On Government

[smh_23]

[quote]kamui wrote:

[quote]
I am not affirming it, I am saying that Pat cannot deny it.[/quote]

What i am saying is :

Physicalism is a reductionnist attempt.
And, as long as it hasn’t succeeded, it’s a failed one.

And for this reason, it’s not viable as an epistemological position.

A purely theoretical possibility ? maybe.
But who cares ?
Being purely theoretical is a cheap way to be undeniable. [/quote]

Its competitors are equally theoretical. Such is their nature. Find a way to test the nature of being and it will become a practical matter.

Anyway, it is far from undeniable. “Here exists something which does not supervene on the physical.” That is the sine qua non of the denial. Sexmachine knows this, which is why he linked to QE. And anyone would allow that QE casts doubt. But “this may not be true” was not the claim.

More importantly, I am not arguing that physicalism is the case. I don’t believe it is. I am arguing against the claim, delivered with certainty, that it is not the case. It is not my fault that such a difficult burden was assumed by someone I am debating.

[pat]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]kamui wrote:
You don’t have to kill physicalism.
Physicalists have the burden to prove that it is remotely alive.

And since physicalism is by definition a radical form of reductionism, they won’t be able to do that until they can reduce everything to physicality.
Even the very concept of physicality.

Good luck with that.

Physicalism is a quite common epistemology, but mainly amongst non-epistemologists. Maybe there is a reason for that fact.

[/quote]

No, the burden of proof is on he who affirms physicalism.

I am not affirming it, I am saying that Pat cannot deny it. He who says “not physicalism” assumes the burden of proof, just as he who says “not God” assumes the same.

[/quote]

I do deny it. That doesn’t mean I can convince everybody I am right. I can deny physicalism on the basis that the metaphysical exists. And as long as one metaphysical anything exists, physicalism is disproven. The physicalist tries to show that the metaphysical is rooted in the physical. But the mechanism is not the object. And no matter that the mechanism be physical, the object is not.
As yall well know I use math in these circumstances because people agree that it exists.
For math you need quantity and function, neither of which are physical.
Now the physicalist will argue this comes from our brains. Maybe that’s true, but it does mean the mechanism of conception is the same as the conceived object. The conceived object fits the definition of metaphysics. It cannot be detected by senses. It has no physical presence, but it does exist.
What pat cannot deny is that people believe and will continue to believe physicalism. But pat can deny that it’s true.
It’s weird talking about myself in 3rd person, I feel like a rapper.

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]countingbeans wrote:

[Natural rights] came from the same place gravity did, how’s that?

[/quote]

I can drop my pen and evidence of gravity as the pen falls to the ground. The questions is this: What such kind of evidence exists for a natural right?[/quote]

Equality of man. Either we are equal or we are not.[/quote]

1. What does “the equality of man” mean?
   [/quote]
   Two people are equal in value. That one man’s will is not greater than the other man’s worth.

2. On what evidence do we affirm the equality of man?

That’s a good question and I am not sure I have the answer per se. But to express it in a negative way, there lacks evidence that the value of one man is greater than another. Which I would call an intrinsic value.

[quote]
3. If [2] is convincing, how and why does the equality of man necessarily entail the existence of a natural right?[/quote]
The equality of man is what I would call the natural right. The equality of man means that the value of each individual is the same. That value being the same means that one has no right to harm the other.
On what basis could we say that man is unequal? What would make a man have a greater value than another? All else being equal (<-This is important for the sake of discussion) what would make one man’s right to not be harmed by another supercede the other mans desire to harm the other?
(hope that made sense)[/quote]

I like where this is headed. More than the physicalism argument. I will respond to this later in the day.

[pat]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]kamui wrote:

[quote]
I am not affirming it, I am saying that Pat cannot deny it.[/quote]

What i am saying is :

Physicalism is a reductionnist attempt.
And, as long as it hasn’t succeeded, it’s a failed one.

And for this reason, it’s not viable as an epistemological position.

A purely theoretical possibility ? maybe.
But who cares ?
Being purely theoretical is a cheap way to be undeniable. [/quote]

Its competitors are equally theoretical. Such is their nature. Find a way to test the nature of being and it will become a practical matter.

