Further Evidence of Incompetence?

Another very helpful post from the Belmont Club – some of his correspondents with expertise in the area offer some explanations.

http://belmontclub.blogspot.com/2004/10/5-eyewitness-news-bunker-reader-n-who.html

Friday, October 29, 2004
The 5 EYEWITNESS NEWS Bunker

Reader N, who identifies himself as a retired EOD officer, amplifies his earlier comments on the contents of the bunker filmed by 5 EYEWITNESS NEWS:

[Reader N note] "Yes, it could have been RDX, HMX or any number of 1.1D explosives. It is difficult to see as they were filming inside the bunker and were dependant on the light coming through the door. I believe that the number 239 right next to the 1.1D placard raises serious issues with the position stated by Mr. David Kay. It could very well be that the Iraqi Army, largely trained in the old days by the Brit’s, utilized the UN system of identifying and storing ordnance/explosives. The 239 number could have been placed on the drum by the manufacturer as well. We know the French have supplied them with ordnance and the French utilize the UN system! The UN number 239 is nitro starch, a rather slow detonation speed of 16,000 fps. This makes it a good choice for blasting, a filler for ordnance, or a booster for other slower explosive charges like ANFO( Ammonium Nitrate Fuel Oil).

If they had these huge quantities of HMX and RDX, why does this clip from channel 5 also show boosters and dynamite in the same bunker? These numbers quoted by the IAEA for the HMX and RDX are so large you would have entire bunkers filled with nothing but HMX and RDX.

If per the clip, it was dynamite (and not TNT or wrapped nitro starch as I previously stated); I can't imagine why anyone would place dynamite with any of your other explosives, especially not an expensive and IAEA monitored explosive like RDX and HDX. Dynamite needs constant attention, especially in hot climates. The nitroglycerin will leech out of the stick and form highly dangerous crystals. Dynamite must be constantly rotated to keep it from leeching. If I were an IAEA inspector, I wouldn't want to go into a bunker in Iraq where I knew dynamite was stored with the HMX, if you know what I mean! Leeching dynamite is a large enough problem in this country, but Iraq with the heat and questionable maintenance issues?

Boosters, why would boosters be placed in the same bunker with HMX? HMX and RDX certainly don't need boosters. Every time I wanted a boosting charge for blasting I would have to violate the IAEA seal to get at the booster charges. What was described as boosters on the film and what I saw was something that one would utilize for blasting purposes. Boosters are placed inside something like Ammonium Nitrate which detonates at 3,300 to 8,200 FPS (See the below link) and is utilized for blasting. Boosters contain things like Pentolite which detonates at 24,500fps. I think that what we may be looking at on that channel 5 clip is a bunker filled with explosives that are most commonly utilized for boosting other explosives for blasting purposes and/or just straight explosives more commonly utilized for blasting or fillers for ordnance.

It's one heck of a coincidence that the number 239 is right next to that 1.1D placard; 239 is the UN symbol for nitro starch; and this 1.1D placard 239 is shown in the clip in a bunker with other obvious booster charges!" [End Reader N note]

His main points then are:

* the material is visually ambiguous and identifying it as HDX is inconsistent with the labeling, at least in his opinion

* the other material in bunker appears to be non-UN controlled explosives and he wonders why these are also behind UN seal

The gist of the argument against is whether an ambiguous substance found together with ordinary explosive should be identified as HDX. The main arguments for its identification as HDX is the presence of the UN seal and David Kay’s identification of the material as such. The presence of the UN seal, assuming it is genuine is two-edged however, considering the presence of ordinary explosive behind it.

UPDATE:

More from reader N, who was an EOD officer.

