On Government

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:

The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true. Is the proposition true in a world with nothing but rocks?
[/quote]

And how do we find out if the proposition is true?

Edit: I don’t like when other people lead me, so I’ll stop doing it to you.

You say that “The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true.” They are exactly the same question. In order to determine whether or not it is true that [2 + 2 = 4], you must calculate [2 + 2] and see whether or not you arrive at [4]. There is no other way.

[sufiandy]

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:
In a world with no sentient minds are mathematical maxims still true. Would 2+2 still equal 4 even if nobody knew it?
We know the proposition is true.[/quote]

How could we test it? Focus on your claim: “We know the proposition is true.” We do indeed. But how do we know that it is true? The question is meant to be taken literally: How do we find the value of an arithmetic expression like [2 + 2]?[/quote]

By using the values and functions available arranged in this manner…[/quote]

Exactly: By doing the calculation.

But when we perform a calculation, we perform it with and within our minds. A rock cannot perform a calculation: A brain is required.

Which means that the only way to test whether or not [2 + 2 = 4] “in a world with no sentient minds” would be to enter the world and perform the calculation. At which exact moment, the world in question is no longer “a world with no sentient minds.” It is a world with one sentient mind.

So if you find that 2 + 2 = 4 in the world in question, you still have not ruled out the possibility that the mathematics supervene on the physical components of your mind.[/quote]

The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true. Is the proposition true in a world with nothing but rocks?
[/quote]

By definition propositions are sharable so they cannot exist in a world of rocks.

[NickViar]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true. Is the proposition true in a world with nothing but rocks?
[/quote]

And how do we find out if the proposition is true?[/quote]

Who is “we” in a world with nothing but rocks?

[smh_23]

[quote]NickViar wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true. Is the proposition true in a world with nothing but rocks?
[/quote]

And how do we find out if the proposition is true?[/quote]

Who is “we” in a world with nothing but rocks?[/quote]

Exactly.

The question is “will this calculation hold in world X”?

The only way to answer the question is to do the calculation in world X.

If world X is meant to be a world without minds, then the question is internally contradictory (invalid), because a mind is necessary for the doing of the calculation.

[squating_bear]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]squating_bear wrote:

1. Wrongs and rights are not indicative of each other
   [/quote]

This.

“I don’t want X to happen to me” does not logically entail that “There exists, and I have, a natural right not to be X’ed.” (Unless those two sentences are synonymous, in which case I have a natural right not to be asked if I want to see people’s vacation photos.)

I’m not saying I know such a thing as a natural right doesn’t exist. I’m saying that if you do know it does, you are having a hell of a time explaining how you know this, or why you have the slightest reason to believe it.[/quote]
No.

You’ve not understood, lets take many steps back.

In the part you quoted I was trying to rephrase the issue. If rights exist, then wrongs also exist. That’s it. That’s all you quoted.

What you quoted has nothing to do with what people want.

Does it logically follow that the existence of rights would also mean that there do exist wrongs? Does it logically follow that the existence of wrongs would also mean that there do exist rights?

---

Also I am not speaking in this thread of needs/wants/desires, you are putting words in my mouth

[pat]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

I would like to see the case that math is physical be made. Can you put together a case? Argument or prose I don’t care.[/quote]

Specific arguments–on both sides–have been made by people who spent their lives studying these things. Neither you nor I can understand them, and neither you nor I can refute them. What I am trying to do here is to get you to see that you know far less than you believe you know. “physicalism/Platonic idealism is not true” or “mathematics do/do not supervene on the physical” are, as claims, over-reaches by people who study these things for a living. Made by you and me, they are infinitely worse.[/quote]

So this is an ego thing? Your not asserting a position just contradicting mine to show me I don’t know a whole lot?
I have already gone through these exercises a long time ago. They are complex to explain the genesis of everyone though and to write lengthy proofs on why a proposition is true or false. Granted I often rely strictly on memory because I am a bit lazy to research, which is a weakness of mine.
I think what you take exception of is my bold assertions of certainty.
I do not to profess to take the easy track, when you start to claim certainty on certain propositions one it tracking a road less traveled. It’s risky, but so be it.
One can take the easy way out and always fall back on the preponderance of evidence or reason makes one proposition more or less weighty than another. It’s what most do after all, because somebody always has an objection.
I used to take the route of non-certainty. But I realized something a while back, why shouldn’t I be certain? I apply it to very little, most things fall in to categories of weight. But if the logic is sound and the proposition is true by definition, why should I shy away from the certainty of the proposition.
I read my share of smart dead guy literature. I don’t need to know everything to know somethings are true.

