US Forces Attacking Mahdi

Off Topic Politics & World Issues
41

Being a Vietnam and Iraqi veteran, may I give a little insight. While in Vietnam, 1969, one of our missions was the scenario of a program called Vietnamization which entailed driving the enemy out of an area, conducting civil affairs operations, and setting up an AO (area of operation) to protect the small villages in same area from being again infiltrated by the VC.

This was hard to do seeing that many of the VC lived in the same villages that we were protecting. As we moved to another AO to set up the same operations, the concentrated VC would move back into the former area.

Fast forward to Iraq, 2004, and again, while operating out of our FOB (forward observation base), our missions involved convoy security, area and road security, quick reaction force, gate security, and civil affairs. Again while on civil affair missions we set out to protect the villages outside our FOB and to build a rapport with the civilian population.

This was a hard thing to do (rapport) for the only military that they could associate with was their former military which was brutal towards the civilian population, but over the months, trust was gained but short lived.

AS we were nearing to deploy back home, the new unit that was to take over our FOB arrived. This unit was a hardlined outfit. With the unofficial backing of the higher-ups, the troopers going outside the wire would take rocks and throw them at people and vehicles that they thought were slow in moving out of the way.

In one instance, a civilian who we knew of would park off the road at an intersection and sell goats. We relayed this to the new unit. The higher-ups did not want him doing so, stating that he was observing the goings on of their unit. When he argued that he was only going about his daily routine of selling and making a living, the squad confronting him flash-banged (type of grenade) him.

He was unhurt but sorely irritated. A few days later, two of their squads were ambushed. As we were preparing to leave country from an area other than our former FOB, we received word that a VBIED detonated at the gates of our former FOB and another VBIED made it onto the grounds of the FOB, resulting in some deaths.

Someone earlier mentioned the ROE (rules of engagement) in dealing with the Mahdi Army. The first convoy mission that our unit conducted was to a civilian hospital, 60 miles south of our FOB in Baghdad. We left around 5:00 AM and around 6:00 AM we were to contact Sherrif, which was a source of infromation that dealt with weather conditions, road closures, enemy activity, and ROE for the day.

Due to communication problems we could not reach them. As we continued on to Baghdad, we passed hundreds of individuals dressed in black robes walking towards the outskirts of Baghdad. Later that day after returning to our FOB, we reported the sighting of the black robed individuals.

We then found out that they were part of the Mahdi Army and ROE for the day stated that they were to be engaged on sight. That same night during our nightly briefing, the ROE had changed concerning the Mahdi Army to watch and observe for intent. The next day, we again convoyed to Baghdad and again could not reach Sherrif for daily updates.

As we approched Baghdad, again we encountered the black robed individuals but just watched and observed for intent as stated the night before concerning the new ROE and noticed that this time they were carrying weapons. Upon arrival back to our FOB, we again reported the sightings and were told that if they were carrying weapons, we were to engage even if they did not show intent as stated in the revised ROE.

As you can see it was hard, and I’m sure still is in dealing with the enemy concerning ROE.

Hopefully I was able to answer in around about way some of the concerns involving the problems in dealing with Iraq and her people and that you could pull from my reply answers and insight to your replies.

42

I’m no expert by any means, but these recommendations by Bing West make imminent sense to me:

[i]1) Deploy hand-held identification devices to fingerprint all military-age males and deprive the insurgents of the ability to move about and blend in with the population (keep track specifically of those who are detained on suspicion of terrorist/insurgent activities).

  1. Shift platoons from our battalions to Iraqi army and police units (more direct training of the Iraqis).

  2. Train our units and advisers in tough police techniques (Iraqis need to detain and jail more malfeasors).

  3. Give cash to our battalions and advisers to buy the loyalty of tribes and reward Iraqi battlefield performance.

  4. Take the offense in Baghdad, with no area off-limits.

  5. Imprison insurgents and militia leaders for the duration of hostilities ? period.

  6. Insist on joint U.S.-Iraqi boards for key governmental appointments and removal for malfeasance.[/i]

I also think they should have targeted leaders on the Shiite side at the beginning - specifically al Sadr (assuming that the Sunnis were already in hiding when we initially came in). Don’t know if it’s too late for that now.

Mr. West has also said this, with which I also agree:

The Iraqi army is the least sectarian organization in Iraq. President Bush should keep open the possibility that the army will control Iraq, as the military did in South Korea and in Turkey in decades past. A stable Iraq under military rule ? overt or behind-the-scenes ? is preferable to a failed state.

43

[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:

I also think they should have targeted leaders on the Shiite side at the beginning - specifically al Sadr (assuming that the Sunnis were already in hiding when we initially came in). Don’t know if it’s too late for that now.
[/quote]
Look up the United Iraqi Alliance, the largest party in the Iraqi legislature and leader of the governing coalition. Take a look at the parties which comprise its membership. They’re Shia resistance organizations favoring some form of theocracy, most have or are tied to militias and have recieved aid from Iran in the past or present.

[quote]
Mr. West has also said this, with which I also agree:

The Iraqi army is the least sectarian organization in Iraq. President Bush should keep open the possibility that the army will control Iraq, as the military did in South Korea and in Turkey in decades past. A stable Iraq under military rule ? overt or behind-the-scenes ? is preferable to a failed state.[/quote]

“Least sectarian organization in Iraq” is like saying least Catholic Pope. As an aside, I’d vote for Leo X, the fun loving pope. While a secular Sunni dictatorship would likely best serve our geopolitical interests- and fit most appropriately with PROVEN imperial (not intended as a pejorative in this case) strategies of governance- we’ve kind of already crossed that bridge and burned it in our wake. Politically things would have to get FAR worse before anyone would even consider making the attempt, even if it were still viable.

44

Mahdi Army gains strength by U.S. aid
Shiites enlist in Iraqi army, are trained, armed by U.S. forces
Feb. 04, 2007
BAGHDAD - The U.S. military’s drive to train and equip Iraq’s security forces has unwittingly strengthened anti-American Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia, which has been battling to take over much of the capital city as American forces are trying to secure it.

U.S. Army commanders and enlisted men who are patrolling east Baghdad, which is home to more than half the city’s population and the front line of al-Sadr’s campaign to drive rival Sunni Muslims from their homes and neighborhoods, said al-Sadr’s militias had heavily infiltrated the Iraqi police and army units that they’ve trained and armed.

“Half of them are JAM. They’ll wave at us during the day and shoot at us during the night,” said 1st Lt. Dan Quinn, a platoon leader in the Army’s 1st Infantry Division, using the initials of the militia’s Arabic name, Jaish al Mahdi. “People (in America) think it’s bad, but that we control the city. That’s not the way it is. They control it, and they let us drive around. It’s hostile territory…”

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF TERRORISM
In the case of an invasion of a Muslim land by non-Muslim forces, however, jihad ceases to be a collective obligation, becoming instead the personal obligation of every Muslim man, woman, and child, whether old or young, infirm or well.

45

[quote]Zap Branigan wrote:
Perhaps if we leveled a few cities like we did in Japan and Germany we could plant the seeds for democracy.[/quote]

They don’t do what you want.
Nuke the FUCKERS!

Canada doesn’t do what you want either.
Nuke Canada too!

The United Nations doesn’t agree with the war. Nuke the UN!

NUKE! NUKE! NUKE! NUKE!