Perhaps this excerpt from the Wilson piece would have been more appropriate:
"Then, in January, President Bush, citing the British dossier, repeated the charges about Iraqi efforts to buy uranium from Africa.
The next day, I reminded a friend at the State Department of my trip and suggested that if the president had been referring to Niger, then his conclusion was not borne out by the facts as I understood them. He replied that perhaps the president was speaking about one of the other three African countries that produce uranium: Gabon, South Africa or Namibia. At the time, I accepted the explanation. I didn’t know that in December, a month before the president’s address, the State Department had published a fact sheet that mentioned the Niger case."
The implication of that passage is obviously that he, the courageous tea-drinking ambassador, had “debunked” the idea that anyone from Iraq had tried to purchase uranium in Niger, British claims to the contrary be damned.
100meters wrote:
Uhh…gee your passage takes place after my passage and others where he fully exlplains the context of reaching his conclusions. He never “debunks” uranium from africa, only offers contradictory information on uranium niger, but he would have been right to assume that he had debunked those claims as the INR agreed with him, and the CIA rated his report “good”. Not to mention being absolutely right helps too.
He explained the context of his report, and then he essentially holds himself out as the keeper of fact on the subject, so that any information to the contrary must be incorrect - those silly tossers over at MI-6 just didn’t have Wilson’s vast experience in the region…
Now recall, your initial claim was that the editorialist for the WaPo was a stupid liar because he wrote:
Mr. Wilson chose to go public with an explosive charge, claiming – falsely, as it turned out – that he had debunked reports of Iraqi uranium-shopping in Niger and that his report had circulated to senior administration officials.
But really we should see the sentence you excerpted in context of the point the author was making in the final paragraph of the editorial:
Nevertheless, it now appears that the person most responsible for the end of Ms. Plame’s CIA career is Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson chose to go public with an explosive charge, claiming – falsely, as it turned out – that he had debunked reports of Iraqi uranium-shopping in Niger and that his report had circulated to senior administration officials. He ought to have expected that both those officials and journalists such as Mr. Novak would ask why a retired ambassador would have been sent on such a mission and that the answer would point to his wife. He diverted responsibility from himself and his false charges by claiming that President Bush’s closest aides had engaged in an illegal conspiracy. It’s unfortunate that so many people took him seriously.
So, first, one could definitely make an argument that Wilson, in his initial op-ed (not to mention his subsequent interviews and speeches) was claiming to have debunked the British claims on Iraqi attempts to purchase yellowcake uranium in Niger.
Second, as has been pointed out quite often since the very beginning, Wilson was calling attention to himself, and thus his relationship with his wife – which was rather the point of the paragraph. And didn’t have anything much to do with the minor point with which you’re trying to quibble.
BTW, I wonder if ol’ Ambassador Joe had clearance to get information on any official evaluations of the British claims by the CIA?
Here is the link to his op-ed – why doesn’t someone else explain why my choice of paragraphs from within it to reference the claim for which the poor editorialist is supposedly a “liar” was the correct one, or whether yours was the correct one:
100meters wrote:
British claims to the contrary:
The Butler report is hogwash (obviously) justified in the report only by the claim the CIA agreed with them.
Patently incorrect. Bush could very well have chosen to rely on British intelligence he viewed as reliable, particularly if he doubted the CIA’s assets in the area (which seems it would have been a particularly good doubt) or had other reason to believe the British intelligence was correct.
As an aside, I’ve not seen the Butler Report debunked at all, though perhaps you could link to something to justify your dismissal of it all as “hogwash”?
Also, you should re-read your CIA quotes - they’re not as strong as you’d like them to be, though disputing their wording would be getting into even more of a digression.
100meters wrote:
Hiatt is faking badly here:
“He ought to have expected that both those officials and journalists such as Mr. Novak would ask why a retired ambassador would have been sent on such a mission and that the answer would point to his wife.”
as Larry Johnson (former cia) says:
“Yes, why would the CIA send the former Director of Africa at the National Security Council, a former Ambassador to Gabon, and the last U.S. official to face down Saddam Hussein to Africa? Because Joe Wilson was uniquely qualified to do the job.”
goodness Hiatt is a nut.
BostonBarrister wrote:
Wilson didn’t have an intelligence background, whether he was an ambassador or not. This was an intelligence mission. I realize we’re short of human intelligence resources, but do you think they could have scrounged up someone who actually had some experience in intel for this? Military, CIA, someone?
100meters wrote:
Uhh the CIA sent him, and send people like this all the time…as Johnson says:
“Moreover, this is (or at least was) a common acitivity by the CIA. My former boss at State Department, Ambassador Morris D. Busby, made at least two trips I know of at the behest of the CIA after leaving government because of his experience in dealing with terrorism, narcotics, and Latin America. There are times when the CIA wants information and does not want to expose its own assets.”
and again he was perfectly qualified to go to Niger and the CIA agreed with his findings, and rated his report good…
as Hiatt knows.
Whether the CIA might have done so in the past, for whatever reason, doesn’t speak to why Wilson was chosen in this particular instance, or whether it would be better to have sent someone with an actual intelligence background. Your quote says the CIA sometimes works with diplomats – and you want that to be definitive proof of Wilson’s credentials on this matter? Are you trying to tell me with your quote that the CIA didn’t think the matter was important enough to risk sending an intelligence officer?
And of course, you are again not even addressing the author’s point – let me reintroduce the entire paragraph again:
Nevertheless, it now appears that the person most responsible for the end of Ms. Plame’s CIA career is Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson chose to go public with an explosive charge, claiming – falsely, as it turned out – that he had debunked reports of Iraqi uranium-shopping in Niger and that his report had circulated to senior administration officials. He ought to have expected that both those officials and journalists such as Mr. Novak would ask why a retired ambassador would have been sent on such a mission and that the answer would point to his wife. He diverted responsibility from himself and his false charges by claiming that President Bush’s closest aides had engaged in an illegal conspiracy. It’s unfortunate that so many people took him seriously.
Again, the point was that Wilson acted in a manner that a rational person would realize might attract media attention to himself and the facts surrounding his claims.
He published an op-ed in the New York Times after the President’s SOTU address that essentially accused the President of lying, during a time when Iraq was a matter of major media focus [Edited because I misread the timeline] – and then of course went on a speaking tour in which he made far more direct accusations of the same. Nah, no one would think that would attract any attention…[/quote]
BB,
All evidence in the Butler report points to the forged Niger documents. Their conclusions are all based on Niger(not africa at large). Those claims have been/were totally debunked, no? (yes).
Did the whitehouse admit they were wrong to include the 16 words. (yes)
Was the british intel the initial reasoning for the the uranium claim (no)
Was Wilson telling the truth (keeping in mind he was sent in response to intel recieving info on the forged documents)
yes.
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
BB habitually lawyers the truth, using reason and argument as a wino uses a lamppost ? for support, not illumination.[/quote]
Every time you use this analogy, you sound like an idiot. Once again, for those who missed shop class, the illumination comes from the light bulb, not from the post. The post provides the support for the light source.