Rather than hopping around and generally saying, well a physicalist would disagree, take a stance and defend it. Be the physicalist don’t just merely tell me that one would disagree. Anybody can continually ask, well how do you know? And how do you know that? And how do you know that? etc.
It’s a little unfair in that it requires a great deal of work only to be met with the same question.
If we really want to parse it down we can take a meta-metaphysical approach. I studied the academics officially, a while back, but I have been through the ringer already.
But if your only goal is to show me hows stupid I am, you win already, because I do not know and cannot know everything nor do I claim to be even close.

So the question I would ask a physicalist, a strict empiricist, is what is existence? ← That’s not rhetorical, I would like an answer.

Conversely, I want to know from the empiricist also, is what is nothing? Also not rhetorical.
Let’s get very strict on terminology.

[pat]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true. Is the proposition true in a world with nothing but rocks?
[/quote]

And how do we find out if the proposition is true?

Edit: I don’t like when other people lead me, so I’ll stop doing it to you.

You say that “The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true.” They are exactly the same question. In order to determine whether or not it is true that [2 + 2 = 4], you must calculate [2 + 2] and see whether or not you arrive at [4]. There is no other way.[/quote]

I am not concerned with how we find out, nor whether we know it or not. Is it a true proposition or not? Verification is not in question. It’s a yes or no question.

[pat]

[quote]sufiandy wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:
In a world with no sentient minds are mathematical maxims still true. Would 2+2 still equal 4 even if nobody knew it?
We know the proposition is true.[/quote]

How could we test it? Focus on your claim: “We know the proposition is true.” We do indeed. But how do we know that it is true? The question is meant to be taken literally: How do we find the value of an arithmetic expression like [2 + 2]?[/quote]

By using the values and functions available arranged in this manner…[/quote]

Exactly: By doing the calculation.

But when we perform a calculation, we perform it with and within our minds. A rock cannot perform a calculation: A brain is required.

Which means that the only way to test whether or not [2 + 2 = 4] “in a world with no sentient minds” would be to enter the world and perform the calculation. At which exact moment, the world in question is no longer “a world with no sentient minds.” It is a world with one sentient mind.

So if you find that 2 + 2 = 4 in the world in question, you still have not ruled out the possibility that the mathematics supervene on the physical components of your mind.[/quote]

The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true. Is the proposition true in a world with nothing but rocks?
[/quote]

By definition propositions are sharable so they cannot exist in a world of rocks.[/quote]

The laws of nature are propositions, do they not exist is a world of rocks? The rocks know nothing. Is a truth, something that is the case, depend on something in an environment knowing it for it to be true?

Nothing in that environment can know it’s true or false or that it exists at all. Does something that is the case, require knowledge of it for it to be true?
Or is there a requirement that for every truth there exists, there must be a mind that knows it?

[pat]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]NickViar wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true. Is the proposition true in a world with nothing but rocks?
[/quote]

And how do we find out if the proposition is true?[/quote]

Who is “we” in a world with nothing but rocks?[/quote]

Exactly.

The question is “will this calculation hold in world X”?

The only way to answer the question is to do the calculation in world X.

If world X is meant to be a world without minds, then the question is internally contradictory (invalid), because a mind is necessary for the doing of the calculation.

[/quote]

Requiring it be known to be true is not important, is it true or not? Does truth require a mind knowing it for it to be true?

[pat]

[quote]NickViar wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true. Is the proposition true in a world with nothing but rocks?
[/quote]

And how do we find out if the proposition is true?[/quote]

Who is “we” in a world with nothing but rocks?[/quote]

There is no we. Does something need a mind to verify truth for something to be true? That’s the essential question.

[Facepalm_Death]

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]Facepalm_Death wrote:

[quote]kamui wrote:
That’s pretty close :

Si les droits n’existaient pas, il faudrait les inventer.

But indeed, the fact is that we can’t invent them arbitrarily.

So, even if there is no “natural right”, the “invention of right” still has some structural rules.

