Goodbye, Alberto Gonzales?

[quote]Lorisco wrote:
etaco wrote:
It seems odd that some are making a big deal out of Clinton replacing the 93 US attorneys upon assuming office when Bush 43 replaced 91 of 93 upon taking office himself. Replacing political appointees after a change in administrations is the standard.

Exactly right. Then explain why the main stream Media is all over Bush and didn’t say a damn then when Clinton did it?[/quote]

I heard nothing of the mass replacements when Bush 43 came in, but I do remember hearing about the Clinton firings then, just like “Travel-gate” and every other “gate” of the Clinton administration.

Remember how every scandel and hint of even the most mild run of the mill corruption was given a snappy name with “-gate” appended to it, as if they rose to the level of importance of Watergate? The media had a field day with all of them, and I think they loved the Clinton administration for it. I think the media may have been expecting the Bush administration to run a slightly tighter ship, meaning less news, but fortunately for ratings, they haven’t. I’m not protesting the investigations, digging, and criticisms by the media of either administration. It’s their goddamn job. There is absolutely nothing more important to a real democracy than transparency. This is true all the more because the business of politics selects for, for lack of a better word, slimy people.

I doubt much will come of this beyond Gonzales’s head, but it makes me feel ever so slightly better about the government when the Legislative and Executive branches are sniffing around each other for the slightest whiff of corruption rather than tossing each others salad and calling it a job well done. Even if their motives are purely political, actors in a divided government have at least a little more incentive behave.

[quote]etaco wrote:
Remember how every scandel and hint of even the most mild run of the mill corruption was given a snappy name with “-gate” appended to it, as if they rose to the level of importance of Watergate? [/quote]

Remember when the Right investigated the Clintons’ White House Christmas Card list? Classic…!

Uh, looks like more shit is hitting the fan at the Justice Department:

Prosecutor Says Bush Appointees Interfered With Tobacco Case

[i]The leader of the Justice Department team that prosecuted a landmark lawsuit against tobacco companies said yesterday that Bush administration political appointees repeatedly ordered her to take steps that weakened the government’s racketeering case.

Sharon Y. Eubanks said Bush loyalists in Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales’s office began micromanaging the team’s strategy in the final weeks of the 2005 trial, to the detriment of the government’s claim that the industry had conspired to lie to U.S. smokers.

She said a supervisor demanded that she and her trial team drop recommendations that tobacco executives be removed from their corporate positions as a possible penalty. He and two others instructed her to tell key witnesses to change their testimony. And they ordered Eubanks to read verbatim a closing argument they had rewritten for her, she said.

“The political people were pushing the buttons and ordering us to say what we said,” Eubanks said. “And because of that, we failed to zealously represent the interests of the American public.”[/i]

(If you don’t remember this case, the Government attorneys had a deal for a 130 billion dollar settlement with the Tobacco companies lined up. At the last minute, the US attorneys scaled back their demands to… only 10 billion. From 130 billion settlement to 10 billion. WTF???)

[i]Eubanks, who retired from Justice in December 2005, said she is coming forward now because she is concerned about what she called the “overwhelming politicization” of the department demonstrated by the controversy over the firing of eight U.S. attorneys. Lawyers from Justice’s civil rights division have made similar claims about being overruled by supervisors in the past.

Eubanks said Congress should not limit its investigation to the dismissal of the U.S. attorneys.

“Political interference is happening at Justice across the department,” she said. “When decisions are made now in the Bush attorney general’s office, politics is the primary consideration. . . . The rule of law goes out the window.”[/i]

[quote]etaco wrote:
…I heard nothing of the mass replacements when Bush 43 came in, but I do remember hearing about the Clinton firings then, …[/quote]

Because it was a Republican replacing another Republicans appointees.

Who is going to make a big stink about that?

Some good, legal analysis of the best-case interpretation that the Democrats could be arguing on the underlying issues can be found here, from a Professor who is no fan of the administration:

This excerpt is particularly good:

[i]If there was any crime committed here, it was probably the “corrupt” influencing of a government proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. 1505 (“Whoever corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, . . . Shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years”); and 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2) (“Whoever corruptly . . . obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.”)

If, say, Karl Rove, or Harriet Miers, or someone else in the White House, tried to pressure the U.S. Attorneys to drop investigations because the targets (e.g., Duke Cunningham) were Republicans, or to press certain investigations or prosecutions because the targets were Democrats (e.g., pressure to bring “vote fraud” cases regardless of whether there was any evidence of such fraud), that would arguably be an attempt to “corruptly” influence official proceedings – to bring improper influences to bear on whether an investigation goes forward, or whether a prosecution is initiated. This is especially so because, as my colleague Julie O’Sullivan has explained in a very informative recent article (96 Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 643, 697-708 (2006)), the definitions of “corruptly” in these statutes are exceedingly vague and capacious, and could easily encompass such behavior . . . if it that’s what happened.

What gives me pause about the prospect of violations of sections 1505 and 1512, however, is that presumably Karl Rove, Harriet Miers, et al., were serving as agents of the President. And the decision whether to prosecute a federal case under current law is ultimately the responsibility of the President himself. Can the President (or those acting on his behalf) “corruptly” influence decisions over which he himself has the ultimate authority? That seems like an odd notion (and would certainly be a novel application of the corrupt influence statutes), but I don’t know enough about these criminal statutes to say for certain. (I would certainly welcome knowledgeable comments about these statutes as applied to this unusual situation.)