All evidence in the Butler report points to the forged Niger documents. Their conclusions are all based on Niger(not africa at large). Those claims have been/were totally debunked, no? (yes).[/quote]
Actually, the British had separate sources for their claims, and did not rely on the forged documents that were the basis of the CIA’s intial belief.
EXCERPT:
British officials still say that the claim about Iraqi uranium purchases rested on a second source, not just the now-discredited documents.
For a more thorough look at Iraq’s attempts at an African uranium shopping trip, see Chris Hitchens’ piece here:
ADDENDUM: Here is another good piece from Hitchens back in 2004 that looks at this whole non-controversy after the Senate report was released, and pays attention to claims made by Joe Wilson in his book:
[quote]100meters wrote:
Did the whitehouse admit they were wrong to include the 16 words. (yes)[/quote]
The WH backed off far too easily in a PR -related move. They had no reason to apologize, as the 16 words were not incorrect.
[quote]100meters wrote:
Was the british intel the initial reasoning for the the uranium claim (no)[/quote]
Who cares if it was the initial reason, provided that it was a separate reason? And it was – see above.
[quote]100meters wrote:
Was Wilson telling the truth (keeping in mind he was sent in response to intel recieving info on the forged documents)
yes. [/quote]
Wilson’s op-ed was misleading, and his subsequent speeches broke over into outright falsehood concerning his debunking of the idea that Iraq had attempted to attain uranium in Africa.
Armitage gossiped to Novak and Novak confirmed the information with Rove.
Seperately, Rove offered the information to Cooper. Cooper confirmed the information with Libby.
Libby also offered up this information to Miller.
Rove and Libby were trying to discredit Wilson by leaking his wife’s name while Armitage is just an idiot with a big mouth that should be punished.
BB believes the Wilson’s got what they deserved which is very telling.
It is too bad that Rove and Libby did not know about Armitage but they did not. Their lack of knowledge about Armitage and the fact that Libby asked for the information was their undoing.
Armitage’s gossiping has nothing to do with Rove, Libby, and the WH’s conspiracy to discredit the Wilson’s. They were willing to get even and go as far as outing a NOC CIA employee.
Actually, the British had separate sources for their claims, and did not rely on the forged documents that were the basis of the CIA’s intial belief.
EXCERPT:
British officials still say that the claim about Iraqi uranium purchases rested on a second source, not just the now-discredited documents.
For a more thorough look at Iraq’s attempts at an African uranium shopping trip, see Chris Hitchens’ piece here:
ADDENDUM: Here is another good piece from Hitchens back in 2004 that looks at this whole non-controversy after the Senate report was released, and pays attention to claims made by Joe Wilson in his book:
100meters wrote:
Did the whitehouse admit they were wrong to include the 16 words. (yes)
The WH backed off far too easily in a PR -related move. They had no reason to apologize, as the 16 words were not incorrect.
100meters wrote:
Was the british intel the initial reasoning for the the uranium claim (no)
Who cares if it was the initial reason, provided that it was a separate reason? And it was – see above.
[/quote]
Ok,
Again, The Butler report totally relies on niger forgeries to make their conclusions. It is actually implied in your excerpt. The report denies having copies of the forgeries, but one of their documents WAS a SUMMARY of the forgeries. British intel’s sources were made pretty clear in this report:
Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction ?
Intelligence and Assessments:
put out by the brits in 2003.
“89. The Committee questioned the Chief of the SIS about the reporting behind these
statements. We were told that it came from two independent sources, one of which was
based on documentary evidence. One had reported in June 2002 and the other in
September that the Iraqis had expressed interest in purchasing, as it had done before,
uranium from Niger. GCHQ also had some sigint concerning a visit by an Iraqi official
to Niger.”
The two sources of information:
1.The true and well known fact of Wissam Al-Zahawi visit to Niger and several other african countries in 1999.
2.The Niger forgeries(or summary of), one of which creates a false (these are forgeries) link to Wissam Al-Zahawi.
Based on the 2 sources, the Butler report made its conclusions on uranium from “africa” (but really niger).
all the deception at work:
"503. From our examination of the intelligence and other material on Iraqi
attempts to buy uranium from Africa, we have concluded that:
a. It is accepted by all parties that Iraqi officials visited Niger in
1999.
b. The British Government had intelligence from several different
sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring
uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of
Niger?s exports, the intelligence was credible.
c. The evidence was not conclusive that Iraq actually purchased, as
opposed to having sought, uranium and the British Government
did not claim this.
d. The forged documents were not available to the British
Government at the time its assessment was made, and so the fact
of the forgery does not undermine it.
Hitchen’s article is basically a reprint of this one:
which itself is revealing only what the Butler report already had, simply that Wissam Al-Zahawi had been to Niger. Hitchens and the Butler report stupidly(dishonestly) assume over-simply that because Niger has alot of uranium, that there must be some implication in Zahawi’s visit.
The Iraq Survey Group concluded he visited Niger to invite the president to Baghdad,
“Regarding specific allegations of uranium pursuits from Niger, Ja?far claims that after 1998 Iraq had only two contacts with Niamey?neither of which involved uranium. Ja?far acknowledged that Iraq?s Ambassador to the Holy See traveled to Niamey to invite the President of Niger to visit Iraq. He indicated that Baghdad hoped that the Nigerian President would agree to the visit as he had visited Libya despite sanctions being levied on Tripoli. Former Iraqi Ambassador to the Holy See Wissam Zahawie has publicly provided a similar account.”
and worse,
So far, ISG has found only one offer of uranium to Baghdad since 1991?an approach Iraq appears to have turned down. In mid-May 2003, an ISG team found an Iraqi Embassy document in the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) headquarters related to an offer to sell yellowcake to Iraq. The document reveals that a Ugandan businessman approached the Iraqis with an offer to sell uranium, reportedly from the Congo. The Iraqi Embassy in Nairobi?in reporting this matter back to Baghdad on 20 May 2001?indicated it told the Ugandan that Iraq does not deal with these materials, explained the circumstances of sanctions, and said that Baghdad was not concerned about these matters right now. Figure 1 is the translation of this document. "
The IAEA says about the trip:
502. We have asked the IAEA what were their grounds for concluding that the visit paid by an
Iraqi official to Africa was not for the purpose of acquiring uranium. The IAEA said:
. . . the Director General explained in his report dated 7 March 2004 [sic] to the UN
Security Council that Iraq ?described the visit by an Iraqi official to a number of
African countries,including Niger, in February 1999,which Iraq thought might have
given rise to the reports?. On a number of occasions in early 2003,including in a
letter dated 1 February 2003,the IAEA requested Iraq to provide details of all
meetings held between Iraqi officials and officials from Niger around the year 2000.
The Director of Iraq?s National Monitoring Directorate responded in a letter of 7
February 2003 to the Director of the IAEA?s Iraq Nuclear Verification Office. (It should
be noted that at the time of Iraq?s response Iraq had not been provided by the IAEA
with any details contained in documents alleging the existence of a uranium
contract.)