This is enough to disprove a strictly positivist position.
And it makes the idea of “natural rights” pretty close to the truth in practice, if not exactly/technically/epistemologically true,[/quote]

In practice, without any external force guiding them, people would believe their rights are infinite, they are “allowed” (they would never think of using this term) to do whatever they want, nothing would ever restrict their actions except what is physically impossible.

Then as people interact and form cooperative relationships, conflicts arise. Person A takes an apple from person B. Person B feels “wronged” but doesn’t know what it means, but he still acts on it. Person B takes the apple back from Person A and Person A feels wronged. Now both people feel “wronged” but both have done the same wrong thing. At this point they may come to an agreement : don’t take my apple and i won’t take yours, or they might even form the general rule :no one can take anothers apples etc. realistically this situation would escalate in a revenge cycle until both people are trying to kill each other, and this would repeat over and over until people collectivly agreed not to steal

But the point is, everything seems to be a natural right at first, the only thing that is ever contructed is a restriction of rights[/quote]

I think if you start layering ‘wrongs’ I think you start to confuse the issue. It’s not that it’s not a proper ethical inquiry in itself. What we don’t want to confuse is what a natural right, being argued for and against is.
In this case it’s the right of a person to not be willfully wronged by another person. Does this right exist? [/quote]

I have quoted “wrong” because I have actually taken a step back from the dicotomy in this thought experiment.

I will think of a better way to explain all this. Until then consider this: Do animals wait for permission (a declaration of “rights”) to do what they must to survive? No. They just act.

Humans do the same thing. However, we can use higher logic, and we can recognize others as being just like us. When we come into conflict with each other, even without ANY existing social structure, it is possible for us to recognize a deadlock because of this. A is physically capable of Taking from B and vice versa. They could take the same thing from each other back and forth forever, but eventually reach an agreement: I will not take what is in your hand if you do not take what is in mine. It requires no reference to “rights” or a “social contract” for both parties to see the value in it.

What I’m saying is “rights” if they exist, can only ever be defined negatively, by placing a restriction on what others can do. The “rights” we have are nothing more than leftovers after restrictions have been placed.

[squating_bear]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:
“I don’t want X to happen to me” does not logically entail that “There exists, and I have, a natural right not to be X’ed.” (Unless those two sentences are synonymous, in which case I have a natural right not to be asked if I want to see people’s vacation photos.)
[/quote]
Also aside from the incorrect interjection of the word “want”, there are more problems with this section

For a person to think they see a particular object does not logically entail that that thing exists. This statement has little to do with the existence of light, or lack thereof

edit:

in other words, non sequitur. I neither said, implied, or believed that it does

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

I would like to see the case that math is physical be made. Can you put together a case? Argument or prose I don’t care.[/quote]

Specific arguments–on both sides–have been made by people who spent their lives studying these things. Neither you nor I can understand them, and neither you nor I can refute them. What I am trying to do here is to get you to see that you know far less than you believe you know. “physicalism/Platonic idealism is not true” or “mathematics do/do not supervene on the physical” are, as claims, over-reaches by people who study these things for a living. Made by you and me, they are infinitely worse.[/quote]

So this is an ego thing? Your not asserting a position just contradicting mine to show me I don’t know a whole lot?[/quote]

No, this is not an ego thing. You made a series of claims to certainty which you cannot justify. That’s what this is.

[quote]
I have already gone through these exercises a long time ago. They are complex to explain the genesis of everyone though and to write lengthy proofs on why a proposition is true or false.[/quote]

Why do you say things like this? It’s beyond fatuous. I am very familiar with your grasp of logical reasoning. You can’t write or critique a fraction of a hundredth of the work that’s been done on the philosophy of mathematics. Not platonism, not nominalism. None of it. Do you know what it looks like? It looks like this:

(1) Synthetic claims of existence should not be given great credence
without strong evidential support.
(2) Existence claims for mathematical abstracta, especially the Axiom of
Infnity, that there exists an infnite set or even plurality, are
synthetic.
(3) There is no good direct evidence for such existence claims. For
instance. contra early efforts of Maddy. we do not perceive sets. and.
in any case. not infnite sets. which classical analysis requires.
(4) The best indirect evidence comes via scientific indispensability argu-
ments. However. alternative programs such as predicativism.
Chihara’s semantic modal-nominalism, and my modal-structuralism
separately and cumulatively undercut such arguments. (For certain
portions of science. Field’s nominalistic constructions also undercut
them.)
(5) The fact that current science takes mathematics for granted is not
good evidence that premise (1) is suspended in the case of mathemat-
ics when viewed from a naturalistic-scientific standpoint.
The conclusion is. therefore.
(6) The evidence currently available for mathematical abstracta is quite
weak. and so we should not put much credence in a face-value.
platonist reading.