In any event, even if the corrupt-influence statutes are inapposite here, pressuring the U.S. Attorneys to make prosecution decisions based on the partisan affiliation of the possible defendants would still be unlawful, because it would violate the President’s constitutional obligation to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. Indeed, the very act of removing the U.S. Attorneys might itself constitute a “take care” violation if they were fired so as to prevent prosecution of Republicans, or to smooth the way for unwarranted prosecutions of Democrats. Just because the President can remove U.S. Attorneys at will does not mean that any ground for removal is permissible. There are constitutional limits. He could not fire them because of their religion or race, for instance. And he could not fire them in order to ensure partisan prosecutorial decisionmaking. As Stuart Taylor remarked on the NewsHour: “You fire the U.S. attorney because you want him to do more death penalty cases, that’s fine. You fire him because you want a Republican, that’s fine. You fire him because you want to put a patronage appointee in the job, that’s fine. You fire him because he’s not prosecuting Democrats or because he is prosecuting Republicans, that’s not fine.”[/i]

I note that there is absolutely no good evidence that any illegal activity occurred in this instance.

I’ve seen numerous postings on political news sights indicating that Gonzales has just about zero support from Republicans on the hill, so the only real battle likely will be over the circumstances under which Rove and Myers testify.

From Jonathan Adler:

http://www.volokh.com/archives/archive_2007_03_18-2007_03_24.shtml#1174663473

Was There “Political Interference” in Tobacco Litigation?

With the Attorneygate scandal continuing unabated, the time was right to renew charges ( The Volokh Conspiracy - ) that political appointees in the Bush Justice Department interfered to weaken the federal government’s attempt to sue tobacco companies under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act. Yesterday, the Washington Post ran a front page article repeating allegations by former Justice Department attorney Sharon Eubanks that “Bush loyalists” at DoJ “began micromanaging the team’s strategy in the final weeks of the 2005 trial, to the detriment of the government’s claim that the industry had conspired to lie to U.S. smokers.”

[i] She said a supervisor demanded that she and her trial team drop recommendations that tobacco executives be removed from their corporate positions as a possible penalty. He and two others instructed her to tell key witnesses to change their testimony. And they ordered Eubanks to read verbatim a closing argument they had rewritten for her, she said.

"The political people were pushing the buttons and ordering us to say what we said," Eubanks said. "And because of that, we failed to zealously represent the interests of the American public." . . .

Eubanks said [DoJ political appontees] largely ignored the case until it became clear that the government might win. She recalled that "things began to get really tense" after . . . news reports in April 2005 that one government expert . . . would argue that tobacco officials who engaged in fraud could be removed from their corporate posts.[/i]

The article notes that DoJ’s Office of Professional Responsibility rejected the charges after a formal investigation. Surprisingly, it makes no mention of the appeals court decision which largely pulled the rug out from under the Justice Department’s legal strategy. In February 2005, in United States v. Philip Morris USA ( http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200502/04-5252a.pdf ), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit roundly rejected the Justice Department’s expansive interpretation of RICO that had been accepted by the lower court, and upon which Eubanks and others had hoped to base draconian penalties. Among other things, the court held that government prosecutors could not seek what amounted to criminal penalties (e.g., disgorgement) under RICO’s civil provisions. This greatly reduced the government’s leverage in settlement negotiations with tobacco companies, and called for rethinking the legal theory of the government’s case – something Eubanks apparently did not wish to do.

The D.C. Circuit panel was divided, but there was never much doubt about the outcome – or that it would be upheld en banc, as it was in April (when Eubanks says she first started to get pressure to scale back the government’s case). From its inception, the federal government’s tobacco litigation was based on an extremely aggressive and expansive interpretation of RICO.

If there was a surprise, it was that political appointees in the Bush Justice Department allowed the government’s case against tobacco makers to proceed for the first five years of the administration without any meaningful oversight, particularly given the novelty and expansive nature of the legal theory upon which the prosecution was based. One does not need to hold any sympathy for tobacco companies to believe a Justice Department victory would have set a dangerous precedent, greatly expanding RICO’s scope, and the federal government’s ability to use RICO’s civil provisions against corporations. It was certainly not the sort of precedent one would expect an ostensibly conservative Justice Department to pursue.

The Post article also quotes anti-tobacco activist Matthew Myers ( http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/organization/bios/myers.shtml ) saying Eubanks account is “the only reasonable explanation” for what occurred. Perhaps Myers should consult the tobacco litigation timeline ( http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/reports/doj/timeline/ ) posted on his own organization’s website, as it includes the D.C. Circuit’s decisions in its chronology of relevant events.


Further, from Ed Whelan:

http://bench.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MDIxNWUwMTBiYmY2Mzg1ZmRlZjg0YmUxZmVhNGZmNWY=

Blowing Smoke [Ed Whelan]

If there is a story that is more factually confused and shows greater confusion about the proper role of so-called political appointees in the executive branch than the U.S. attorneys kerfuffle, it is this article in today?s Washington Post titled ?Prosecutor Says Bush Appointees Interfered With Tobacco Case?. In the article, Sharon Eubanks, the now-retired career lawyer in the Department of Justice who led a civil lawsuit against tobacco companies, complains that senior DOJ political appointees improperly meddled in her case. Specifically, the article says that the senior officials ?demanded that she and her trial team drop recommendations that tobacco executives be removed from their corporate positions as a possible penalty,? reduced the proposed monetary penalty sought in the case, ?instructed her to tell key witnesses to change their testimony,? and ?ordered [her] to read verbatim a closing argument they had rewritten for her.?

Eubanks?s charges are absurd:

  1. Even if the correct story line were that ?political appointees? reversed course on what career attorneys wanted to do?and, as I discuss in point 2, that?s not what happened?so what? As much as some career DOJ lawyers may not like it, they answer to the non-career ?political? appointees whom the President and the Attorney General put in charge to implement the Administration?s law-enforcement and legal-policy priorities. That?s part of what a presidential election is all about. To regard direction from senior DOJ officials as ?interference? is to misunderstand who answers to whom.