The Iraqi response referred to above explained that,on 8 February 1999,Mr. Wissam
Al Zahawie,Iraq?s then Ambassador to the Holy See,as part of a trip to four African
countries,visited Niger as an envoy of the then President of Iraq to Mr. Ibrahim Bare,
the then President of Niger,in order to deliver an official invitation for a visit to Iraq,
planned for 20 to 30 April 1999. (N.B. Mr. Bare passed away on 9 April 1999.)
According to the Iraqi information,no such presidential visit from Niger to Iraq took
place before 2003.
The Iraqi authorities provided the IAEA with excerpts from Mr. Al Zahawie?s travel
report to Niger. These excerpts support the above explanation by the Ambassador
regarding the purpose of his visit to Niger and do not contain any references to
discussions about uranium supply from Niger.
In order to further clarify the matter,the IAEA interviewed Mr. Al Zahawie on 12
February 2003. The information provided by the Ambassador about details about
his 1999 trip to Africa also supported the information obtained previously by the
124
Agency on this visit. The demeanour of the Ambassador and the general tone of the
interview did not suggest that he was under particular pressure to hide or fabricate
information.
Notwithstanding the information summarized above,and in view of the fact that the
IAEA so far has not obtained any other related information than the forged
documents,the IAEA is not in the position to demonstrate that Iraq never sought to
import uranium in the past. This is the reason why the IAEA only concluded that it
had ?no indication that Iraq attempted to import uranium since 1990? but it would
?follow up any additional evidence,if it emerges,relevant to efforts by Iraq to illicitly
import nuclear materials?. So far no such additional information has been obtained
by the Agency. http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc898/898.pdf
Wilson’s own take:
"OLBERMANN: Is that the same story as this, that was purported online today by Christopher Hitchens, whose reporting is on occasion very sound, he wrote that in February of ?99, a man named Wisam al-Zahawari, Zahaiwai, excuse me…
WILSON: Zahawi.
OLBERMANN: … Zahawi, was the Iraqi representative at that point of the International Atomic Energy Agency, paid an official visit to Niger. He doesn?t come out and explicitly say that that trip in ?99 was to seek uranium, but his headline does. It reads, ?Sorry, everyone, but Iraq did go uranium shopping in Niger.? Is there merit to the Hitchens story?
WILSON: No. Mr. Al-Zahawi, Wisam al-Zahawi, who is a man that I know from my time as the acting ambassador in Baghdad during the first Gulf War, in the first Bush administration. He was ambassador to the Vatican, and he made a trip in 1999 to several West and Central African countries for the express purpose of inviting chiefs of state to violate the ban on travel to Iraq.
He has said repeatedly to the press, he?s now in retirement, and also to the International Atomic Energy Agency, to their satisfaction, that uranium was not on his agenda.
la republica’s take on the forgeries:(MUST READ)
" Alain Chouet wants to put in the right sequence dates and protagonists. A substantial correction: the `Nigergate’ prologue was staged in the summer 2001, before September 11th, at the hands of the CIA.
"Early in the summer 2001, the CIA passed us a piece of information both general and alarming. `Iraq' - Langley warned - `is apparently trying to purchase uranium from an African country'. The Americans added that they had been put on the alert by a trip, dating back two years, of the Iraqi ambassador to the Holy See to [several] Central-African nations. As standard procedure, the Americans never reveal the source of their information. Washington did not mention Niger but, in more general terms, Africa. The U.S. knew that not a leaf stirs in the African francophone ex-colonies that the French aren't aware of, especially in the field of counter-proliferation. For that matter, that information, though general, wasn't just routine for us. From the Gulf War (1991) onwards, France could not afford to be accused of underestimating Saddam Hussein's rearmament programs. Therefore, when the Americans moved in the summer 2001, I rolled up my sleeves. I instructed my men to get to work in Africa. In Niger, obviously, but also in Namibia (you will soon understand why). The outcome was entirely negative. At the end of August 2001, the alert died down. After the attack against the Towers, between September 2001 and the spring of the following year, that piece of information about the uranium from Niger was once again an indistinct and irrelevant background noise. Then something happened..."
This is what happened according to the Sismi. On September 21st 2001, Admiral Gianfranco Battelli (Pollari's predecessor) sent a cable to Langley with news of a mission `of Iraqi staff to Niger, which took place in 1999. On that trip questions were asked as to the production of uranium ore in the country's two mines and on the mode of exportation of that material'. On October 15th of the same year, Nicol? Pollari took office at Sismi. On October 18th, with a letter one and a half pages long, Pollari explained to the CIA that `the news on Niger come from a reliable source, even though we cannot evaluate its quality'. In February and March 2002, two more reports confirming the Niger lead of Saddam's atomic re-armament came to Langley from a `foreign Service'. Sismi claimed it was `French information'. Chouet smiles.
"No, things did not go that way. The CIA knocked on our door once again, with the story of the uranium, only in late spring 2002. The end of April, I would say, beginning of May (therefore after the February and March reports). This time their request had high-priority urgency (on February 2002, Vice-President Dick Cheney demanded the CIA to get information, after receiving a report from the DIA confirming the Iraqi purchase of 500 tons per year of uranium from Niger). Compared to the summer of the previous year, the Americans were more precise. They named a country, Niger. [And] gave a number of details. They actually handed us all the information which only later we found - and I'm stressing `only later found' - were in Rocco Martino's dossier and which we had never heard about till then. As standard procedure, Langley held back the source. They did not mention Martino or Sismi. They simply asked us to check that stuff. Langley's pressure was strong. The CIA asked for an immediate answer about the authenticity of the information. Immediately after September 11th, the relations between Dgse and the CIA were excellent (these good relations have always been questioned by Italy) and therefore I arranged a `deep undercover' mission. Between the end of May and June 2002, `my men' were in Njamey, the capital of Niger. The mission - as arranged by the Dgse operative directions - was held back from our Foreign Office as well as from the whole diplomatic network".
In Niger the Dgse men found nothing at all, nothing different from what had already been found by ex-Ambassador Joseph Wilson, whom the CIA had sent to Njamey in February.
"Five of our best men were part of the team. With a deep knowledge of Niger and of all the issues connected to yellowcake. My men stayed in Africa for a couple of weeks and, once back, they told me a very simple thing: `the American information on uranium is all bullshit'. When I read their report, I did not doubt their work nor, if you let me say so, my mind. I know Niger well but I can say that I have known Baghdad and Saddam even better. And I know that if Saddam had wanted to purchase yellowcake (which he already owned in great quantities) from Niger he would have never asked an Ambassador to open negotiations. Saddam did not trust anybody in his Foreign Office. He certainly didn't trust his ambassadors around the world. For such a task he would have sent one of his sons. On the other hand, we knew the reason of the journey of Iraqi Ambassador to the Holy See, Wissam Al Zahawie. He had to identify an African country ready to accept the storage of the regime's hazardous toxic waste, in exchange for money. In fact Namibia, which had been used as a dumping ground by Iraq, had told Baghdad they couldn't go on contaminating their soil. I told the CIA the results of our mission in Niger. The Americans seemed very disappointed for what they had to hear. I understood then the reasons for their frustration and I understood them even better when the CIA, not content with the result, at the end of June 2002, sent us a part of the documents of the Niger dossier, as if they wanted to underline the reasons for their insistence".