[Reader N note] "Additional information on the Channel 5 clip concerning the IAEA HMX explosives. The number 239 next to the 1.1 D placard on the drums is very difficult to explain away. Storing boosters (other explosives) with IAEA monitored RDX and HMX behind sealed doors doesn’t pass the common sense test. Why would anyone place useable explosives (the boosters) behind a door that they can’t enter. They wouldn’t do it. Explosive items like the boosters are highly valued items in that part of the world. In the U. S. and the Western world one might say just throw those other explosives in with the IAEA monitored RDX and HMX, we don’t really need them now. I don’t see them mingling these explosives which for all practicable purposes would be written off…

Concerning safety and storage compatibility, I just wonder if the IAEA might not have dictated to the Iraqis that NO other explosive items be stored with the RDX and HMX explosives. Compatibility and safety issues were huge problems for our soldiers in Bosnia who were entering explosive bunkers where various explosives can’t be stored with other explosive items. A worst case example that occurred in Bosnia was storing blasting caps (primary explosives for initiating a charges) in the same vicinity as the detonating explosives (secondary explosives). It is dangerous business entering into an ordnance bunker not knowing what is contained in that bunker which raises another issue.

The IAEA must have a list of all ordnance contained within a IAEA monitored explosive bunker! Explosive items have a shelf life and some need to be destroyed as they become dangerous with age. Why would the IAEA seal off a bunker that contains other explosive items not monitored by the IAEA and not be knowledgeable of all the items in the bunker for safety purposes?" [End Reader N note]

[quote]BostonBarrister wrote:

This is the exact problem with this whole line of argument.

OF COURSE it must be reconciled. Either that, or one of the sources must be wrong. This is simply logic when you are dealing with a seeming paradox.

However, the ABB crowd just wants to blame everything on Bush, irrespective of whether anything actually went wrong. This goes well beyond this little incident, and encompasses a whole arm of the Kerry strategy. And people hate Bush so much they buy into it hook, line and sinker without bothering to stop and think for a moment.
[/quote]

Perhaps my wording was off. It must be reconciled in the sense that the truth ought to be uncovered. My jab at you, BB, was that you must personally reconcile it to the degree that Bush can’t be responsible at all.

It is true that the ABB crowd’s first reaction is to pin it all on Bush. I am, admittedly, a proud member of the ABB crowd. However, instances like this one in question, I don’t believe can be blamed solely on the president. He’s not a micromanager and I understand this. However, it just MIGHT be indicative of the rush to war, the failure to consider all aspects, etc.

[quote]Right Side Up wrote:

Perhaps my wording was off. It must be reconciled in the sense that the truth ought to be uncovered. My jab at you, BB, was that you must personally reconcile it to the degree that Bush can’t be responsible at all.

It is true that the ABB crowd’s first reaction is to pin it all on Bush. I am, admittedly, a proud member of the ABB crowd. However, instances like this one in question, I don’t believe can be blamed solely on the president. He’s not a micromanager and I understand this. However, it just MIGHT be indicative of the rush to war, the failure to consider all aspects, etc.

[/quote]

RSU:

I’m in disagreement with the way people go about making their criticisms. I think it’s necessary to have realistic expectations concerning the war, meaning that there will be things that go wrong. Just look at your military history, and you will see that both in terms of lives lost and being surprised by conditions, Iraq ranks far below conflicts such as WWII, the Civil War, etc.

Look at tactical failures, such as Okinawa, that cost, in a few weeks time, around 30 times the losses that we have suffered in the entirety of the Iraq conflict. It was a pyrrhic victory, and likely led directly to the use of the atomic bomb on the Japanese mainland.

The people of the North were appalled at the losses suffered early on in the Civil War. In fact, if you go back and look at your military and political history (I know, it’s an un-P.C. topic, and not nearly as interesting as studying the daily lives of the proletariat in that period), you will see that Lincoln would likely have been defeated for re-election had it not been for Grant and Sherman’s victory at Shenandoah. Lincoln had already begun drawing up a transition plan so that there could be a smooth transition of leadership in war time.

I know, I know – this conflict isn’t WWII or the Civil War. But it is a war, and it’s important to think of it as a war. In all honesty, if we would have been less humane, and had less care about military casualties on the Iraqi side, let alone civilian casualties, we wouldn’t be having this problem right now. Would you have preferred that course of action? In Germany after WWII, when we were occupying that country, we still had problems with our soldiers being attacked after several years of occupation – and that was after the German fighting-age men had been decimated in WWII, and the population had been further decimated by battles and fire-bombing campaigns. If we had killed more Iraqi soldiers, instead of allowing their retreat – especially the hard-core Baathists – we would be having much less of a problem with insurgents. Honestly, would this have been your preferred strategy?