Anyway, it is far from undeniable. “Here exists something which does not supervene on the physical.” That is the sine qua non of the denial. Sexmachine knows this, which is why he linked to QE. And anyone would allow that QE casts doubt. But “this may not be true” was not the claim.

More importantly, I am not arguing that physicalism is the case. I don’t believe it is. I am arguing against the claim, delivered with certainty, that it is not the case. It is not my fault that such a difficult burden was assumed by someone I am debating.[/quote]

Can we prove that even one single metaphysical thing exists?

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]kamui wrote:
You don’t have to kill physicalism.
Physicalists have the burden to prove that it is remotely alive.

And since physicalism is by definition a radical form of reductionism, they won’t be able to do that until they can reduce everything to physicality.
Even the very concept of physicality.

Good luck with that.

Physicalism is a quite common epistemology, but mainly amongst non-epistemologists. Maybe there is a reason for that fact.

[/quote]

No, the burden of proof is on he who affirms physicalism.

I am not affirming it, I am saying that Pat cannot deny it. He who says “not physicalism” assumes the burden of proof, just as he who says “not God” assumes the same.

[/quote]

I do deny it. That doesn’t mean I can convince everybody I am right. I can deny physicalism on the basis that the metaphysical exists. And as long as one metaphysical anything exists, physicalism is disproven. The physicalist tries to show that the metaphysical is rooted in the physical. But the mechanism is not the object. And no matter that the mechanism be physical, the object is not.
As yall well know I use math in these circumstances because people agree that it exists.
For math you need quantity and function, neither of which are physical.
Now the physicalist will argue this comes from our brains. Maybe that’s true, but it does mean the mechanism of conception is the same as the conceived object. The conceived object fits the definition of metaphysics. It cannot be detected by senses. It has no physical presence, but it does exist.
What pat cannot deny is that people believe and will continue to believe physicalism. But pat can deny that it’s true.
It’s weird talking about myself in 3rd person, I feel like a rapper.
[/quote]

If mathematics is a structural function of human rationality, and human rationality is a structural function of the human brain, and the human brain supervenes on the physical, then mathematics is consistent with physicalism.

[pat]

[quote]kamui wrote:

[quote]
I am not affirming it, I am saying that Pat cannot deny it.[/quote]

What i am saying is :

Physicalism is a reductionnist attempt.
And, as long as it hasn’t succeeded, it’s a failed one.

And for this reason, it’s not viable as an epistemological position.

A purely theoretical possibility ? maybe.
But who cares ?
Being purely theoretical is a cheap way to be undeniable. [/quote]

The irony behind physicalism being a ‘theoretical possibility’ is not lost on me…

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]kamui wrote:

[quote]
I am not affirming it, I am saying that Pat cannot deny it.[/quote]

What i am saying is :

Physicalism is a reductionnist attempt.
And, as long as it hasn’t succeeded, it’s a failed one.

And for this reason, it’s not viable as an epistemological position.

A purely theoretical possibility ? maybe.
But who cares ?
Being purely theoretical is a cheap way to be undeniable. [/quote]

Its competitors are equally theoretical. Such is their nature. Find a way to test the nature of being and it will become a practical matter.

Anyway, it is far from undeniable. “Here exists something which does not supervene on the physical.” That is the sine qua non of the denial. Sexmachine knows this, which is why he linked to QE. And anyone would allow that QE casts doubt. But “this may not be true” was not the claim.

More importantly, I am not arguing that physicalism is the case. I don’t believe it is. I am arguing against the claim, delivered with certainty, that it is not the case. It is not my fault that such a difficult burden was assumed by someone I am debating.[/quote]

Can we prove that even one single metaphysical thing exists?[/quote]

One thing that does not supervene on the physical, to be precise. That is exactly the question.

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]kamui wrote:

[quote]
I am not affirming it, I am saying that Pat cannot deny it.[/quote]

What i am saying is :

Physicalism is a reductionnist attempt.
And, as long as it hasn’t succeeded, it’s a failed one.

And for this reason, it’s not viable as an epistemological position.