We are at a crucial point. End of June 2002. Langley sent a part of the Niger documents to Paris. Which documents? According to the Italian and American reconstruction, those documents were not yet in the hands of the CIA nor had they ever been in the hands of the Sismi.
"If what I'm saying surprises you, I can't help it. I tell you I received a `sample' of those documents in the summer 2002 from Langley. They sent the sealed envelope to Paris through the usual intelligence channels. I can remember they were no more than a dozen pages. There was a short introduction where the CIA explained the meaning of the documents and no more than three complete documents, I would say. After a quick scrutiny we decided it was all rubbish. Gross fakes. The document which struck me most referred to the Iraqi Ambassador to the Holy See. Reading that page, I thought back to the odd and general request of the summer 2001 and wondered: `Hey, the Americans... they have had this stuff for one year and they tell us only now, after we have already been to Niger twice'. Anyway the Americans didn't say who they got that stuff from, then or later. But we discovered things ourselves. We may be French but not altogether that stupid. First of all, those documents, as far as one could read, led to the Niger Embassy in Rome. And we definitely know where Rome is. Besides, on those same days when the CIA handed down to us part of the documents, this gentleman appeared. A Rocco Martino, your fellow countryman".
According to Sismi, Rocco Martino has been a Dgse agent at least since 2000. He had his office in Luxembourg with a covering firm, the Security Development Organization, Intelligence Office at no. 3, Rue Hoel, Sandweiler. So, Rocco Martino worked for Chouet, according to our Intelligence. He handed the fake Niger documents to Dgse, as reported by Gianni Letta to Parliament, even before September 11th. To confirm the circumstance, Sismi gave the press a photo of Rocco Martino talking `in Brussels' with a French agent, whose name was also given, Jacques Nadal.
"This story about Rocco Martino working for us is just a falsehood. The first time he knocked on our door was at the end of June 2002. He said he had important documents about an illicit trade of uranium from Niger to Iraq and asked one hundred thousand dollars for the stuff. Now, I'm too used to Arab souks to swallow bait like that. So I told my people to tell him we would look at the stuff first and then, if we were interested, we would discuss the price. This is how things went. Martino turned up at our Embassy in Luxembourg and asked to talk to some of our people. I asked Jaques Nadal, at the Brussels station, to meet the Italian in Luxembourg. Nadal met him at the end of June 2002".
Note: Hitchen’s despite the title of his article doesn’t say Zahawi bought/sought uranium, its implied, similarily the Butler report implies (in light of the forgeries)
“b. The British Government had intelligence from several different
sources indicating that this visit was for the purpose of acquiring
uranium. Since uranium constitutes almost three-quarters of
Niger?s exports, the intelligence was credible.”
Since the IAEA learned these were forgeries the following have walked away/stayed away from uranium claims:]
IAEA
ISG
CIA :Tenet says:
“since learning that the Iraq-Niger uranium deal was based on false documents earlier this spring, we no longer believe that there is sufficient other reporting to conclude that Iraq pursued uranium from abroad.”
Ouch.
Perhaps you know something Tenet doesn’t, but I highly doubt it.
Note the british stand firm on the one point…Niger has uranium and Zahawi went to niger (and to several other african nations…inviting all to visit baghdad).
OK, for all of that, you don’t address the fact that the forgeries do not, and never did, disprove the underlying intelligence.
As you note, your parentheticals notwithstanding, both of the Butler report and the MI-6 positions are that the underlying intelligence was sound.
And of course, in the SOTU, the infamous 16 words held that the British had intel that Iraq had tried to buy uranium in Africa, which was true then and is true now, and for which the WH should never have apologized nor backed down from.
There was also a previous dossier of intelligence on Niger, which you are conveniently forgetting to mention.
Now turn to the front page of the June 28 Financial Times for a report from the paper’s national security correspondent, Mark Huband. He describes a strong consensus among European intelligence services that between 1999 and 2001 Niger was engaged in illicit negotiations over the export of its “yellow cake” uranium ore with North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and China. The British intelligence report on this matter, once cited by President Bush, has never been disowned or withdrawn by its authors. The bogus document produced by an Italian con man in October 2002, which has caused such embarrassment, was therefore more like a forgery than a fake: It was a fabricated version of a true bill.
[i]Instead, we are told that Zahawie visited Niger and other West African countries to encourage them to break the embargo on flights to Baghdad, as they had broken the sanctions on Qaddafi’s Libya. A bit of a lowly mission, one might think, for one of the Iraqi regime’s most senior and specialized envoys.
The Duelfer Report also cites “a second contact between Iraq and Niger,” which occurred in 2001, when a Niger minister visited Baghdad “to request assistance in obtaining petroleum products to alleviate Niger’s economic problems.” According to the deposition of Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far (the head of Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons program), these negotiations involved no offer of uranium ore but only “cash in exchange for petroleum.” West Africa is awash in petroleum, and Niger is poor in cash. Iraq in 2001 was cash-rich through the oil-for-food racket, but you may if you wish choose to believe that a near-bankrupt African delegation from a uranium-based country traveled across a continent and a half with nothing on its mind but shopping for oil.[/i]
And even better, here is Zawahie adding to his own credibility problems on this issue in an interview with Time, from the Hitchens piece:
[i]Zahawie’s name and IAEA connection were never mentioned by ElBaradei in his report to the United Nations, and his past career has never surfaced in print. Looking up the press of the time causes one’s jaw to slump in sheer astonishment. Here, typically, is a Time magazine “exclusive” about Zahawie, written by Hassan Fattah on Oct. 1, 2003:
"The veteran diplomat has spent the eight months since President Bush's speech trying to set the record straight and clear his name. In a rare interview with Time, al-Zahawie outlined how forgery and circumstantial evidence was used to talk up Iraq's nuclear weapons threat, and leave him holding the smoking gun."
A few paragraphs later appear, the wonderful and unchallenged words from Zahawie: “Frankly, I didn’t know that Niger produced uranium at all.” Well, sorry for the inconvenience of the questions, then, my old IAEA and NPT “veteran” (whose nuclear qualifications go unmentioned in the Time article).[/i]
So, no, the claims were not incorrect then, and have not been debunked now.
Now, as to the main point, which was that Wilson was drawing attention to himself and his wife, I return again to Hitchens’ piece from back in 2004:
EXCERPT:
Given the CIA’s institutional hostility to the “regime change” case, the blatantly partisan line taken in public by Wilson himself, and the high probability that an Iraqi delegation had at least met with suppliers from Niger, how wrong was it of Robert Novak to draw attention to the connection between Plame and Wilson’s trip? Or of someone who knew of it to tell Novak?
To add my own line of reasoning here, how difficult was it to predict that there would be substantial press interest in the details of the trip Wilson was claiming was the source of his information that the President had lied to the country in the SOTU, or that such attention would be persistent once it became obvious that Wilson’s claims were hardly a slam dunk?
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
Armitage gossiped to Novak [/quote]
This is the only part of what you wrote that is seemingly confirmed, and even for this neither Armitage or Novak has actually confirmed it.