[…]

How can polyadic second-order quantification be introduced? One way–the
one I initially pursued in Mathematics without Numbers–is to resort to
brute force: since only conceptual possibilities matter. one can postulate
enough extraneous atoms to code ordered pairs of given individuals: relations
are then coded as wholes of pairs. But more recently. more general and elegant
methods were developed by Burgess and Lewis [I991], ingeniously
combining mereology with plural quantification. It needs to be assumed that
there are infitely many atoms (or individuals behaving enough like atoms).
but, for modal-structural mathematics it suffices to entertain this merely
hypothetically. Then (following Burgess’ construction) unordered pairs of
atoms (diatomic wholes) can code a 1-1 correspondence between all the atoms
and some of them, and some other diatoms can code a second l-l correspon-
dence between all the atoms and others entirely discrete from (not overlap-
ping) the first targets. (To insure this much. one must assume a kind of partition of all the atoms into three disjoint pieces, (a part of) each equinumerous with the remaining two. something which can be expressed with plural quantification and mereology.) Then one can make sense of the “first image”
of any given individual, i.e. the sum (fusion) of the images of its atoms
under the first 1-1 correspondence, and the “second image” of a given individual, the sum of the images of its atoms under the second 1-1 correspondence.
These images are always discrete from one another. The ordered pair of two,
possibly overlapping individuals is then defined as the sum of the first image
of the one to be first and the second image of the one to be second. Relations
are then available by quantifying plurally over ordered pairs. All this is
relative to a given trisection of the given infinitude of atoms, and it is
cumbersome to write it all out. But it works. The upshot is a nominalistic
reduction of arbitrary n-adic relations in the language of tenereology and
(monadic) plural quantification.

Hellman, Geoffrey. “On Nominalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):691-705 (2001)

Go look that up and read it and tell me that you

1. Understand what’s being said and

2. Can deny any of it.

You do that, I’ll buy you Metabolic Drive for rest of your life.

I anticipate the responses: “That’s not fair, you’re quoting esoteric jargon that only one or two members of this entire forum can understand.”

To which I reply, again, that it isn’t my fault that I’m debating someone who makes these laughable claims about entire philosophical schools which he says he knows to be bullshit…while not being able to differentiate between a valid and an invalid argument in propositional logic.

Edited

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]NickViar wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

The question isn’t whether something can calculate it, it’s whether or not the proposition is true. Is the proposition true in a world with nothing but rocks?
[/quote]

And how do we find out if the proposition is true?[/quote]

Who is “we” in a world with nothing but rocks?[/quote]

Exactly.

The question is “will this calculation hold in world X”?

The only way to answer the question is to do the calculation in world X.

If world X is meant to be a world without minds, then the question is internally contradictory (invalid), because a mind is necessary for the doing of the calculation.

[/quote]

Requiring it be known to be true is not important, is it true or not?[/quote]

Take a look at that sentence again.

In order for me to answer, what will I have to do? I will have to know whether it is true or not, yes? In the world in question. Yes?

See?

[smh_23]

[quote]squating_bear wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]squating_bear wrote:

1. Wrongs and rights are not indicative of each other
   [/quote]

This.

“I don’t want X to happen to me” does not logically entail that “There exists, and I have, a natural right not to be X’ed.” (Unless those two sentences are synonymous, in which case I have a natural right not to be asked if I want to see people’s vacation photos.)

I’m not saying I know such a thing as a natural right doesn’t exist. I’m saying that if you do know it does, you are having a hell of a time explaining how you know this, or why you have the slightest reason to believe it.[/quote]
No.

You’ve not understood, lets take many steps back.

In the part you quoted I was trying to rephrase the issue. If rights exist, then wrongs also exist. That’s it. That’s all you quoted.

What you quoted has nothing to do with what people want.