A purely theoretical possibility ? maybe.
But who cares ?
Being purely theoretical is a cheap way to be undeniable. [/quote]

The irony behind physicalism being a ‘theoretical possibility’ is not lost on me…[/quote]

It does seem ironic.

But the physicalist retorts that theories supervene on the physical.

[smh_23]

I have to go for now, back later.

[pat]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]kamui wrote:
You don’t have to kill physicalism.
Physicalists have the burden to prove that it is remotely alive.

And since physicalism is by definition a radical form of reductionism, they won’t be able to do that until they can reduce everything to physicality.
Even the very concept of physicality.

Good luck with that.

Physicalism is a quite common epistemology, but mainly amongst non-epistemologists. Maybe there is a reason for that fact.

[/quote]

No, the burden of proof is on he who affirms physicalism.

I am not affirming it, I am saying that Pat cannot deny it. He who says “not physicalism” assumes the burden of proof, just as he who says “not God” assumes the same.

[/quote]

I do deny it. That doesn’t mean I can convince everybody I am right. I can deny physicalism on the basis that the metaphysical exists. And as long as one metaphysical anything exists, physicalism is disproven. The physicalist tries to show that the metaphysical is rooted in the physical. But the mechanism is not the object. And no matter that the mechanism be physical, the object is not.
As yall well know I use math in these circumstances because people agree that it exists.
For math you need quantity and function, neither of which are physical.
Now the physicalist will argue this comes from our brains. Maybe that’s true, but it does mean the mechanism of conception is the same as the conceived object. The conceived object fits the definition of metaphysics. It cannot be detected by senses. It has no physical presence, but it does exist.
What pat cannot deny is that people believe and will continue to believe physicalism. But pat can deny that it’s true.
It’s weird talking about myself in 3rd person, I feel like a rapper.
[/quote]

If mathematics is a structural function of human rationality, and human rationality is a structural function of the human brain, and the human brain supervenes on the physical, then mathematics is consistent with physicalism.[/quote]

The mechanism is not the object and that’s the problem. The physical mechanism of conceiving the metaphysical does not reduce the metaphysical to being physical.

[pat]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:
I have to go for now, back later.[/quote]

Me too…

[SexMachine]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]SexMachine wrote:
@smh - I’m not sure if you are aware, but your rejection of natural rights places you in the “legal positivism” camp. Legal positivists argue that that the law should not concern itself with extrinsic values such as whether a particular law is “just” or “ethical,” but rather the law should only be concerned with the law. John Austin, regarded as the father of legal positivism insisted that:

1. The law is simply a command issued by a sovereign - king, parliament etc.

2. Such commands are backed by sanctions - or as a libertarian would say “a gun in the room.”

and

3. A sovereign is someone who must be obeyed but who does not themselves obey anyone.

Austin’s concept of legal positivism is vastly more authoritarian than even Hobbes who, whilst advocating absolute monarchy still believed that man should disobey lex humana(human law) when it conflicts with lex aeterna(divine law.)

As you know I do believe in natural law. I ascribe to Cicero’s maxim, lex injusta non est lex(an unjust law is not law.)

Just curious as to what you think about legal positivism?[/quote]

Good post. I considered getting into some of the formal philosophy yesterday, but decided instead to keep things simple by remaining focused on the one issue.

I should note here that I have been doing some devil’s advocacy in this thread. This is not to say that my arguments have been insincere, but some of the language and forcefulness have been exaggerated for polemical effect.

So, when I say that it is my position that “no natural law exists,” what I really mean to say is that “you, Nick/Beans/Pat, have overstated your case by claiming unequivocally that natural law exists, and, in order for me to accept your plain, certain claim as true, you must offer evidence.” In other words, my primary or underlying target here is unmerited certainty, not natural law philosophy.

But, on positivism: I find it fairly useless. Though I’m not necessarily an interpretivist, I would sooner subscribe to Dworkin’s view of things than to Hart’s. I read The Concept of Law when I was slightly too young, and I was baffled: How could somebody think like that after the Holocaust? I understand things a little better now, but I remain generally unimpressed. To take one of many examples of positivism’s foolishness, it is self-defeating–a philosophy of law that invalidates philosophy of law by elevating the institutional at the expense of the analytical. Another example of its foolishness: It does little to solve the problem of infinite regression in legal validity.