Does anyone doubt, for example, that senior DOJ officials may properly seek to reduce the penalty that underlings propose? Let?s say that a prosecutor wanted to seek the death penalty against a criminal defendant but was overruled by senior officials. Would anyone call this improper interference? Reasonable people might disagree with the judgment of the senior officials, but I don?t see how anyone can dispute their authority. (In the tobacco case, as one of the senior officials (paraphrased in the article) points out, the decision that was made ?was vindicated by the judge?s ruling that she could not order? even the lower proposed penalty.)

  1. I am reliably informed that every decision that senior DOJ officials made originated with, and was consistent with the advice of, career prosecutors in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, who generally have jurisdiction over RICO cases, both civil and criminal. (The tobacco case ended up being handled by the Civil Division because the original complaint led with non-RICO charges (which were dismissed).) All that senior DOJ officials did was referee disputes between the DOJ career attorneys in the Criminal Division who were expert in this area and Eubanks?s team.

  2. The title of the article strains to echo the unsubstantiated insinuations in the U.S. attorneys matter. It even labels Eubanks, a Main DOJ civil litigator, as a ?prosecutor?. (Although that usage is technically defensible?any plaintiff?s lawyer can be said to ?prosecute? a case?the term ?prosecutor? is generally reserved for those who prosecute crimes, and I doubt very much that there are any civil litigators in Main Justice who refer to themselves as prosecutors.)

  3. To seek, as a civil remedy against a corporation, the dismissal of corporate executives is a highly unusual remedy. This case (I am reliably informed) did not meet the refined criteria that the Criminal Division had established. More generally, the revision in remedies sought was a direct response to the D.C. Circuit?s interlocutory ruling rejecting the government?s more grandiose disgorgement theories (a ruling that those bad, bad political appointees tried to get overturned in the Supreme Court).

  4. The article somehow fails to explain its most inflammatory charge, that senior officials ?instructed her to tell key witnesses to change their testimony.? A casual reader might think that senior officials wanted them to change their testimony on factual matters?in other words, to say things that the witnesses didn?t believe to be true. But all that happened is that expert witnesses on remedies were asked to revise their testimony to comport with the revised remedies being pursued.

  5. If senior officials ordered Eubanks to read verbatim a closing argument they had drafted for her, that is obviously because they did not trust her to exercise her legal judgment consistent with their directions. Her renewed complaints indicate that they were right.


http://bench.nationalreview.com/post/?q=OTg0OGYzN2M0NWE1OTM5MzhjYzU1ODEwNjZjOTIwMjk=

Re: Blowing Smoke [Ed Whelan]

In support of my point 2 in my post below?that every decision that senior DOJ officials made originated with, and was consistent with the advice of, career prosecutors in the Criminal Division of the Justice Department?here?s a letter to the editor published in the Washington Post on June 15, 2005, by Frank J. Marine, a DOJ career attorney in the Criminal Division. I?ve italicized key portions.

 "A June 10 editorial said that the Justice Department's decision to reduce from $130 billion to $10 billion the amount it sought from the major tobacco companies in its fraud case "appears to be the result of political pressure." [i]It also came to the offensive and unfounded conclusion that the change was not based on the "legal merits" of the case as assessed by "career lawyers."[/i]

 I am a senior member of the Justice Department section involved with enforcement of racketeering laws. In 1998 the office of Attorney General Janet Reno asked whether it would be appropriate to bring civil racketeering claims against the tobacco industry for defrauding the public. [i]I recommended that such a lawsuit be brought, and I have been a member of the case's trial team ever since.[/i]

 At the trial, Michael C. Fiore testified that a smoking-cessation program that would enable smokers who wished to quit to do so would cost $130 billion and take 25 years. However, the legal requirements that the appeals court established for the case said specifically that any remedy must be limited to addressing future violations of the law by the tobacco companies and may not seek to address the injuries caused by their past fraudulent conduct.

 I was concerned that a reviewing court might conclude that Dr. Fiore's proposal would not satisfy that standard, so [i]I recommended that the department present to the court a modified program designed to comply with the appeals court's decision. My recommendation was adopted.[/i]

 With respect to the editorial's allegation that witnesses were asked to soften their testimony, I was concerned that some witnesses were seeking to propose remedies that would violate the Constitution and laws and that the Justice Department could not endorse such proposals. As a result, the department determined that the witnesses it put on the stand had to include in their testimony a statement that they spoke only for themselves and not for the department ? as they then did.

 Both my parents died of smoking-related illnesses, and I yield to no one in my desire to devise remedies to help addicted people stop smoking. However, as a public official and an officer of the court, my actions must comport with the rule of law. My actions and those of other career prosecutors involved in this case have done just that."

[quote]Brad61 wrote:
So the claim is that Iglesias was fired because he underperformed in prosecuting voter fraud. But Iglesias was twice selected to train other prosecutors in how to prosecute voter fraud cases, in 2005 and 2006.

"Justice Dept. Recognized Prosecutor’s Work on Election Fraud Before His Firing

One of the U.S. attorneys fired by the Bush administration after Republican complaints that he neglected to prosecute voter fraud had been heralded for his expertise in that area by the Justice Department, which twice selected him to train other federal prosecutors to pursue election crimes.

Looks like the Justice Department will have to cook up another alibi…[/quote]

Some more specific stuff on Iglesias, from Ed Whelan:

http://bench.nationalreview.com/post/?q=MjgzNzVmZTM0OWZhMzdiYTViMDUxNTRjNTVlZTMyMmI=

Why Iglesias Was Fired [Ed Whelan]

In yesterday?s New York Times, David C. Iglesias, former U.S. attorney for the District of New Mexico, has an op-ed titled “Why I Was Fired” ( Opinion | Why I Was Fired - The New York Times ). Referring also to his fellow U.S. attorneys who were recently dismissed, Iglesias asserts, among other things, that “it seems clear that politics played a role in the ousters” and that “we had apparently been singled out for political reasons”. He claims that he was fired “for not being political” and refers twice to the U.S. attorneys brouhaha as a “scandal”.