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
and Novak confirmed the information with Rove.
Seperately, Rove offered the information to Cooper. Cooper confirmed the information with Libby.
Libby also offered up this information to Miller.[/quote]
Or, for a different gloss based on what we know and the lack of any charges filed, I refer again to Tom Maguire:
EXCERPT:
KEEPIN’ HOPE ALIVE: The chorus from the left will harmonize in response to this from the Wapo:
[i] Unaware that Ms. Plame’s identity was classified information, Mr. Armitage reportedly passed it along to columnist Robert D. Novak “in an offhand manner, virtually as gossip,” according to a story this week by the Post’s R. Jeffrey
...It follows that one of the most sensational charges leveled against the Bush White House -- that it orchestrated the leak of Ms. Plame's identity to ruin her career and thus punish Mr. Wilson -- is untrue.[/i]
Not necesarily! Although it takes a fantasist to imagine that the White House orchestrated the leak to Novak by way of Armitage (I bet I could find one!), what about the leaks to Matt Cooper and Judy Miller?
With Cooper, it is clear (to some) that after Karl Rove learned from Novak that a column about Wilson and Plame was imminent, Rove ruthlessly sat by the phone and waited for Matt Cooper to call him and ask about Niger.
Then when Cooper interviewed Libby the next day, Libby was so brutal and crafty that he never raised the subject of Ms. Plame, but offered something like “I heard that, too” when Cooper asked him about her.
And the Judy Miller leak? Libby was so intent on besmirching Wilson with the nepotism charge that he forgot to tell Judy that Ms. Plame had a role in arranging her husband’s trip to Niger.
Note that no one has named either Libby or Rove as a source, your theorizing notwithstanding.
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
Rove and Libby were trying to discredit Wilson by leaking his wife’s name while Armitage is just an idiot with a big mouth that should be punished.[/quote]
Except that, again, no one has named Rove or Libby as a source. At most, I suppose you can claim Rove and Libby were in a conspiracy to discredit Wilson via confirmation…
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
BB believes the Wilson’s got what they deserved which is very telling.[/quote]
Very telling when one is trying to figure out who is to blame for something, yes…
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
It is too bad that Rove and Libby did not know about Armitage but they did not. Their lack of knowledge about Armitage and the fact that Libby asked for the information was their undoing.[/quote]
It doesn’t matter whether they knew about Armitage, which I agree they did not – what matters is they knew that the reporters already knew about the relationship between Plame and Wilson.
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
Armitage’s gossiping has nothing to do with Rove, Libby, and the WH’s conspiracy to discredit the Wilson’s. They were willing to get even and go as far as outing a NOC CIA employee.[/quote]
I love the wacky conspiracy theories… especially when: 1) as far as I can recall, Plame’s cover at the time has still not been established; 2) whether it has or has not, Rove and Libby do not appear to have had any knowledge of whatever status she may have had; and 3) Rove and Libby weren’t the sources…
[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:
Marmadogg wrote:
Armitage gossiped to Novak
This is the only part of what you wrote that is seemingly confirmed, and even for this neither Armitage or Novak has actually confirmed it.
Marmadogg wrote:
and Novak confirmed the information with Rove.
Seperately, Rove offered the information to Cooper. Cooper confirmed the information with Libby.
Libby also offered up this information to Miller.
Or, for a different gloss based on what we know and the lack of any charges filed, I refer again to Tom Maguire:
EXCERPT:
KEEPIN’ HOPE ALIVE: The chorus from the left will harmonize in response to this from the Wapo:
[i] Unaware that Ms. Plame’s identity was classified information, Mr. Armitage reportedly passed it along to columnist Robert D. Novak “in an offhand manner, virtually as gossip,” according to a story this week by the Post’s R. Jeffrey
...It follows that one of the most sensational charges leveled against the Bush White House -- that it orchestrated the leak of Ms. Plame's identity to ruin her career and thus punish Mr. Wilson -- is untrue.[/i]
Not necesarily! Although it takes a fantasist to imagine that the White House orchestrated the leak to Novak by way of Armitage (I bet I could find one!), what about the leaks to Matt Cooper and Judy Miller?
With Cooper, it is clear (to some) that after Karl Rove learned from Novak that a column about Wilson and Plame was imminent, Rove ruthlessly sat by the phone and waited for Matt Cooper to call him and ask about Niger.
Then when Cooper interviewed Libby the next day, Libby was so brutal and crafty that he never raised the subject of Ms. Plame, but offered something like “I heard that, too” when Cooper asked him about her.
And the Judy Miller leak? Libby was so intent on besmirching Wilson with the nepotism charge that he forgot to tell Judy that Ms. Plame had a role in arranging her husband’s trip to Niger.
Note that no one has named either Libby or Rove as a source, your theorizing notwithstanding.
Marmadogg wrote:
Rove and Libby were trying to discredit Wilson by leaking his wife’s name while Armitage is just an idiot with a big mouth that should be punished.
Except that, again, no one has named Rove or Libby as a source. At most, I suppose you can claim Rove and Libby were in a conspiracy to discredit Wilson via confirmation…
Marmadogg wrote:
BB believes the Wilson’s got what they deserved which is very telling.
Very telling when one is trying to figure out who is to blame for something, yes…
Marmadogg wrote:
It is too bad that Rove and Libby did not know about Armitage but they did not. Their lack of knowledge about Armitage and the fact that Libby asked for the information was their undoing.
It doesn’t matter whether they knew about Armitage, which I agree they did not – what matters is they knew that the reporters already knew about the relationship between Plame and Wilson.
Marmadogg wrote:
Armitage’s gossiping has nothing to do with Rove, Libby, and the WH’s conspiracy to discredit the Wilson’s. They were willing to get even and go as far as outing a NOC CIA employee.
I love the wacky conspiracy theories… especially when: 1) as far as I can recall, Plame’s cover at the time has still not been established; 2) whether it has or has not, Rove and Libby do not appear to have had any knowledge of whatever status she may have had; and 3) Rove and Libby weren’t the sources…
[/quote]
Nice straw man arguement.
Rove and Libby do not have to be the first people to leak confidential information to be violating the law.
As a lawyer you should know better.
At the end of the day your arguement comes down to the fact that Libby and Rove were not the first to speak to Novak but they were the first to leak the information to both Cooper and Miller and that is a fact.
They are traitors and history will view them as traitors.
A conspiracy is as simple as a married person having a secret affair with someone other than their spouse. Conspiracies are started every second of every day in this country. Conspiracies are common place in DC too.
Senior officals in the WH conspired to undermine Wilson by attacking Plame and they got caught trying to cover their tracks.
Rove and Libby do not agree with you otherwise they would not have tried to cover it up. It they had nothing to hide we would have nothing to discuss.
Rove and Libby do not have to be the first people to leak confidential information to be violating the law.
As a lawyer you should know better.[/quote]
This is what I know.
To actually “leak” information, you need to be the source. Otherwise, the information has already leaked.
But if you want to get legal, we can do that too.