Does it logically follow that the existence of rights would also mean that there do exist wrongs? Does it logically follow that the existence of wrongs would also mean that there do exist rights?

---

Also I am not speaking in this thread of needs/wants/desires, you are putting words in my mouth[/quote]

Ah I see, your confusion is semantic. A natural right is not the concept of rightness. The postulated entity called a “right” is not implied by “my sister got hit in the head and this was bad for her.” If to be “wronged” means more than this, what does it mean and on what evidence do you affirm this meaning?

Edited

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:
why shouldn’t I be certain?
[/quote]

Because at some point even you will tire of your ludicrous statements of certainty on controversial and complex (complex to the point that they are unintelligible to you) philosophical questions which you do not remotely understand–questions the authority to express assurance whereon eludes you by a margin of years’ (if not decades’) worth of rigorous formal study.

Hubris and incompetence are an ugly couple.

[pat]

[quote]Facepalm_Death wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]Facepalm_Death wrote:

[quote]kamui wrote:
That’s pretty close :

Si les droits n’existaient pas, il faudrait les inventer.

But indeed, the fact is that we can’t invent them arbitrarily.

So, even if there is no “natural right”, the “invention of right” still has some structural rules.

This is enough to disprove a strictly positivist position.
And it makes the idea of “natural rights” pretty close to the truth in practice, if not exactly/technically/epistemologically true,[/quote]

In practice, without any external force guiding them, people would believe their rights are infinite, they are “allowed” (they would never think of using this term) to do whatever they want, nothing would ever restrict their actions except what is physically impossible.

Then as people interact and form cooperative relationships, conflicts arise. Person A takes an apple from person B. Person B feels “wronged” but doesn’t know what it means, but he still acts on it. Person B takes the apple back from Person A and Person A feels wronged. Now both people feel “wronged” but both have done the same wrong thing. At this point they may come to an agreement : don’t take my apple and i won’t take yours, or they might even form the general rule :no one can take anothers apples etc. realistically this situation would escalate in a revenge cycle until both people are trying to kill each other, and this would repeat over and over until people collectivly agreed not to steal

But the point is, everything seems to be a natural right at first, the only thing that is ever contructed is a restriction of rights[/quote]

I think if you start layering ‘wrongs’ I think you start to confuse the issue. It’s not that it’s not a proper ethical inquiry in itself. What we don’t want to confuse is what a natural right, being argued for and against is.
In this case it’s the right of a person to not be willfully wronged by another person. Does this right exist? [/quote]

I have quoted “wrong” because I have actually taken a step back from the dicotomy in this thought experiment.

I will think of a better way to explain all this. Until then consider this: Do animals wait for permission (a declaration of “rights”) to do what they must to survive? No. They just act.

Humans do the same thing. However, we can use higher logic, and we can recognize others as being just like us. When we come into conflict with each other, even without ANY existing social structure, it is possible for us to recognize a deadlock because of this. A is physically capable of Taking from B and vice versa. They could take the same thing from each other back and forth forever, but eventually reach an agreement: I will not take what is in your hand if you do not take what is in mine. It requires no reference to “rights” or a “social contract” for both parties to see the value in it.

What I’m saying is “rights” if they exist, can only ever be defined negatively, by placing a restriction on what others can do. The “rights” we have are nothing more than leftovers after restrictions have been placed.

[/quote]
I agree mostly. I don’t know that they can only be described negatively it certainly easier to do so. The ‘do no harm’ contingent of natural rights is the easiest way to talk about it.

[pat]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

I would like to see the case that math is physical be made. Can you put together a case? Argument or prose I don’t care.[/quote]

Specific arguments–on both sides–have been made by people who spent their lives studying these things. Neither you nor I can understand them, and neither you nor I can refute them. What I am trying to do here is to get you to see that you know far less than you believe you know. “physicalism/Platonic idealism is not true” or “mathematics do/do not supervene on the physical” are, as claims, over-reaches by people who study these things for a living. Made by you and me, they are infinitely worse.[/quote]

So this is an ego thing? Your not asserting a position just contradicting mine to show me I don’t know a whole lot?[/quote]

No, this is not an ego thing. You made a series of claims to certainty which you cannot justify. That’s what this is.
[/quote]
What claims are these?