No one is going to claim that in making certain choices, the Bush Administration did not create certain problems for themselves after achieving the fall of Hussein’s government. However, you need to also recognize they averted other problems, and also that some of their plans made sense, given their intelligence information (for instance, they were surprised by the degradation of the basic infrastructure – things like water, power, sewers, etc.) that had taken place during the sanctions, as Saddam diverted Oil-for-Food money to his palaces and to bribes instead of in keeping up the country.

To circle up, there are plenty of valid criticisms to be made of the Iraq occupation. However, one needs to keep things in perspective, especially w/r/t cherry-picking negative items and viewing them out of the context of the whole situation.

I don’t want you to think I’m a military expert either – just someone with an interest in history.

I’m not arguing a dichotomy. There were other options other than killing everyone in sight. However, even with the enlarged number of troops on the ground that was proposed by some of the Pentagon brass (notably Shakishevelli (sp?)), we would still be seeing this insurgency, for a few reasons.

Firstly, when our soldiers are serving a policing role rather than fighting role, they are basically targets. More of them would mean more targets - at least up to a certain level. This is especially true in the urban area. This is why Bush wants to transition those types of duties largely to Iraqis, and this is why the insurgents are so dead-set against that transition – they will lose a whole lot of support among the population when they are solely killing Iraqis rather than occupying soldiers.

Secondly, even with the number of troops they were suggesting, we still wouldn’t have had enough to completely seal the borders or control the city – especially if they were regular troops and not trained for police-type patrols or border-patrols.

Thirdly, with more troops but still following the minimize-enemy-casualties strategy, we would have had the same two options: let the enemy soldiers run away to fight another day (which we did), or find somewhere to house them all as prisoners while we used troops to guard them and slowed down the advance.

Aside from that, with a larger force we would have necessarily needed more time to mass forces, and would have had to move forward more slowly, as running ahead of our supply lines would have been more problematic. Having to move more slowly would have given time to Saddam to booby trap his oil fields, bridges, water, etc, and create a huge humanitarian crisis for the Iraqi citizenry.

To the extent that one can surprise the other side after massing 150,000 troops on their border, we did – at least the evidence points that way. The advancing soldiers found lots of booby traps – basically bombs with fuses and blasting caps – that were not set off at the oil fields, bridges, water facilities, electricity plants, etc. I’ve seen it speculated that this is because Saddam didn’t think we would advance until we could pincer down from the north, which route was closed off to us because Turkey wouldn’t give its permission to use its territory. So some of our troops that had been stationed up north and were supposed to go down from the north didn’t participate in the initial advance. Saddam was surprised – however, this diplomatic setback was problematic because those forces were supposed to advance through Falluja and some of those cities, controlling them on the way – had they been able to go through Turkey, those cities likely wouldn’t be a problem (but who knows where the insurgents would have set up camp then?).

Basically, all I’m saying is that one needs to think about why the decisions that were actually made were made, rather than just sitting back and seeing what actually went wrong. Remember that we have no idea how many problems didn’t arise because of the strategic choices that were made (i.e. the humanitarian crisis that was warned of but did not arise due to surprising Saddam). If you go back and look at all the disasterous scenarios that were warned of but did not come to pass, think, “Why didn’t those happen,” and then keep that in mind when judging the things that did occur that look like horrific mistakes in hindsight.

BB: That was, in my opinion, one of the best posts I’ve ever read by you. And that’s saying something.

The really sad part of all this is that people will be making a choice on Nov 2 based on what someone is telling them instead of finding out what the truth is. They will let some unlearned, uneducated person lead them into making a choice without thinking about the outcome of their choice. This election year should have educated a lot of people as to how we are informed by our news media about situations. The one thing to remember when a story breaks is give it time for all the facts to come out and in time you will learn the real truth. But as it was written “they be blind leaders of the blind and if the blind lead the blind they will both fall into the ditch”. Vote smart!!

BB:

That is a fine summary of what has occurred in Iraq. Also, an accurate look from an historical perspective!