Unfortunately, Iglesias offers not an iota of evidence for his charge that the Bush administration fired him (or any of the other U.S. attorneys) for improper political reasons. As his is the one dismissal among the eight that has as its backdrop seemingly inappropriate inquiries into a pending investigation, this absence of evidence is a striking sign of the lack of substance behind the charges of scandal.

Let?s consider a few points:

  1. Iglesias states in his op-ed (and has previously testified) that Representative Heather Wilson and Senator Pete Domenici separately contacted him to inquire about a “politically charged corruption case ? involving local Democrats.” They shouldn’t have done so. I won’t sort through here the competing accounts of whether the inquiries were relatively innocuous missteps or grossly improper pressure. In either case, they aren’t chargeable to the Administration.

  2. Iglesias does provide one clear account of improper behavior?his own. In the same paragraph in which he states that “[p]rosecutors may not legally talk about indictments,” he relates that he nonetheless informed Domenici that he didn’t think he would file corruption charges before November. Separately, he has admitted that he failed to comply with DOJ directives requiring him to report Domenici?s and Wilson’s improper contacts.

  3. Understood in a very broad sense, “politics” probably played the same role in Iglesias’s ouster that it had played in his initial selection. For better or worse, same-party senators have extraordinary influence in the selection of U.S. attorneys for their home districts. Domenici was largely responsible for Iglesias’s appointment. Once he made the fact of his dissatisfaction with Iglesias clear to the Administration, it would hardly be surprising that the Administration would look to replace him at an appropriate time. (It is highly doubtful that it would matter to the Administration whether Domenici offered any reasons, though it’s worth noting that he has stated that he had growing frustration with Iglesias’s alleged failure to move expeditiously on immigration and drug cases.) Giving a home-state senator so much clout may not be the best practice (though there are around 100 senators who like that clout), and it’s understandable that Iglesias would feel aggrieved by it, but it would not be improper, much less scandalous.

[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:

…With the Attorneygate scandal continuing unabated, the time was right to renew charges ( The Volokh Conspiracy - ) that political appointees in the Bush Justice Department interfered to weaken the federal government’s attempt to sue tobacco companies under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act. …
[/quote]

They wanted to use RICO to go after the tobacco companies? He was right to interfere with that!

I hate tobacco but that is total abuse of the law. He should have fired those assholes too!

RICO is like the Patriot Act. It is good to use against the original intended target but using it against anything else is just plain wrong.

The good news is that there will be public hearings with sworn testimony, so that everything will come out into the open.

Oversight and accountability, that’s what sensible people want, and it’s been all too scarce with this administration.

“Sunlight is the best disinfectant”.

Okay let me see if I have the White House’s story straight…

According spokesman Tony Snow, President Bush was not involved in the decision-making on the firings.

And according to Alberto Gonzales, he (AG) was not involved in the decision-making on the firings.

So underlings in the Justice Department decided to remove the US Attorneys and replace them… Yet the given excuse is that “US Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the president”. (But they can be fired without direct involvement from Bush or Gonzales?) That doesn’t make a damn bit of sense.

Somebody has to be lying.

I think it’s going to be two more weeks. Sampson who was Gonzales’ underling at the Justice Dept and one of the key figures, has been notified he is expected to testify under oath this Thursday.

Fred Fielding already tried to broker a deal on the White Houses’ behalf, that Rove, Sampson and Gonzales would agree to testify, but only if they did it in private and there was no oath to tell the truth. This offer destroys Bush’s argumement that nobody in his administration should be compelled to testify because of executive privelege… Fielding already OFFERED it. The argument now is should the public hear the testimony, and should witnesses be sworn in, to tell the Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth. The Executive Privelege issue was already conceded by the President’s spokesman.

I believe the White House would like to replace Gonzales soon but they are having a hard time finding the right replacement. Bush likes to surround himself with insiders and yes-men. I believe they are running out of names on a very short list, of people who are somewhat qualified, who Bush actually trusts, who will kow-tow to whatever Bush wants first and foremost.

So I think only two more weeks, while the White House makes phone calls and interviews potential replacements. Gonzales is toast, it’s just a matter of when, now.

Pretty good article in Slate by former Clinton Solicitor General, Assistant Attorney General and White House counsel Walter Dellinger on the scope of executive privilege and Congress’ power to oversee the executive branch:

What Congress Gets To Know
How to end the standoff on executive privilege and the U.S. attorney scandal.
By Walter Dellinger and Christopher H. Schroeder
Posted Monday, March 26, 2007, at 4:44 PM ET

What information is Congress entitled to know about the U.S. attorney scandal, and what is the White House entitled to withhold? Whose testimony may Congress seek, and whose appearance is off limits? Here is our best effort to answer those questions in relation to the U.S. attorney scandal.

  1. What is Congress entitled to know, and what is the White House entitled to withhold? Notwithstanding the competing cynical assumptions that Congress is off on a partisan fishing expedition or that the White House is engaged in a coverup, each branch has significant and legitimate interests at stake. Congressional evaluation of the performance of executive branch agencies has long been an indispensable part of our constitutional system. The notion that Congress has no legitimate interest in overseeing White House involvement in the administration of law?as White House spokesman Tony Snow suggested last week?has no support in history. President Nixon thought that the White House itself was special and immune from oversight, but this extreme view has never been endorsed by Congress or by any court.

The argument for an executive privilege to withhold information from Congress is less obvious, but still substantial. As the Supreme Court has recognized, the privilege of protecting the deliberative process within the White House “is fundamental to the operation of Government.” The country is best served if the president’s advisers are free to give him blunt, candid, even harsh, assessments. Judges and their law clerks, senators and their staffers, editors and their reporters all believe the quality of their work and the candor of their advice benefits from confidential consultations. So it is with the president.