With regard to the law in question, for a person to be guilty he needs to knowingly expose the identity of a classified operative who meets certain definitions. Leaving aside the definition of a classified operative for a moment, one could definitely argue, as you seem to be doing in a roundabout fashion, that confirming a leaked piece of information would violate the law because that is part of exposing the identity. Fair enough.
But that does not address the “knowingly” point. A person would both need to be aware that the person met the definition of an undercover operative and then act to expose such person’s identity.
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
At the end of the day your arguement comes down to the fact that Libby and Rove were not the first to speak to Novak but they were the first to leak the information to both Cooper and Miller and that is a fact.[/quote]
At the end of the day, my gut feeling is that Libby and Rove had the impression that the information was already “out there” because reporters were asking them questions on it. My hunch is that they confirmed, but wanted to keep it on the QT because they didn’t want the WH associated with the info to the extent possible, because they didn’t want to give the impression that 1) the WH was giving JW any credence whatsoever or 2) that there was any sort of organized effort against a “whistleblower”, which is how the press would portray it.
Then the “scandal” blows up, and, unfortunately for Libby and almost for Rove, they were put in the position of answering questions before they could figure out if they might have done something wrong. They may have even thought they may have, a la Martha Stewart, who thought she had engaged in insider trading but in fact had not. Then, ordered to cooperate, they answered questions evasively – likely prior to a point when they could have gone back to review all their notes on the dates in question. Thus the perjury charge for Libby and the consideration of one for Rove.
On the non-gut level, my legal key is the knowledge standard in the law. We’ve seen nothing that would indicate any knowledge on the part of Libby or Rove or Armitage that Plame had any undercover status at all, let alone status that would qualify her for statutory protection.
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
They are traitors and history will view them as traitors.[/quote]
I would think history requires intent to adjudge treason.
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
A conspiracy is as simple as a married person having a secret affair with someone other than their spouse. Conspiracies are started every second of every day in this country. Conspiracies are common place in DC too.
Senior officals in the WH conspired to undermine Wilson by attacking Plame and they got caught trying to cover their tracks.
Rove and Libby do not agree with you otherwise they would not have tried to cover it up. It they had nothing to hide we would have nothing to discuss.[/quote]
The reason people don’t tend to believe in complicated conspiracy theories is that they would require everyone involved to keep them quiet and to not succumb to the desire to cut a deal to save himself at the expense of the cabal. This imagined conspiracy is no different.
I don’t need to imagine coordinated plots when there is a simple counter theory that would correspond with normal expectations.
[i][W]e now know that the original “leak,” in casual conversations with reporters Novak and Bob Woodward, came not from the conspiracy theorists’ target in the White House but from the deputy secretary of state at the time, Richard Armitage, an esteemed member of the Washington establishment and no pal of Rove or President Bush. ?
Newsweek, in a July 25, 2005, cover story on Rove, after dutifully noting that Rove’s lawyer said the prosecutor had told him that Rove was not a target of the investigation, added: “But this isn’t just about the Facts, it’s about what Rove’s foes regard as a higher Truth: That he is a one-man epicenter of a narrative of Evil.”
And in the American Prospect’s cover story for August 2005, Joe Conason wrote that Rove “is a powerful bully. Fear of retribution has stifled those who might have revealed his secrets. He has enjoyed the impunity of a malefactor who could always claim, however implausibly, deniability ? until now.”
These and other publications owe Karl Rove an apology. And all of journalism needs to relearn the lesson: Can the conspiracy theories and stick to the facts.[/i]
The only ones holding on to the idea of any sort of conspiracy on this are the nutters…
[quote]bigflamer wrote:
I must say that I’m enjoying watching the leftists go crazy as their hopes and dreams go up in flames w/r/t this “leak” that wasn’t.
It’s like watching a childs dead goldfish swirl in the toilet, the child sobing, desperately hoping for a sign of life.
BB’s argument falls apart because Armitage did not have the authority to declassify information so act of confirming still classified information is illegal.
[quote]Marmadogg wrote:
BB’s argument falls apart because Armitage did not have the authority to declassify information so act of confirming still classified information is illegal.
Nice try.[/quote]
You’re ignoring the whole argument on the knowledge standard.
[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:
OK, for all of that, you don’t address the fact that the forgeries do not, and never did, disprove the underlying intelligence.
As you note, your parentheticals notwithstanding, both of the Butler report and the MI-6 positions are that the underlying intelligence was sound.
And of course, in the SOTU, the infamous 16 words held that the British had intel that Iraq had tried to buy uranium in Africa, which was true then and is true now, and for which the WH should never have apologized nor backed down from.
There was also a previous dossier of intelligence on Niger, which you are conveniently forgetting to mention.
Now turn to the front page of the June 28 Financial Times for a report from the paper’s national security correspondent, Mark Huband. He describes a strong consensus among European intelligence services that between 1999 and 2001 Niger was engaged in illicit negotiations over the export of its “yellow cake” uranium ore with North Korea, Libya, Iraq, Iran, and China. The British intelligence report on this matter, once cited by President Bush, has never been disowned or withdrawn by its authors. The bogus document produced by an Italian con man in October 2002, which has caused such embarrassment, was therefore more like a forgery than a fake: It was a fabricated version of a true bill.
[i]Instead, we are told that Zahawie visited Niger and other West African countries to encourage them to break the embargo on flights to Baghdad, as they had broken the sanctions on Qaddafi’s Libya. A bit of a lowly mission, one might think, for one of the Iraqi regime’s most senior and specialized envoys.
The Duelfer Report also cites “a second contact between Iraq and Niger,” which occurred in 2001, when a Niger minister visited Baghdad “to request assistance in obtaining petroleum products to alleviate Niger’s economic problems.” According to the deposition of Ja’far Diya’ Ja’far (the head of Iraq’s pre-1991 nuclear weapons program), these negotiations involved no offer of uranium ore but only “cash in exchange for petroleum.” West Africa is awash in petroleum, and Niger is poor in cash. Iraq in 2001 was cash-rich through the oil-for-food racket, but you may if you wish choose to believe that a near-bankrupt African delegation from a uranium-based country traveled across a continent and a half with nothing on its mind but shopping for oil.[/i]
And even better, here is Zawahie adding to his own credibility problems on this issue in an interview with Time, from the Hitchens piece:
[i]Zahawie’s name and IAEA connection were never mentioned by ElBaradei in his report to the United Nations, and his past career has never surfaced in print. Looking up the press of the time causes one’s jaw to slump in sheer astonishment. Here, typically, is a Time magazine “exclusive” about Zahawie, written by Hassan Fattah on Oct. 1, 2003:
"The veteran diplomat has spent the eight months since President Bush's speech trying to set the record straight and clear his name. In a rare interview with Time, al-Zahawie outlined how forgery and circumstantial evidence was used to talk up Iraq's nuclear weapons threat, and leave him holding the smoking gun."
A few paragraphs later appear, the wonderful and unchallenged words from Zahawie: “Frankly, I didn’t know that Niger produced uranium at all.” Well, sorry for the inconvenience of the questions, then, my old IAEA and NPT “veteran” (whose nuclear qualifications go unmentioned in the Time article).[/i]
So, no, the claims were not incorrect then, and have not been debunked now.