[quote]

I have already gone through these exercises a long time ago. They are complex to explain the genesis of everyone though and to write lengthy proofs on why a proposition is true or false.[/quote]

Why do you say things like this? It’s beyond fatuous. I am very familiar with your grasp of logical reasoning. You can’t write or critique a fraction of a hundredth of the work that’s been done on the philosophy of mathematics. Not platonism, not nominalism. None of it. Do you know what it looks like? It looks like this:

I think you think you know me, but you don’t. At all. I am aware of the massive collection of work done over time. Nobody can know all of it. Even the best of the best may know a hundredth of it. Such is the breadth of knowledge.

[quote]

(1) Synthetic claims of existence should not be given great credence
without strong evidential support.
(2) Existence claims for mathematical abstracta, especially the Axiom of
Infnity, that there exists an infnite set or even plurality, are
synthetic.
(3) There is no good direct evidence for such existence claims. For
instance. contra early efforts of Maddy. we do not perceive sets. and.
in any case. not infnite sets. which classical analysis requires.
(4) The best indirect evidence comes via scientific indispensability argu-
ments. However. alternative programs such as predicativism.
Chihara’s semantic modal-nominalism, and my modal-structuralism
separately and cumulatively undercut such arguments. (For certain
portions of science. Field’s nominalistic constructions also undercut
them.)
(5) The fact that current science takes mathematics for granted is not
good evidence that premise (1) is suspended in the case of mathemat-
ics when viewed from a naturalistic-scientific standpoint.
The conclusion is. therefore.
(6) The evidence currently available for mathematical abstracta is quite
weak. and so we should not put much credence in a face-value.
platonist reading.

[…]

How can polyadic second-order quantification be introduced? One way–the
one I initially pursued in Mathematics without Numbers–is to resort to
brute force: since only conceptual possibilities matter. one can postulate
enough extraneous atoms to code ordered pairs of given individuals: relations
are then coded as wholes of pairs. But more recently. more general and elegant
methods were developed by Burgess and Lewis [I991], ingeniously
combining mereology with plural quantification. It needs to be assumed that
there are infitely many atoms (or individuals behaving enough like atoms).
but, for modal-structural mathematics it suffices to entertain this merely
hypothetically. Then (following Burgess’ construction) unordered pairs of
atoms (diatomic wholes) can code a 1-1 correspondence between all the atoms
and some of them, and some other diatoms can code a second l-l correspon-
dence between all the atoms and others entirely discrete from (not overlap-
ping) the first targets. (To insure this much. one must assume a kind of partition of all the atoms into three disjoint pieces, (a part of) each equinumerous with the remaining two. something which can be expressed with plural quantification and mereology.) Then one can make sense of the “first image”
of any given individual, i.e. the sum (fusion) of the images of its atoms
under the first 1-1 correspondence, and the “second image” of a given individual, the sum of the images of its atoms under the second 1-1 correspondence.
These images are always discrete from one another. The ordered pair of two,
possibly overlapping individuals is then defined as the sum of the first image
of the one to be first and the second image of the one to be second. Relations
are then available by quantifying plurally over ordered pairs. All this is
relative to a given trisection of the given infinitude of atoms, and it is
cumbersome to write it all out. But it works. The upshot is a nominalistic
reduction of arbitrary n-adic relations in the language of tenereology and
(monadic) plural quantification.

Hellman, Geoffrey. “On Nominalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):691-705 (2001)

Go look that up and read it and tell me that you

1. Understand what’s being said and

2. Can deny any of it.

You do that, I’ll buy you Metabolic Drive for rest of your life.

I anticipate the responses: “That’s not fair, you’re quoting esoteric jargon that only one or two members of this entire forum can understand.”

To which I reply, again, that it isn’t my fault that I’m debating someone who makes these laughable claims about entire philosophical schools which he says he knows to be bullshit…while not being able to differentiate between a valid and an invalid argument in propositional logic.