Across time and political party, the executive branch has had a firm position that conversations and communications with the president himself are covered by executive privilege. That’s the right rule. But what about communications of senior officers among themselves that don’t involve the president, such as conversations or e-mails between the White House counsel and the president’s chief of staff? Harriet Miers talking to Karl Rove, or Rove or Miers talking to Alberto Gonzales or Paul McNulty or Kyle Sampson at the Department of Justice?

From the lone decision by the D.C. Circuit (one of the federal courts of appeal) on whether executive privilege extends to senior aides for communications that do not involve the president: “Given the need to provide sufficient elbow room for advisers to obtain information from all knowledgeable sources, the privilege must apply both to communications which these advisers solicited and received from others as well as those they authored themselves.” The court spoke in the context of an independent counsel investigation of Clinton administration Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy. The judges delineated the scope of the privilege to “communications authored or solicited and received by those members of an immediate White House adviser’s staff who have broad and significant responsibility for investigating and formulating the advice to be given to the President.” Certainly this definition covers the president’s political adviser and his legal counsel and a number of others on the White House staff.

Even at its strongest, however, the privilege is not absolute. As United States v. Nixon made clear, tapes of oral office conversations between senior White House officials and the president himself can be the subject of disclosure where the need for the information is sufficiently compelling, as it was in Nixon where it was relevant to the prosecution and defense of a major criminal case. The Supreme Court’s decision doesn’t tell us whether the privilege applies when there is evidence of possible wrongdoing and misstatements to Congress, which could be criminal but probably are not.

  1. What investigative methods can Congress use? May Congress compel public, sworn, transcribed testimony of White House officials? The president is on weak grounds in resisting all public or transcribed testimony. Forty-seven times during the Clinton presidency, senior White House officials testified in public about matters relevant to an investigation. In the matter of the U.S. attorney firings, there are likewise relevant questions that can be answered without disclosing conversations at the White House that directly involved the president. With so many precedents on the books, it would be hard to defend a White House refusal to permit any transcribed testimony about any aspect of the firings. (Whether the testimony should be under oath matters less: False statements to a congressional committee, even if unsworn, are a crime.)

Whether prosecutors were dismissed to make way for new patronage appointments, however, is not a subject that warrants compelled public testimony. U.S. attorneys serve at the pleasure of the president. He can fire them all because they are not members of his political party. He can replace his own appointees to bring in fresh blood. He can replace those who are not carrying out the prosecutorial policies of his administration (greater emphasis on indecency cases, for example). He can dismiss a U.S. attorney to make room for a buddy of his chief political adviser. This may not be admirable management, but it’s not an act of wrongdoing that would justify intrusive investigative techniques.

There is one kind of wrongdoing, though, that would fall within an entirely different category: The replacement of one or more U.S. attorneys in order to impede or speed along particular criminal investigations for illegitimate reasons, such as the party affiliation of the person being investigated. There are two important things to be said about this charge: One is that if it happened it would be a deep and profound wrong. The other, deserving of equal emphasis, is that there is no firm basis for concluding that any such thing actually happened. So far, the basis for the suggestion consists of suspicious timing, scattered but troublesome e-mail references, and the skepticism generated by unpersuasive explanations for the dismissals. An additional complicating factor is the possibility, now common during investigations, that some wrongdoing could have occurred in response to the investigation itself.

  1. So, where should this come out? Communications among senior White House staff members, and between them and the president, ought to remain confidential where the only charges being investigated concern “mere” patronage appointments to the U.S. attorney posts. To give one example, the claims of executive privilege are sufficiently strong that Karl Rove, as the president’s political adviser, should not be compelled to testify about conversations with President Bush or his other senior advisers if the only thing to investigate concerning Rove is whether he ousted a U.S. attorney to make room for the appointment of a crony. For these allegations, Congress can rely upon compelled testimony from Justice Department officials and others outside the White House, and voluntary testimony and evidence from within the White House.

But if there is a plausible basis for believing that the Bush administration replaced any U.S. attorney to improperly obstruct a criminal investigation or improperly prompt an indictment, or a plausible basis for believing that earlier congressional inquiries were wrongfully impeded, then claims of executive privilege should give way for evidence pertinent to that charge. We can’t say whether such a plausible basis exists because that would require a familiarity with the facts that we just don’t have. Our solution isn’t perfect, but it accommodates the competing interests of the branches. And it sure beats stalemate.

Another good explanatory post, generally, by Professor Marty Lederman – as before, I don’t agree with all the assumptions, but it seems generally logical to me given what we know. I will note that I find it highly improbable that any U.S. attorneys were removed for improper means, given what we know thus far, particularly regarding the timeline and the review of each candidate for removal, and the mechanical point that any investigations/cases in progress are generally run by assistant U.S. attorneys:

Who’s “the Decider”?

Marty Lederman

The Attorney General is now in hot(ter) water ( http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/24/washington/24attorney.html?_r=1&oref=slogin )because he assured the public two weeks ago that he had very little to do with choosing U.S. Attorneys to be dismissed, and now it turns out that just prior to the dismissals, he convened meetings devoted to that very subject.

It is, of course, troubling if the Attorney General was trying to hide the truth from Congress. But the alternative would be worse. The truth is probably somewhere in between – or a few blocks down Pennsylvania Avenue, anyway.

As I explained last week ( Balkinization: So Much for the <span style="font-style:italic;">Unitary</span> Executive ), the White House is trying to make the case that the President had nothing to do with these dismissals – that, in Tony Snow’s words, “This is a decision that was made at the U.S. Department of Justice,” and “The President has no recollection of this ever being raised with him.”

