[quote]stokedporcupine8 wrote:
Headhunter wrote:
Then you obviously have no understanding of epistemeology. Humans form concepts by abstracting from percepts. If percepts have sufficient similarity, we lump them together under one concept. This concept then gets ‘tagged’ with a word or phrase.
What is sufficient similarity? If the DEFINING characteristic of percepts match, we then form the concept. For ex, color is not a defining charactersitic for ‘human being’. Nor is sexual orientation and many others. The defining characteristic is Rational Animal (Aristotle).
It therefore follows that the concept ‘God’ is not valid in the same sense that we formed concepts like tree, horse, and so on. Singularities must remain nameless, which is why the Bible often refers to God as ‘nameless’ or ‘He whom know one can know’. And that’s why I say that only when God speaks to you can you know the existence of God.
On the contrary, I understand very well modern research in epistemology. I am a philosophy student after all. Basically what you said amounts to a confused jumble of (outdated) ideas in epistemology, and you’re application of these ideas to God is confused as well. Even your basic assumption that concept formation is synonymous with knowledge is dubious at best. I’ll try to elaborate.
As for the first paragraph, whether or not the process of abstraction that you describe is the “foundation” of Human understanding or the only means of acquiring concepts would be hotly contested by most working epistemologists or cognitive science people. It would be hotly contested on the first account because a more plausible and generally accepted approach is that concept formation is integrally involved with linguistic conventions in some way (say alla Wittgenstein). It would be hotly contested on the second account because there are seemingly many different ways Humans can form concepts. For example, a still well-headed approach is given by Russell in his distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. That is, some concepts we acquire through some means by direct acquaintance with the object, but other concepts we acquire because someone describes them to us using other concepts we already have. As one quick objection to your theory, if what you’re saying is true about concept formation, then how can we form concepts of things we have no precepts of? There are many examples of things that we have no precepts of but yet surely we have a perfectly good conception of. Example abound. Unicorns and Higgs bosons will do, but you can think of many more. Really there are lots of problems with the sort of view you’re putting forward, but I leave you to the literature to look at them.
As for the second paragraph, I hope you realize epistemology has progressed far beyond Aristotle. Virtually no one thinks the notion of essential vs. accidental predicates that you describe as any merit at all, when applied to most objects. For example, if you want to talk about concepts that correspond to objects that we think really exist in the world, as with your example of ‘man’, then no one is going to stand up for Aristotle and say that these sorts of concepts have essential predicates relating to them that in some sense define the concept. On the other hand if you are just talking about concepts that we have chosen to define, then of course there are “essential” or defining predicates in a trivial sense–the very ones we used to define the concept.
This leads to a good point, which is that you’re also using the word “concept” ambiguously. As I hinted at above, some concepts seemingly correspond to objects that actually exist in the world–people, dirt, the sun, etc.–while others are “defined”, say like circles, colors, etc. The idea is that the defined concepts are defined via a process of selective attention–abstraction–whereby one focuses on certain properties of objects and then considers those properties in isolation (or more aptly, in abstraction). The former concepts, the objects, seem to lack essential predicates or properties, while the latter ones have trivial essential predicates or properties.
Now you may object that you meant by “concept” something more basic then this, and that your account of abstraction was meant to describe how we come about our concepts of what we take as objects–people, dirt, the sun, etc… This though merely brings me back to my original point, which was if you want to try and give this sort of account of how we come to form concepts about objects you are not going to find much support in modern epistemology. I can’t think of anyone who would put forward seriously what you’re saying.
Hence why I said you are confused. You are talking about a process-abstraction–that while is a credible and important epistemological process does not really apply as you think it does.
Anyway, on to your application of all this to our ability to know about God. Since we most likely don’t form concepts such as ‘horse’, ‘true’, etc. in the way you describe anyway, who cares whether or not we can form a concept of God via this way? Most likely our concepts of ‘horse’, ‘tree’, etc. are actually formed through linguistic conventions in a more Wittgenstinian sort of way , while more complicated concepts like ‘atom’, ‘god’, etc. are formed largely through a sort of Russellian description. But in any case our ability to know things about objects has little to do with how we initially formed the concept anyway. For example, a scientists might have initially gotten the concept of ‘atom’ through a description in a class, but later through empirical observation learn new things about the object associated with that concept. So even if the concept of God is formed on the most dubious of grounds, there is still nothing stopping us from learning more about the object that we assume to be associated with that concept.
As for your comments about singularities remaining nameless and some seeming connection of this with the Biblical tendency to leave God nameless, that’s silly. First if “singularities” must remain “nameless”, then we could have no knowledge of things we have only seen one of. That’s silly.
Anyway… [/quote]
That was a lot of typing. Let me sum it up for you: “Modern philosophers don’t know what words are and have chosen to remain at the intellectual level of a baby, where everything is a mass of swirling colours. Since they don’t know what words are, we’ll say they are arbitrary constructs, because mommie told us so!”
I’m very familiar with logical positivism, Russell’s and Frege’s big bag of crap, and the modern ‘analysts’. Of course, nothing tops Willard Quine.
Pathetic.