historically, people have been very creative in finding ways to lie, cheat, steal and otherwise corrupt both people and systems.

The more checks and balances to help root out such mischief, whether government induced or not, the better.

[quote]
BostonBarrister wrote:
There’s a big difference between operating without checks and balances and having certain authority with which you disagree.

These programs need to be evaluated based on the specific freedom infringed versus the specific efficiency gained. That’s why I’m generally a lot less bothered with computerized data mining, aka random, non-human controlled searches that are less capable of being abusive, than I am about expanded authority to prosecute.

vroom wrote:
No, I think what you are promoting is the idea that the checks and balances should be suspended in certain situations.[/quote]

No, I’m saying they shouldn’t be created if they don’t already exist for certain situations. That we actually need to think about things and weigh out costs and benefits when confronted with novel applications of technology that may not fit under established regulations.

[quote]vroom wrote:
Anyway, I suggest you think with a bit more creativity when you say that certain activities are not as open for abuse. [/quote]

You’ve already got enough creativity going for the both of us, seeing as how you’re making up my points for me…

[quote]vroom wrote:
Sometimes automated systems are the most powerful and most trusted. If the computer says something, then people take it as true.

As somebody who develops software, I know just how easy it is to slip misinformation into a database. Do you imagine that the bad guys won’t find ways to either threaten or entice the people with the ability to work with such systems?

You are naive indeed if you think organized crime doesn’t have people typing on the keyboards of many of our instititions. This is particularly true in business/financial situations, where crooks can access and sell our credit records, perhaps our drivers license information, and other records (maybe for the purpose of identity theft), this is a big business these days.

There are more types of abuse than simply evil government abuse. Seriously, anything that concentrates power, whether it be the power to watch or the power to falsely incriminate, or the power to misappropriately specify identity, can be abused.

Historically, people have been very creative in finding ways to lie, cheat, steal and otherwise corrupt both people and systems.

The more checks and balances to help root out such mischief, whether government induced or not, the better.[/quote]

All of that is beside the point - someone slips something in the database and miraculously the case still needs to be proved. Is your programmer going to plant evidence all the way through the investigation process?

And it does not suffice as an argument to note that all power can be abused. While this may sound sublimely intelligent in your head as you repeat it while typing, it amounts to stating the obvious. I’m sure we should disempower all environmental regulation because such power may be abused…

Checks and balances are systematic - they apply to the entire process. The protections from later in the process don’t evaporate because of novel applications of technology to the finding of probable cause.

Each novel application should be weighed for its utility as compared with any loss of rights - not rights we think we have, but rights we actually have. It goes without saying that we would be working with approximations and estimates, but that’s the approach we should take.

Quite simply, data mining is much less invasive of privacy than actually empowering humans to listen in. If your algorithms work well, there is a huge benefit in identifying problems before they are actually causing catastrophes. If they are not working, you have essentially moved someone innocent (or not moved someone guilty) closer to the next step of having a human listen in – which, of course, was the starting point previously. In other words, the datamining is just a tool for providing probable cause for more particular investigation – and given the current tools of relying on informers or blind luck to come upon probable cause, I would think it compares favorably.

Other than that, I am also at a complete loss for how your example of criminals stealing data is even remotely relevant to the NSA program. That all data can be misused, just like all power can be abused? Again, profound… The argument isn’t that no data should be protected – the argument is that society has a real interest in allowing certain collection and analysis of data by the government as a starting point for figuring out how to allocate its investigative resources.

[quote]ZEB wrote:

Well then as long as there’s no problems and never a mistake…

Oops!

WASHINGTON ? The FBI says it sometimes gets the wrong number when it intercepts conversations in terrorism investigations, an admission critics say underscores a need to revise wiretap provisions in the Patriot Act (search).

The FBI would not say how often these mistakes happen. And, though any incriminating evidence mistakenly collected is not legally admissible in a criminal case, there is no way of knowing whether it is used to begin an investigation.

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,170940,00.html

I don’t know about you ole’ pal, but I think they need to get it right. Not unlike a doctor who is operating to save someones life. There is no room for these sort of mistakes.
[/quote]

Zeb,

I don’t think we can make the perfect the enemy of the good – nor can we expect perfection.

Aside from that, the story you linked indicates the language is talking about authorized wiretaps for which the phone company gave the FBI the wrong number, not the NSA-style wiretaps. A warrant doesn’t protect you against this.