This is, of course, nonsense. As the President himself stated, “the Justice Department made recommendations, which the White House accepted, that eight of the 93 would no longer serve.” By law, the decision was the President’s, and he (appropriately) exercised it, undoubtedly with the advice of his close advisers (which is the best-case scenario for what he meant when he said “the White House accepted”).

The reason the White House wants to deny presidential involvement is to support its argument that congressional investigation into internal White House communications is simply irrelevant to the question of whether any laws or constitutional obligations were violated. (As I’ve noted previously ( Balkinization: The White House Offer on the U.S. Attorney Imbroglio ), the most important limitation in the White House Counsel’s offer is not that Rove, et al., would be testifying without oath, but that they would not answer any questions, nor provide any documents, concerning internal White House activities and communications.)

And so the White House endeavors to place the blame squarely on the sholders of the Attorney General. But it turns out he could not have done anything improper, either, because he delegated everything about the decision to others, too – or so he said on March 13th: “So far as I knew, my chief of staff was involved in the process of determining who were the weak performers. . . . That is in essence what I knew about the process; was not involved in seeing any memos, was not involved in any discussions about what was going on. . . . Many decisions are delegated. . . . I never saw documents. We never had a discussion about where things stood. What I knew was that there was ongoing effort that was led by Mr. Sampson, vetted through the Department of Justice, to ascertain where we could make improvements in U.S. attorney performances around the country.”

As we now know, this is unlikely to be entirely accurate. But if it were accurate, it would mean that the Attorney General delegated this very serious, unusual and sensitive function – deciding to recommend that the President remove several U.S. Attorneys – to an aide in his mid-30’s who had virtually no experience or knowledge of institutional norms, and even less practical or political judgment, and that the Attorney General himself forwarded such recommendations on to the President without even bothering to check the evidence with respect to whether these U.S. Attorneys had done such a bad job in office as to justify the solemn step of firing them in midstream, i.e., without even knowing whether the removals would be justified or wise.

If this were the true story, it would demonstrate atrocious judgment on the part of the Attorney General, and would be much more troubling than the fact that he dissembled a bit in a press conference about the level of his own involvement.

We now know that it is not entirely true – that Judge Gonzales convened at least one meeting shortly before the dismissals in which he was told of the plan. Presumably (at least one hopes), at that meeting he was given at least some indication about why these faithful public servants were being ignominiously dropped.

But I suspect there is at least some truth to his original claims of being mostly out of the loop. To be sure, Judge Gonzales probably did not inquire deeply into the details of the justifications for the removals. But it’s also likely that he did not simply take Kyle Sampson’s word for it – something that would be virtually inexplicable.

The reason the Attorney General could be so hands-off about the entire mess was that the real decisionmakers – the President’s close aides, such as Karl Rove and Harriet Miers – had already made their choices on who would be fired, and had “signed off” on DOJ’s so-called “recommendations.” The e-mail traffic I’ve seen shows that Sampson was taking his marching orders from Miers, her Deputy William Kelley, and Rove, who appear to have been orchestrating the affair from the outset. In a November 15 memo, for instance, Sampson urged Miers to reach out to Rove’s office as a “pre-execution necessity I would recommend.” The weeks went by, with Sampson waiting for the “green light” from the White House Counsel’s office. On December 4, Kelley wrote to Sampson: “We’re a go for the U.S. attorney plan. WHU leg (office of legislative affairs), political (office), and communications have signed off and acknowledged that we have to be committed to following through once the pressure comes.”

Gonzales knew all of this, of course – that this was a White House initiative that had been vetted carefully not only by his own Chief of Staff, but also by various components in the White House, who would recommend to the President that the removals be made. I should add that there is nothing wrong with this, and it’s what one would expect, in any Administration, with respect to such an important exercise of the President’s removal power. Indeed, the notion that this project would go forward in DOJ without White House leadership and guidance is virtually inconceivable.

What does this mean? Well, for one thing, it means that the current focus on the Attorney General is something of a distraction, at least insofar as Congress’s objective is to determine whether anything unlawful or unconstitutional was involved in the U.S. Attorney dismissals. The real action was in the White House, and one cannot determine whether the removals were made for improper reasons unless one knows what Rove and Miers advised the President, and why they did so. But that’s precisely the subject matter that Fred Fielding would put off-limits in his offer to allow questioning of those officials. [There’s a great deal of chatter online, and from the likes of Charles Krauthammer, suggesting that these removals could not have been impermissible because the U.S. Attorneys serve at the President’s pleasure. I have explained here ( Balkinization: Did Anyone in the White House Act Unlawfully? ) why I think this is wrong – why it is at least possible that certain criminal laws were violated or that the President and others acted in derogation of his constitutional obligation to faithfully execute the law. See also Josh Marshall’s latest ( http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/013251.php ). I’m not saying that the removals were or were not unlawful or unconstitutonal – merely that it’s possible, and that the evidence adduced so far (and the absence of any coherent story about permissible reasons for the removals), leaves the question open.]

I should caution, in closing, that even if Congress were to receive full access to evidence from within the White House, Congress might not ever learn of what Rove and Miers actually said, or why they acted. They and their aides are very unlikely, in response to questioning, to expressly acknowledge that the U.S. Attorneys were fired for improper reasons (if that is in fact what happened); and it is entirely possible that there is no e-mail or other memorialized evidence explaining forthrightly why the decisions were made. (And if there are such smoking-gun documents, it is highly unlikely that the White House will ever disclose them, short of an order from the Supreme Court, which is itself a very uncertain prospect and would take at least a year.)

Looks like Monica Goodling (Senior counselor to Attorney General Gonzales) plans on taking the Fifth Ammendment, at her deposition on Thursday.

I thought the Fifth was reserved for criminal cases… for when a crime has already been committed (not as a way to avoid perjury). She’s presumably a lawyer or has legal training. Does this amount to an acknowledgement of criminal activity?