What is my true view of things, then? Well, like nearly every other question there is, it reduces to the question of God. It would take me a long time to faithfully represent my views of God/no-God and morality/amorality here. But I will say this: Whether in an objective or a subjective capacity, “good” does exist, and all forms of life affirm, on a constant basis, that some things are “good” and some things are not (even when they don’t agree on the particulars). In light of this, to devise a legal philosophy which denies a role to (or, in more recent incarnations, minimizes the role of) “the goodness of law”–this is the height of stupidity, even if notions of goodness are but evolutionary traits or processes.

Edited[/quote]

Interesting essay:

WAJ_Vol3_2012_Yang---The-Rise-of-Legal-Positivism.pdf

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]kamui wrote:
You don’t have to kill physicalism.
Physicalists have the burden to prove that it is remotely alive.

And since physicalism is by definition a radical form of reductionism, they won’t be able to do that until they can reduce everything to physicality.
Even the very concept of physicality.

Good luck with that.

Physicalism is a quite common epistemology, but mainly amongst non-epistemologists. Maybe there is a reason for that fact.

[/quote]

No, the burden of proof is on he who affirms physicalism.

I am not affirming it, I am saying that Pat cannot deny it. He who says “not physicalism” assumes the burden of proof, just as he who says “not God” assumes the same.

[/quote]

I do deny it. That doesn’t mean I can convince everybody I am right. I can deny physicalism on the basis that the metaphysical exists. And as long as one metaphysical anything exists, physicalism is disproven. The physicalist tries to show that the metaphysical is rooted in the physical. But the mechanism is not the object. And no matter that the mechanism be physical, the object is not.
As yall well know I use math in these circumstances because people agree that it exists.
For math you need quantity and function, neither of which are physical.
Now the physicalist will argue this comes from our brains. Maybe that’s true, but it does mean the mechanism of conception is the same as the conceived object. The conceived object fits the definition of metaphysics. It cannot be detected by senses. It has no physical presence, but it does exist.
What pat cannot deny is that people believe and will continue to believe physicalism. But pat can deny that it’s true.
It’s weird talking about myself in 3rd person, I feel like a rapper.
[/quote]

If mathematics is a structural function of human rationality, and human rationality is a structural function of the human brain, and the human brain supervenes on the physical, then mathematics is consistent with physicalism.[/quote]

The mechanism is not the object and that’s the problem. The physical mechanism of conceiving the metaphysical does not reduce the metaphysical to being physical.[/quote]

Again, if mathematics are a structural consequence of human rationality–as several of the prevailing contemporary views hold–and human rationality supervenes on the physical, then mathematics supervene on the physical.

It is a mistake to say things like “mathematics exist independently of the human mind.” It is also a mistake to say things like “mathematics do not exist independently of the human mind.” There are theories, schools of thought. There are reasons to believe and reasons to doubt each. But it has not been proved–ever–that there exists something which does not supervene on the physical, just as it has not been proved that there does not exist such a thing.

[pat]

[quote]SexMachine wrote:

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]SexMachine wrote:
@smh - I’m not sure if you are aware, but your rejection of natural rights places you in the “legal positivism” camp. Legal positivists argue that that the law should not concern itself with extrinsic values such as whether a particular law is “just” or “ethical,” but rather the law should only be concerned with the law. John Austin, regarded as the father of legal positivism insisted that:

1. The law is simply a command issued by a sovereign - king, parliament etc.

2. Such commands are backed by sanctions - or as a libertarian would say “a gun in the room.”

and

3. A sovereign is someone who must be obeyed but who does not themselves obey anyone.

Austin’s concept of legal positivism is vastly more authoritarian than even Hobbes who, whilst advocating absolute monarchy still believed that man should disobey lex humana(human law) when it conflicts with lex aeterna(divine law.)

As you know I do believe in natural law. I ascribe to Cicero’s maxim, lex injusta non est lex(an unjust law is not law.)

Just curious as to what you think about legal positivism?[/quote]

Good post. I considered getting into some of the formal philosophy yesterday, but decided instead to keep things simple by remaining focused on the one issue.