Edited[/quote]

Why are you being a jerk?
I take exception to premise 1 and I don’t believe premise 2 follows. Premise one deals with a demand for evidence for the synthetic a priori premise 2 takes evidence and says it’s not evidence?
As Kamui would say Kant wins again:

Analytic a posteriori judgments cannot arise, since there is never any need to appeal to experience in support of a purely explicative assertion.
Synthetic a posteriori judgments are the relatively uncontroversial matters of fact we come to know by means of our sensory experience (though Wolff had tried to derive even these from the principle of contradiction).
Analytic a priori judgments, everyone agrees, include all merely logical truths and straightforward matters of definition; they are necessarily true.
Synthetic a priori judgments are the crucial case, since only they could provide new information that is necessarily true. But neither Leibniz nor Hume considered the possibility of any such case.
Unlike his predecessors, Kant maintained that synthetic a priori judgments not only are possible but actually provide the basis for significant portions of human knowledge. In fact, he supposed (pace Hume) that arithmetic and geometry comprise such judgments and that natural science depends on them for its power to explain and predict events. What is more, metaphysicsâ??if it turns out to be possible at allâ??must rest upon synthetic a priori judgments, since anything else would be either uninformative or unjustifiable. But how are synthetic a priori judgments possible at all? This is the central question Kant sought to answer.

synthetic a priori proposition, in logic, a proposition the predicate of which is not logically or analytically contained in the subjectâ??i.e., syntheticâ??and the truth of which is verifiable independently of experienceâ??i.e., a priori. Thus the proposition â??Some bodies are heavyâ?? is synthetic because the idea of heaviness is not necessarily contained in that of bodies. On the other hand, the proposition â??All husbands are maleâ?? is analytic because the idea of maleness is already contained in that of husband. In general the truth or falsity of synthetic statements is proved only by whether or not they conform to the way the world is and not by virtue of the meaning of the words they contain. Synthetic a priori knowledge is central to the thought of Immanuel Kant, who argued that some such a priori concepts are presupposed by the very possibility of experience.

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

I would like to see the case that math is physical be made. Can you put together a case? Argument or prose I don’t care.[/quote]

Specific arguments–on both sides–have been made by people who spent their lives studying these things. Neither you nor I can understand them, and neither you nor I can refute them. What I am trying to do here is to get you to see that you know far less than you believe you know. “physicalism/Platonic idealism is not true” or “mathematics do/do not supervene on the physical” are, as claims, over-reaches by people who study these things for a living. Made by you and me, they are infinitely worse.[/quote]

So this is an ego thing? Your not asserting a position just contradicting mine to show me I don’t know a whole lot?[/quote]

No, this is not an ego thing. You made a series of claims to certainty which you cannot justify. That’s what this is.
[/quote]
What claims are these?

[quote]

I have already gone through these exercises a long time ago. They are complex to explain the genesis of everyone though and to write lengthy proofs on why a proposition is true or false.[/quote]

Why do you say things like this? It’s beyond fatuous. I am very familiar with your grasp of logical reasoning. You can’t write or critique a fraction of a hundredth of the work that’s been done on the philosophy of mathematics. Not platonism, not nominalism. None of it. Do you know what it looks like? It looks like this:

I think you think you know me, but you don’t. At all. I am aware of the massive collection of work done over time. Nobody can know all of it. Even the best of the best may know a hundredth of it. Such is the breadth of knowledge.

(1) Synthetic claims of existence should not be given great credence
without strong evidential support.
(2) Existence claims for mathematical abstracta, especially the Axiom of
Infnity, that there exists an infnite set or even plurality, are
synthetic.
(3) There is no good direct evidence for such existence claims. For
instance. contra early efforts of Maddy. we do not perceive sets. and.
in any case. not infnite sets. which classical analysis requires.
(4) The best indirect evidence comes via scientific indispensability argu-
ments. However. alternative programs such as predicativism.
Chihara’s semantic modal-nominalism, and my modal-structuralism
separately and cumulatively undercut such arguments. (For certain
portions of science. Field’s nominalistic constructions also undercut
them.)
(5) The fact that current science takes mathematics for granted is not
good evidence that premise (1) is suspended in the case of mathemat-
ics when viewed from a naturalistic-scientific standpoint.
The conclusion is. therefore.
(6) The evidence currently available for mathematical abstracta is quite
weak. and so we should not put much credence in a face-value.
platonist reading.