I wonder if she will ask for immunity in exchange for her testimony.

Seems to me that Gonzales’ shifting rationale and contradictory statements are intended to shield someone’s misconduct or overrreaching… either himself or a superior. My first guess is that person would probably be Karl Rove.

Here’s Gonzales’ press conference where he keeps saying that he accepts responsibility for everything. Doesn’t accepting responsibility mean stepping down, when there’s a trainwreck?

Or is accepting responsibility just a symbolic thing with this crowd?

Note the part where he acknowldges that he ‘may have’ given “incomplete information” in his testimony (around 4:50)

[quote]Brad61 wrote:

I thought the Fifth was reserved for criminal cases… for when a crime has already been committed (not as a way to avoid perjury). She’s presumably a lawyer or has legal training. Does this amount to an acknowledgement of criminal activity? …[/quote]

March 27, 2007
Monica Goodling Has A Valid Basis For Asserting The Fifth Amendment Privilege

Josh Marshall asks his lawyer-readers to opine ( http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/archives/013272.php ) on whether Monica Goodling is stating a valid basis for invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege in response to a subpoena by the Senate Judiciary Committee.

The answer: Yes, rather clearly so, unless there is no reasonable scenario under which she fears that a prosecutor could take something she says before the committee as a link in a chain leading to evidence of wrongdoing. (Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).)

The Fifth Amendment privilege protects not just the guilty, but also the innocent, who fear that even their entirely truthful responses might provide the government with incriminating evidence from their own mouths. (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001) (dictum).) “The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.” (Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Ed. of the City of New York, 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956).)

A careful defense lawyer would be especially justified in advising his or her client to consider taking the Fifth in a highly charged political environment such as the Senate Judiciary Committee’s investigation into the firings of U.S. Attorneys and the alleged minimization (dare we say “cover-up?”) of the role of the Attorney General and the White House in those firings. It is important to remember that “a witness innocent of wrongdoing may well refuse to answer a question not because he fears conviction, but because he fears unfounded prosecution, a risk which every one runs at all times, theoretically at least.” (Lewis Mayers, Shall We Amend the Fifth Amendment? 4 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959).)

The Akin Gump attorney probably did not need to broadcast his attack on the fairness of the atmosphere in the Judiciary Committee as he did; that does indeed smack of politics. But that doesn’t mean that the advice he has given his client is bad. It is not. It is of course possible that the invocation of the Fifth is in bad faith, and that neither Ms. Goodling nor her attorney has any basis at all to fear her eventual prosecution, either for perjury, for making false statements, for obstruction of justice, or some other crime. But that strikes me as quite unlikely.

I understand and share the disgust over the firing of these U.S. Attorneys, over the politicization of the institution of the United States Attorney’s Office in this administration and the elevation of political loyalty as a value, and over the White House’s and the Attorney General’s efforts to “manage” the crisis. But that’s no reason to ditch the important values that the Fifth Amendment privilege serves.

An editorial from the right calling for Gonzalez to step down - from the National Review:

http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NTNjY2U3Yjk0NTRmNTcyNjg1M2EwM2FlNTA0OTYyMzU=

Time to Go

By The Editors

The story of the eight fired U.S. attorneys has been relentlessly overhyped. We do not know that any of them was fired because the administration put its political interests ahead of his or her prosecutorial judgment. Sen. Dick Durbin’s recent insinuation that the attorneys who were not fired had kept their jobs by compromising their prosecutions was outrageous.

If congressional Democrats are wrong to bluster, however, they are within their rights to investigate. They may yet turn up enough evidence to prove that some of the firings were improper violations of political norms.

We do not need more evidence, however, to reach a conclusion about the suitability of Alberto Gonzales for the leadership of the Department of Justice. While we defended him from some of the outlandish charges made during his confirmation hearings, we have never seen evidence that he has a fine legal mind, good judgment, or managerial ability. Nor has his conduct at any stage of this controversy gained our confidence.

His claim not to have been involved in the firings suggests that he was either deceptive or inexcusably detached from the operations of his own department. His deputy, Paul McNulty, insulted the fired prosecutors by claiming that they had been asked to resign for “performance-related issues.” But many of them received good reviews, and none of them said he was told about any disappointment with his performance. If Justice wanted to clear them out to make way for new blood, or to find attorneys who shared their prosecutorial priorities, that would have been perfectly legitimate. By saying what he did, McNulty guaranteed that the fired attorneys would lash out in the press. Gonzales’s latest tactic has been to concede that improper motives may have played a role in the firings, but to blame his underlings for any misconduct and to pledge to get to the bottom of it.

What little credibility Gonzales had is gone. All that now keeps him in office, save the friendship of the president, is the conviction of many Republicans that removing him would embolden the Democrats. It is an overblown fear. The Democrats will pursue scandals, real or invented, whether or not Gonzales stays. But they have an especially inviting target in Gonzales. He cannot defend the administration and its policies even when they deserve defense. Alberto Gonzales should resign. The Justice Department needs a fresh start.

A good background article from Byron York here:

http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=ZGIyNGU4MjdhYWIzNWE1ODNlMWQ3NzQwMzdiOGU3YmE&bcsi_scan_86F709A1450AC327=AJSLm7U4uNzFWcjy1dU1yAkAAABBSzgB

Kind of long, so here’s the key conclusion – read the whole thing:

[i]The most incendiary charge leveled by Democrats, and particularly by committee member Sen. Charles Schumer, is that the Bush administration fired the U.S. attorneys to stop criminal investigations that targeted Republicans. The worst example, Schumer has alleged, is the firing of Carol Lam, the California U.S. attorney who successfully prosecuted former Republican Rep. Randy “Duke” Cunningham for bribery. Lam was fired, Schumer charges, to keep her from investigating others in the GOP.