I should note here that I have been doing some devil’s advocacy in this thread. This is not to say that my arguments have been insincere, but some of the language and forcefulness have been exaggerated for polemical effect.

So, when I say that it is my position that “no natural law exists,” what I really mean to say is that “you, Nick/Beans/Pat, have overstated your case by claiming unequivocally that natural law exists, and, in order for me to accept your plain, certain claim as true, you must offer evidence.” In other words, my primary or underlying target here is unmerited certainty, not natural law philosophy.

But, on positivism: I find it fairly useless. Though I’m not necessarily an interpretivist, I would sooner subscribe to Dworkin’s view of things than to Hart’s. I read The Concept of Law when I was slightly too young, and I was baffled: How could somebody think like that after the Holocaust? I understand things a little better now, but I remain generally unimpressed. To take one of many examples of positivism’s foolishness, it is self-defeating–a philosophy of law that invalidates philosophy of law by elevating the institutional at the expense of the analytical. Another example of its foolishness: It does little to solve the problem of infinite regression in legal validity.

What is my true view of things, then? Well, like nearly every other question there is, it reduces to the question of God. It would take me a long time to faithfully represent my views of God/no-God and morality/amorality here. But I will say this: Whether in an objective or a subjective capacity, “good” does exist, and all forms of life affirm, on a constant basis, that some things are “good” and some things are not (even when they don’t agree on the particulars). In light of this, to devise a legal philosophy which denies a role to (or, in more recent incarnations, minimizes the role of) “the goodness of law”–this is the height of stupidity, even if notions of goodness are but evolutionary traits or processes.

Edited[/quote]

Interesting essay:

http://www.murdoch.edu.au/School-of-Law/_document/WA-jurist-documents/WAJ_Vol3_2012_Yang---The-Rise-of-Legal-Positivism.pdf[/quote]

Well, I would have to say I would agree. That’s often been the issue with moral relativism in the arbitrariness of accepted behavior or law, supersedes the natural right of a person to not only exist, but be able to thrive in one’s environment. Good essay, it’s worth a read.

[pat]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

If mathematics is a structural function of human rationality, and human rationality is a structural function of the human brain, and the human brain supervenes on the physical, then mathematics is consistent with physicalism.
The mechanism is not the object and that’s the problem. The physical mechanism of conceiving the metaphysical does not reduce the metaphysical to being physical.

Again, if mathematics are a structural consequence of human rationality–as several of the prevailing contemporary views hold–and human rationality supervenes on the physical, then mathematics supervene on the physical.
[/quote]
Well then I would still have to resort to saying that the mechanism by which something is obtained does not preclude the object.
Human rationality is not objects generated by the human brain, but rather that brains ability to recognize that which already is.
If we can rationally create objects, we can therefore rationally manipulate them as well. It then becomes not rationalization, but creation. If we can make it, we can change it.
Rationalization works with that which exists already. The pieces of the puzzle exist, the rational mind is able to assemble them to make an accurate picture. It cannot both create the pieces and assemble them.

[quote]
It is a mistake to say things like “mathematics exist independently of the human mind.” It is also a mistake to say things like “mathematics do not exist independently of the human mind.” There are theories, schools of thought. There are reasons to believe and reasons to doubt each. But it has not been proved–ever–that there exists something which does not supervene on the physical, just as it has not been proved that there does not exist such a thing.[/quote]
Reasons to doubt. Objections and questions sharpen our understanding, but do not invalidate either theory per se.
We have reasons to believe to believe math exists dependent on the human mind in the sense that by the mechanism of rationalization we were able to categorize the discipline and separate it from other disciplines.
So we can say, mathematics are dependent on the human mind. We are able to put that type of data and function in it’s own box.
We have reasons to doubt that they are independent as well. Despite our ability to categorize, the quantity and functions exist independently of the human mind. In that, particular quantities matched with particular functions will always yield the same result. And this is true whether we know it or not.

So what we can break it down into is a type of dualism. Our ability to categorize and recognize that certain objects belong with other similar objects. Our rational minds give us the ability to recognize and group like objects, but the objects are not of the mind only recognized by it. The grouping is of our physical mind, the objects in the group are independent.