[…]

How can polyadic second-order quantification be introduced? One way–the
one I initially pursued in Mathematics without Numbers–is to resort to
brute force: since only conceptual possibilities matter. one can postulate
enough extraneous atoms to code ordered pairs of given individuals: relations
are then coded as wholes of pairs. But more recently. more general and elegant
methods were developed by Burgess and Lewis [I991], ingeniously
combining mereology with plural quantification. It needs to be assumed that
there are infitely many atoms (or individuals behaving enough like atoms).
but, for modal-structural mathematics it suffices to entertain this merely
hypothetically. Then (following Burgess’ construction) unordered pairs of
atoms (diatomic wholes) can code a 1-1 correspondence between all the atoms
and some of them, and some other diatoms can code a second l-l correspon-
dence between all the atoms and others entirely discrete from (not overlap-
ping) the first targets. (To insure this much. one must assume a kind of partition of all the atoms into three disjoint pieces, (a part of) each equinumerous with the remaining two. something which can be expressed with plural quantification and mereology.) Then one can make sense of the “first image”
of any given individual, i.e. the sum (fusion) of the images of its atoms
under the first 1-1 correspondence, and the “second image” of a given individual, the sum of the images of its atoms under the second 1-1 correspondence.
These images are always discrete from one another. The ordered pair of two,
possibly overlapping individuals is then defined as the sum of the first image
of the one to be first and the second image of the one to be second. Relations
are then available by quantifying plurally over ordered pairs. All this is
relative to a given trisection of the given infinitude of atoms, and it is
cumbersome to write it all out. But it works. The upshot is a nominalistic
reduction of arbitrary n-adic relations in the language of tenereology and
(monadic) plural quantification.

Hellman, Geoffrey. “On Nominalism.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):691-705 (2001)

Go look that up and read it and tell me that you

1. Understand what’s being said and

2. Can deny any of it.

You do that, I’ll buy you Metabolic Drive for rest of your life.

I anticipate the responses: “That’s not fair, you’re quoting esoteric jargon that only one or two members of this entire forum can understand.”

To which I reply, again, that it isn’t my fault that I’m debating someone who makes these laughable claims about entire philosophical schools which he says he knows to be bullshit…while not being able to differentiate between a valid and an invalid argument in propositional logic.

Edited[/quote]

Why are you being a jerk?
I take exception to premise 1 and I don’t believe premise 2 follows. Premise one deals with a demand for evidence for the synthetic a priori premise 2 takes evidence and says it’s not evidence?
As Kamui would say Kant wins again:

Analytic a posteriori judgments cannot arise, since there is never any need to appeal to experience in support of a purely explicative assertion.
Synthetic a posteriori judgments are the relatively uncontroversial matters of fact we come to know by means of our sensory experience (though Wolff had tried to derive even these from the principle of contradiction).
Analytic a priori judgments, everyone agrees, include all merely logical truths and straightforward matters of definition; they are necessarily true.
Synthetic a priori judgments are the crucial case, since only they could provide new information that is necessarily true. But neither Leibniz nor Hume considered the possibility of any such case.
Unlike his predecessors, Kant maintained that synthetic a priori judgments not only are possible but actually provide the basis for significant portions of human knowledge. In fact, he supposed (pace Hume) that arithmetic and geometry comprise such judgments and that natural science depends on them for its power to explain and predict events. What is more, metaphysicsâ??if it turns out to be possible at allâ??must rest upon synthetic a priori judgments, since anything else would be either uninformative or unjustifiable. But how are synthetic a priori judgments possible at all? This is the central question Kant sought to answer.

synthetic a priori proposition, in logic, a proposition the predicate of which is not logically or analytically contained in the subjectâ??i.e., syntheticâ??and the truth of which is verifiable independently of experienceâ??i.e., a priori. Thus the proposition â??Some bodies are heavyâ?? is synthetic because the idea of heaviness is not necessarily contained in that of bodies. On the other hand, the proposition â??All husbands are maleâ?? is analytic because the idea of maleness is already contained in that of husband. In general the truth or falsity of synthetic statements is proved only by whether or not they conform to the way the world is and not by virtue of the meaning of the words they contain. Synthetic a priori knowledge is central to the thought of Immanuel Kant, who argued that some such a priori concepts are presupposed by the very possibility of experience.

What are you quoting without attribution here?

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:
I take exception to premise 1 and I don’t believe premise 2 follows.
[/quote]

Premise 2 is not meant to follow from premise one, they are separate premises the synthesis of which is mean to lead to a conclusion. You need to grasp the fundamentals.