“The most notorious [case] is the Southern District of California, San Diego,” Schumer said on NBC’s Meet the Press on March 18. “Ms. Lam, the U.S. attorney, had already brought about the conviction of Duke Cunningham. It came out in the newspapers that she was continuing to pursue that investigation, and it might lead to others ? legislative and others ? and in the middle of this investigation, she was fired.”

If that indeed happened, it would be reasonable to guess that there might be some clues in the more than 3,000 pages of e-mails and other documents pertaining to the U.S. attorneys matter released by the Justice Department. But that?s not the case. In fact, the e-mails show a much different dynamic at work. The picture that emerges from the evidence in the Lam case is of a Justice Department at profound policy odds with the U.S. attorney, preparing to take action against her, but at the same time ignoring or brushing off outsiders who criticized Lam on the very grounds that troubled Department officials. Added to that was a bureaucratic morass that made it impossible for the Department to do anything quickly. Together, those factors created a situation in which Department officials pursued a reasonable goal ? finding a new U.S. attorney for Southern California ? while denying to outsiders that they were doing it, taking far too long to get it done, and mismanaging its execution. In other words, it was an operation in which Justice Department officials did virtually everything wrong ? except what they’re accused by Democrats of doing.[/i]

[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:
Brad61 wrote:

I thought the Fifth was reserved for criminal cases… for when a crime has already been committed (not as a way to avoid perjury). She’s presumably a lawyer or has legal training. Does this amount to an acknowledgement of criminal activity? …

March 27, 2007
Monica Goodling Has A Valid Basis For Asserting The Fifth Amendment Privilege

The answer: Yes, rather clearly so, unless there is no reasonable scenario under which she fears that a prosecutor could take something she says before the committee as a link in a chain leading to evidence of wrongdoing. (Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).)

The Fifth Amendment privilege protects not just the guilty, but also the innocent, who fear that even their entirely truthful responses might provide the government with incriminating evidence from their own mouths. (Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17 (2001) (dictum).) “The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances.” (Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Ed. of the City of New York, 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956).)
…[/quote]

Further to the point above, today’s WSJ editorial:

[i]The Libby Precedent
March 28, 2007; Page A16

If Senate Judiciary Chairman Patrick Leahy wants to investigate the Bush Administration’s dismissal of eight U.S. attorneys, that’s certainly his prerogative. But he and other Democrats determined to play up this faux scandal shouldn’t be surprised if government officials decide they’d rather not step into this obvious perjury trap.

The Judiciary Committee is seeking testimony from, among others, Monica Goodling, the Justice Department’s liaison to the White House. Democrats want to quiz Ms. Goodling on her communications with other Justice officials such as Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty, who testified about the firings before the Senate committee in February. This week Ms. Goodling indicated she will exercise her Constitutional right to keep mum.

Sad to say, this is one more unfortunate result of the Beltway’s modern habit of criminalizing political differences, a la the Scooter Libby travesty. Congress has the right to conduct oversight of the executive, and in a better world government officials would be willing to testify and give as good as they get. Thus would the public be educated about the facts and policy differences be aired.

But Ms. Goodling has been around, and she can see Democrats don’t really want to know the truth; they want to shout “liar, liar” and set the stage to accuse Justice officials of criminal behavior. In a statement to the committee explaining her decision, Ms. Goodling said, “I have read public remarks by members of both the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary in which those members have drawn conclusions about the subject matter and the testimony now under investigation by the Committee.” We’ve read them, too.

Representative Linda Sanchez has already concluded that there have been “attempts to mislead the public on this issue.” In a joint press conference, Senators Charles Schumer and Dianne Feinstein characterized Justice’s testimony as “misleading statement after misleading statement – deliberate misleading statements.” Mr. Schumer is also a lawyer, and we reckon he deliberately chose that word “deliberate” as a prelude to charging criminal deception and keeping the issue alive long enough to help elect more Senate Democrats next year. (He runs the Senate Democratic campaign committee.)

Senator Leahy himself issued a press release asserting that Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Mr. McNulty “failed to tell Congress the whole truth about this matter under oath.” Now that these Democrats have reached a verdict, they want to hold the trial.

If anyone had any doubt about this criminalization game, it should have vanished late Monday with Senator Leahy’s suggestion that Ms. Goodling’s decision not to testify implies that she’s done something wrong. “The American people are left to wonder what conduct is at the base of Ms. Goodling’s concern that she may incriminate herself in connection with criminal charges if she appears before the committee under oath,” Mr. Leahy said.

But the only thing the American people might wonder about is why the Senator, a lawyer who should know better, has seen fit to bully an individual for doing nothing more than invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Mr. Leahy’s public smear prompted a rebuttal from Ms. Goodling’s lawyer, John Dowd, who reminded the Senator that “the Fifth Amendment protects innocent persons who might otherwise be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances, as much as it protects those who may have done something wrong.”

Count Ms. Goodling’s silence as one more unintended consequence of the Scooter Libby case. Mr. Libby made the mistake of cooperating with the investigation into a leak he had nothing to do with, and he later found himself charged with perjury based on little more than conflicting memories of who said what and when. The prosecutor never even charged anyone for the leak that started it all.

There’s no apparent underlying crime in this “scandal” either, but we’ll bet more than one Democrat will soon be calling for a “special prosecutor” to investigate it nonetheless. The New York Times has already floated the idea, as usual. As Mr. Dowd put it in his letter to Mr. Leahy: “The potential for legal jeopardy for Ms. Goodling from even her most truthful and accurate testimony under these circumstances is very real. One need look no further than the recent circumstances and proceedings involving Lewis Libby.”

If the probing Senators want to know why lawyers can’t in good conscience advise their honest clients in government to answer Senate questions, they should look first to the bitter climate their own habits have created.[/i]