Now, as to the main point, which was that Wilson was drawing attention to himself and his wife, I return again to Hitchens’ piece from back in 2004:
EXCERPT:
Given the CIA’s institutional hostility to the “regime change” case, the blatantly partisan line taken in public by Wilson himself, and the high probability that an Iraqi delegation had at least met with suppliers from Niger, how wrong was it of Robert Novak to draw attention to the connection between Plame and Wilson’s trip? Or of someone who knew of it to tell Novak?
To add my own line of reasoning here, how difficult was it to predict that there would be substantial press interest in the details of the trip Wilson was claiming was the source of his information that the President had lied to the country in the SOTU, or that such attention would be persistent once it became obvious that Wilson’s claims were hardly a slam dunk?
[/quote]
Actually it is the issue of the forgeries that undermines the uranium claim. I guess I didn’t make it clear enough but in both the Taylor report, and the Butler report that I linked to it is crystal clear that the uranium assumption is totally base 2 pieces of intelligence.
The Committee questioned the Chief of the SIS about the reporting behind these statements. We were told that it came from two independent sources, one of which was based on documentary evidence. One had reported in June 2002 and the other in September that the Iraqis had expressed interest in purchasing, as it had done before, uranium from Niger. GCHQ also had some sigint concerning a visit by an Iraqi official to Niger…
Note: one is based on documentary evidence!
it goes on:
90. The SIS?s two sources reported that Iraq had expressed an interest in buying uranium from Niger, but the sources were uncertain whether contracts had been signed or if uranium had actually been shipped to Iraq. In order to protect the intelligence sources and to be factually correct, the phrase ?Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa? was used. At the time of producing the dossier, nothing had challenged the accuracy of the SIS reports.
In February 2003 the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) received from a third party (not the UK) documents that the party had acquired in the autumn of 2002 and which purported to be evidence of Iraq?s attempts to obtain uranium from Niger. In March 2003 the IAEA identified some of the documents it had received as forgeries and called into question the authenticity of the others.
The third party then released its documents to the SIS. The SIS then contacted its source to check the authenticity of its documentary evidence. The SIS told us that its source was still conducting further investigations into this matter.
The SIS stated that the documents did not affect its judgement of its second source and consequently the SIS continues to believe that the Iraqis were attempting to negotiate the purchase of uranium from Niger. We have questioned the SIS about the basis of its judgement and conclude that it is reasonable.
This throws out exhibit a. summary of the forgeries, their only documentary evidence.
This left them with exhibit b. the Zahawi letter—which is also a forgery—again the basis being Zahawi’s visit to Niger—which was actually legitimate.
on the forged nature of it:
The inspectors asked in detail what he knew of any contacts between Iraq and Niger and the visits exchanged between officials from both countries. "Then they asked me about the purposes and the details of my own visit and the meeting with the President. They even asked whether he gave me any presents. I said yes: he told me he would like to give me a camel's saddle -- a howdah....
The inspectors finally came around to the subject of documents, said Mr Zahawie, "and asked in particular whether I had signed a letter on 6 July 2000 to Niger concerning uranium. I said absolutely not, and if they had seen such a letter it must surely be a forgery.
"The questioning continued for more than an hour. They even asked about other officials working in the Iraq missions in Rome, and who kept the embassy seal. I explained that I myself kept the seal under lock and that it was used only to stamp official notes with no signature. Notes were only initialed, not signed, while letters were signed but not stamped with the seal. They did not seem to know of this standard procedure observed in all diplomatic correspondence. There was obviously something wrong with the document in their possession if it carried both the seal and a signature."
The retired ambassador was never allowed to see what documents the inspectors had, but learned the next day that the director of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, was deeply disappointed with the results of the interview: "The feeling was that I knew more than I was willing to reveal." He immediately asked for another meeting with the inspectors, at which he rejected suggestions that he was being unhelpful and demanded that they produce the document they held. They refused; he said he could sue them for libel.
"The inspectors told their Iraqi liaison officer that my denials would be better substantiated if they could obtain an original facsimile of my signature. I sent them, the next day, copies of letters that I had written when I was still in Rome. Those letters must have convinced the IAEA team at long last that the document they had was indeed a forgery."
It has since been suggested that after Mr Zahawie left the Vatican in August 2000, someone might have used his official seal in a forgery. Asked about this, he told The Independent on Sunday: "There were no Iraqi diplomats remaining in Rome after I left, so I gave the seal to the accountant of the Sudanese embassy, where the Iraqi interests section was housed, because he had a safe and could lock it up."
and
...al-Zahawie was summoned back to Baghdad for what he had expected would be a request to help Iraq's Foreign Service plan for deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz's planned visit to the Vatican. Instead, upon landing in Baghdad, al-Zahawie was taken to meet with UN weapons inspectors. Five inspectors interviewed him in a 90-minute session, he says.
...
Italy had handed over cables from al-Zahawie to the Niger government announcing the trip, and other documents had pointed to his presence in Niger. But the inspectors were particularly interested in a July 6, 2000, document bearing al-Zahawie's signature, concerning a proposed uranium transaction. The inspectors refused to show him the letter, he says, but al-Zahawie was sure he had never written it.
"If they had such a letter, it had to have been a forgery," he says.
The tell-tale signs of the forgery were quite obvious, he stresses. Diplomatic procedure typically called for official notes between Iraq and other governments to feature a government seal, but they are typically unsigned; correspondence between an ambassador and other dignitaries would be signed but would have no seal. The letter in question had both, the inspectors admitted.
Also keep in mind that IAEA according the taylor report already discussed had recieved all the Brits evidence and had discounted it, again because all roads led to the already debunked forgeries.
Also nobody but the brits are standing by this. And only on the basis of an admitted forged letter.
Wilson was right.
Bush was wrong.
Cia confirmed this
Bush admitted this.
Actually it is the issue of the forgeries that undermines the uranium claim. I guess I didn’t make it clear enough but in both the Taylor report, and the Butler report that I linked to it is crystal clear that the uranium assumption is totally base 2 pieces of intelligence.
…
Note: one is based on documentary evidence!
…
This throws out exhibit a. summary of the forgeries, their only documentary evidence.
This left them with exhibit b. the Zahawi letter—which is also a forgery—again the basis being Zahawi’s visit to Niger—which was actually legitimate.
on the forged nature of it:
…
Also keep in mind that IAEA according the taylor report already discussed had recieved all the Brits evidence and had discounted it, again because all roads led to the already debunked forgeries.
Also nobody but the brits are standing by this. And only on the basis of an admitted forged letter.
Wilson was right.
Bush was wrong.
Cia confirmed this
Bush admitted this.
[/quote]
I seem to have missed the part in which you establish that the Brits based their conclusion on the letter, forged or otherwise, to which you refer.
I see a reference to 2 sources, one of which was documents. Then you start refering to another forged document, after already assigning the source that was based on documents? Perhaps you could be a bit more clear…
The Brits had two sources, one of which was based on the forged docs, and one of which was independent of the forged docs. And they have stuck to their guns.