For instance, we can recognize that S. America, N. America, Asia, Europe, Antarctica and Africa are continents. We created the definition of what a continent is. We did not create the continents, those already existed.

[smh_23]

[quote]pat wrote:
Well then I would still have to resort to saying that the mechanism by which something is obtained does not preclude the object.
[/quote]

Right, I understand the claim. Mathematics exist and do not supervene on the physical. The rest of your post is a series of re-statements of this claim.

What is missing is evidence. On what evidence do you affirm that mathematics exist–actually exist–as a set platonic, non-physical ideals? On what evidence do you claim to know that it is not the case that mathematics supervene on the physical “material”–I use the term widely here–of the brain and its physical perception of the physical world it inhabits?

Note that analogy will not substantiate your claims. You drew an analogy involving continents. But it does not logically follow from “human conception of continents <---- physical continents, which exist outside the mind” that “human conception of mathematics <---- *non-physical mathematics, which exist outside the mind.” There is no necessary logical entailment in the analogy (as there just about never is: Analogy makes for poor philosophy).

*Note that the analogy doesn’t even work internally, because continents are physical entities whereas mathematics, in your view, are not.

Edited

[smh_23]

I’ll respond to the rights stuff tomorrow as well.

[pat]

[quote]smh_23 wrote:

[quote]pat wrote:
Well then I would still have to resort to saying that the mechanism by which something is obtained does not preclude the object.
[/quote]

Right, I understand the claim. Mathematics exist and do not supervene on the physical. The rest of your post is a series of re-statements of this claim.

What is missing is evidence. On what evidence do you affirm that mathematics exist–actually exist–as a set platonic, non-physical ideals? On what evidence do you claim to know that it is not the case that mathematics supervene on the physical “material”–I use the term widely here–of the brain and its physical perception of the physical world it inhabits?

Note that analogy will not substantiate your claims. You drew an analogy involving continents. But it does not logically follow from “human conception of continents <---- physical continents, which exist outside the mind” that “human conception of mathematics <---- *non-physical mathematics, which exist outside the mind.” There is no necessary logical entailment in the analogy (as there just about never is: Analogy makes for poor philosophy).

*Note that the analogy doesn’t even work internally, because continents are physical entities whereas mathematics, in your view, are not.

Edited[/quote]

Well Kant posed this same problem the unlovable son of a bitch he was, he did have good points.
But first, I would highly contend that analogy makes poor philosophy. I have read my share of philosophy books and treatises and whatever other agonizing thing a dead guy can write. I cannot honestly think of one at the moment that did not use analogies. Maybe Aristotle? Jesus used them exclusively to make points.
Analogies not only make great philosophy, they make the subject matter tolerable. I may have made a bad analogy, but it doesn’t make all analogies bad.
Anyhow, the problem with the metaphysical is that no matter how we try, we have no choice but to interact by means of the physical.
There are many ways I think to attack it.
The many worlds hypothesis is one. The idea that a proposition would be true whether or not there where any human minds to to know it. In a possible world with no physical beings with minds exist, would a proposition still be true? Do the objects of the proposition still exist?
So with math, what are numbers? What are functions? ← not rhetorical.

Another approach is to take a look at the physical itself. In as much as Kant was right, so was Berkeley who proposed nothing physical exists, they are all objects of a mind. Berkeley has a university named after him, if Kant does I don’t know it. So who was right?
In as much as we cannot extrude our physicality from the examination of metaphysical objects as Kant says. We cannot prove the physical actually exists as Berkeley says.

As for the analogy, the point was objects exist whether we know it or not. One may not know anything about continents and indeed there was a time where that was true, yet they exist. Math also exists whether we know it or not. If nobody knew it, would it still exist? I believe the answer has to be yes. After all math wasn’t made, it was discovered. Nobody is credited with creating math, people are credited with discovering it. I don’t think it a matter of semantics.

[Bismark]

Much like the divine right of kings, so called natural rights are a social construction. Both are examples of reification informed by political and material factors.

[pat]

[quote]Bismark wrote:
Much like the divine right of kings, so called natural rights are a social construction. Both are examples of reification informed by political and material factors.[/quote]

According to the essay that’s called ‘positive legalism’.