Actually it is the issue of the forgeries that undermines the uranium claim. I guess I didn’t make it clear enough but in both the Taylor report, and the Butler report that I linked to it is crystal clear that the uranium assumption is totally base 2 pieces of intelligence.
…
Note: one is based on documentary evidence!
…
This throws out exhibit a. summary of the forgeries, their only documentary evidence.
This left them with exhibit b. the Zahawi letter—which is also a forgery—again the basis being Zahawi’s visit to Niger—which was actually legitimate.
on the forged nature of it:
…
Also keep in mind that IAEA according the taylor report already discussed had recieved all the Brits evidence and had discounted it, again because all roads led to the already debunked forgeries.
Also nobody but the brits are standing by this. And only on the basis of an admitted forged letter.
Wilson was right.
Bush was wrong.
Cia confirmed this
Bush admitted this.
I seem to have missed the part in which you establish that the Brits based their conclusion on the letter, forged or otherwise, to which you refer.
I see a reference to 2 sources, one of which was documents. Then you start refering to another forged document, after already assigning the source that was based on documents? Perhaps you could be a bit more clear…
The Brits had two sources, one of which was based on the forged docs, and one of which was independent of the forged docs. And they have stuck to their guns. [/quote]
That the other source was the Zahawi letter: http://timesonline.typepad.com/mick_smith/2006/04/nigergate_i_the.html
the evidence…“which was described by the Butler report as ?credible?, was a letter from Wissam Zahawi, the Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican, dated July 6, 2000, specifically talking about obtaining uranium.”
That it was a forgery is descibed in my previous, note the dates the IAEA recieves it for review, interviews zawahi, gives its findings.
As I posted before the IAEA recieved all the british intel, and concluded all were based on forgeries.
As you can see, the relevance of who did bush source first is relevant because, all intel was backing away from his 16 words. The cia said remove it from every draft, yet it kept appearing, to get around that, you have the 16 words.
And thus Wilson’s op-ed.
Keeping in mind he was sent to investigate what the forgeries claimed.
the evidence…“which was described by the Butler report as ?credible?, was a letter from Wissam Zahawi, the Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican, dated July 6, 2000, specifically talking about obtaining uranium.”
That it was a forgery is descibed in my previous, note the dates the IAEA recieves it for review, interviews zawahi, gives its findings.
As I posted before the IAEA recieved all the british intel, and concluded all were based on forgeries.
As you can see, the relevance of who did bush source first is relevant because, all intel was backing away from his 16 words. The cia said remove it from every draft, yet it kept appearing, to get around that, you have the 16 words.
And thus Wilson’s op-ed.
Keeping in mind he was sent to investigate what the forgeries claimed.[/quote]
The article you link above is obviously written by someone who did not agree with the intel used in the build up to the war with Iraq.
However, did you read it? It would seem your case isn’t as open and shut as you think it is, given the article says the IAEA still stands by the letter, which you say it does not.
The conclusion of the article you link above:
But as I have often said, and I am going to say again, those now infamous “16 words” were probably the only accurate comment on Iraqi WMD that the president made in the run-up to war.
From the articile you link above:
The British intelligence service MI6 did believe that Saddam was trying to persuade Niger to sell it uranium ore, and as I report in today?s Sunday Times, with good reason. Indeed, they still do. MI6 has apologised for and withdrawn every bit of intelligence on Iraqi WMD that was used to make the case for war, apart from the claim that Saddam was seeking uranium from Niger. Why would that be? Well because the French secret service the DGSE, who supplied the intelligence concerned, are also still sticking by it. The intelligence they continue to defend, and which was described by the Butler report as “credible”, was a letter from Wissam Zahawi, the Iraqi ambassador to the Vatican, dated July 6, 2000, specifically talking about obtaining uranium.
Another key from that article:
The documents were sent to the IAEA on February 4, 2003, and a month later the IAEA dismissed them as amateurish forgeries. According to the Senate Intelligence Committee report, the US government learned at the same time ?that the French had based their initial assessment that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium from Niger on the same documents that the US had provided to the IAEA?. This statement is deeply misleading. In fact, the French had based their initial assessment on a number of pieces of intelligence which included just one of the Martino/Montini documents the US gave to the IAEA, the genuine document on Zahawi?s 1999 visit to Niger and that initial assessment had since been confirmed by the July 2000 Zahawi letter.
Note that the letter was a confirmation or, in other words, an additional piece of information backing up intelligence the French already had on the Zahawi trip – and the French shared that intel with MI-6. Note also that the French have not backed away from this either.
From the first comment and the reply thereto in your article that you linked above:
[i]We want to see a copy of the July 6 2000 letter from Zahawi, the Iraqi Vatican attache, regarding the attempt to purchase the uranium.
What does it say?
[Mick says: So do I. But I dont have high hopes of getting one! The IAEA had a copy which they will not pass on to anyone because the French who provided it told them not to. MI6 had a copy which they were famously not allowed to pass on to the CIA so they are hardly likely to let us see it. The French of course also had a copy but since they are the ones stopping MI6 and the IAEA from passing it on we’re hardly likely to see it. We also know that the IAEA believed it to be genuine and that it was not part of the forged Martino documents because these were not passed to the IAEA until 4 February 2003 whereas the IAEA interviewed Iraqi officials about the Zahawi letter on 20 January 2003, and did not believe their denials. This was revealed by one of those Iraqi officials, Jafar Dhia Jafar, in his book The Assignment.
We also know that the Butler Inquiry deemed it to be credible and confirmed it had nothing to do with the faked documents.
What it says precisely we do not know. But we do have a fair idea of what it says in general terms. We know for instance that it doesnt say that there was a contract between Iraq and Niger, because we can be pretty sure that if it did we would be told that, and we know that it indicates in some way that Iraq was trying to obtain uranium from Niger, not just because that was the interpretation put on it by the DGSE and MI6. It was also clearly the interpretation put on it by the IAEA when they refused to believe Jafar’s denials. [/i]
And this is all aside from the fact that there was a intelligence dossier on Niger’s previous attempts to sell its yellowcake uranium to many of the well known “rogue nations.” And also aside from the fact of Zahawi’s previous high position in the Iraqi nuclear program.
Those items of intelligence were confirmed by the letter, but would not go away even if it were a forgery, which Iraqi claims to the contrary certainly do not establish. This is why the Butler report and the British do not characterize their second source (the one independent of the Italian forgeries) as “document based.”
So, no, Wilson wasn’t right, the 16 words were right, and Wilson very well brought press attention to himself and the details of his trip by publishing an op-ed in the NYT talking about his trip and citing it as evidence for a claim that the President was lying in the SOTU.
[i]Armitage says he told Novak because it was “just an offhand question.” “I didn’t put any big import on it and I just answered and it was the last question we had,” he says.
Armitage adds that while the document was classified, "it doesn’t mean that every sentence in the document is classified.
“I had never seen a covered agent’s name in any memo in, I think, 28 years of government,” he says.
He adds that he thinks he referred to Wilson’s wife as such, or possibly as “Mrs. Wilson.” He never referred to her as Valerie Plame, he adds.
“I didn’t know the woman’s name was Plame. I didn’t know she was an operative,” he says. [/i]